

HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN ORISSA

VOL. I

CHIEF EDITOR

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EDITOR

SUSHIL CHANDRA DE

**HISTORY OF
THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT
IN ORISSA**

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Vol. I

(1757—1856)

Chief Editor

Dr. HAREKRUSHNA MAHTAB

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SUSHIL CHANDRA DE

State Committee for Compilation of
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FOREWORD

The rebellion which took place in 1857 is euphemistically described by the British Historians as the Sepoy Mutiny. But in fact it was a rebellion on a large scale planned and executed by a very large number of persons who were dissatisfied with the British administration of the time. The rebellion was confined mainly to Northern India, particularly the provinces of Bihar., U. P. and Delhi. When the causes of the rebellion are studied from the point of view of history, it is doubtful if the rebellion can in fact be called as the First War of Independence. First of all, the current of nationalism which swept over Europe about the same time in the wake of Industrial Revolution did not then reach the shores of India. There was no trace of nationalism anywhere during that period of history of India. Internal strife was the order of the day. Many foreign powers were competing with one another to take advantage of the acute internal strife in India and to establish their sovereignty. Ultimately the British won the race. They introduced a kind of administration with which they were conversant in their own country. As a result of the introduction of the new system of administration, a large number of persons enjoying vested interests for a long period were adversely affected and that was the main cause of discontent which expressed itself in a regular rebellion.

Leaving aside the sentiment of nationalism, even the the religious sentiment was not a strong factor in those days. But it had its own force amongst the common masses out of whom recruitment was made for various regiments. The discontented persons appealed to the religious sentiment of the Indian soldiers in order to make the rebellion a success. Assuming that the British had gone slow and had not disturbed violently the then existing customs and interests, it is doubtful if the rebellion or the 'Sepoy Mutiny' as it is called, could ever have taken place. From this point of view, many eminent historians would not like to call the rebellion of 1857 as a 'War of Independence.' But if nationalism is to be defined as the sentiment of enlightened self-interest, then the rebellion which took place as a result of the accumulated discontent

of a large number of individuals disgruntled on their individual grounds may well be described as a war on the power which created that discontent amongst so many individuals of influence.

Had not Lord Dalhousie introduced the policy of Escheat many prominent actors in the drama of 1857 would not have appeared on the stage. But the fact is that a large number of individuals were adversely affected by the policy introduced by the foreign power and they joined together to have their own individual interests served by declaring war on the power that was. Feudal loyalty of the common people to their lords was so great that a large number of common people got involved in the rebellion in the interest and at the behest of their lords. This aspect of the question also should be taken into account while discussing the history of that period at this distance of time.

All these are, however, academic discussions. The broad fact which has to be taken into account is that a spirit of revolt grew during that period and that was successfully suppressed. In the subsequent periods of history, when nationalism grew and became stronger and stronger, advantage was taken of the romantic remembrance of the fights of 1857 which were current in many parts of the country in the form of legends and folk songs in order to rouse the spirit of revolt against the foreign rule. In this way the history of 1857 has its own importance.

All the causes of the Rebellion of 1857 in Northern India had already appeared in Orissa soon after the British took possession of it in 1803. The administration they introduced deprived a large number of persons, to whom the common people owed feudal loyalty, of their long-enjoyed rights and privileges. On that account a series of rebellions took place all over the territory which is now known as Orissa. By the time the rebellion of Northern India took place in 1857, the British had completely entrenched themselves on the soil of Orissa by suppressing ruthlessly all rebellions that took place during the first quarter of the 19th century. Each State has its own story to tell. Wherever the rights and privileges were suddenly taken away by force, there was resistance either organised or disorganised. In Orissa, however, there was

organised resistance on a large scale against the British throughout the first quarter of the 19th century. This resistance was ruthlessly suppressed and the people were cowed down by the time the rebellion of 1857 took place. That is the reason why Orissa as a whole does not come into the picture of what is now called as the first War of Independence. When the history of the first War of Independence is being written, Orissa has to tell her story of the first quarter of the 19th century which has its own historical importance and gives the background of the events which followed later on.

The real fight for freedom actually took place in 1920 when, under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership, non-violent non-cooperation was declared. That was the culmination of the process which started in the first quarter of the 19th century and temporarily ended in 1857. Historically speaking, the first half of the 19th century was full of resistance to the British everywhere. The next half of the century was peaceful period in which nationalism had an opportunity to grow. It is Gandhiji who gave concrete shape to the growing nationalism in the form of non-violent non-cooperation. If we look upon the movement of non-violent non-cooperation as the full-blossomed lotus on the surface of serene water of nationalism, we have to treat the movements of resistance which took place in the first half of the 19th century as the roots of the plant deep down in the dark corner of history, full of mud, strife and corruption.

An attempt has been made in these four volumes to throw a ray of light in that dark region. The four volumes presented to the public by the eminent authors—Sri Sushil Chandra De, Sri Prabhat Mukherji, Sri Sudhakar Patnaik and Sri Ghanshyam Das, must be regarded as valuable contribution to the current history of India. I would humbly urge upon all readers of these volumes to critically study the history of that period and try to find out where lay the pitfalls and why the movements of resistance were started and why they did not succeed. That study should warn all of us against the future. The study of history is as much for drawing inspiration from the past as for guarding against the future. India is now a new nation reborn after hundreds of years on the 15th of

August 1947. She had played glorious roles in her past life. Now she has to play a distinctive role in the world in her new life. Let the study of the history of the past enable us to make the future of the country much more glorious than ever in the past.

Harekrushna Mahtab

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The Freedom Movement in Orissa passed through three well marked phases. The first phase (1803-1885) witnessed the foundation of British rule in Orissa and armed resistance of the people against the imposition of a system of Government that was highly prejudicial to their interests. The second phase (1885-1920) saw the birth of National institutions in the wake of the establishment of the Indian National Congress. This resulted in growth of political consciousness among the people who carried on agitation for securing civil rights in a constitutional way under the guidance of the Congress. The long standing grievance of the Oriyas about unification of all Oriya-speaking tracts under one administration emerged into the lime light of public attention at this stage. So, vigorous agitation was carried on for fulfilment of this aspiration of the people. This constitutes a special feature of Orissa's activities during the second phase. The National activities, in the third phase (1920-1947), relates mainly to the Congress Movement under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi leading to the achievement of Independence of India.

Though the Freedom Movement in Orissa, in broad sense, begins with the establishment of the British rule in 1803, the struggle of the Oriyas for liberation starts from the year 1568 when they lost their independence. Thereafter, they remained successively under the Afghans, Mughals and the Marathas during the years, 1568-1803. In this period, specially under the Muslim regime, Oriyas were subjected to much hardship, oppression and exploitation. They had to struggle against heavy odds. Thus, the story of the struggle of the Oriyas under the British regime is but a continuation of the same under the Muslim and Maratha rule. Though the complexion of the resistance movement under foreign rule was completely changed, and it assumed an Indian, rather than the local, character, we can, by no means, overlook the history preceeding the establishment of foreign domination, if we wish to judge the nature and scope of the Freedom Movement in Orissa, or for that matter, in any other part of India, in its true perspective. Hence, we have to discuss, in short, the condition of the

people of Orissa during the period, 1568-1803, before we take up the History of the Freedom Movement under the British rule.

LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE OF ORISSA

As we have said before, the year 1568 marked the end of independence of Orissa. Mukundadeva, the last king of Orissa, who ruled from 1560-68, was the master of the eastern coastal strip from the Ganges to the Godavari. He was a strong monarch, and his power was a source of anxiety to the neighbouring Muslim kingdoms of Bengal and Golconda.

The relation between Bengal and Orissa was very strained mainly for two reasons. Sulaiman Karrāni's growing power and the prosperity of Bengal had raised apprehensions in the mind of Akbar, who, for purpose of suppressing him, formed an alliance with Mukundadeva. Secondly, Ibrahim Sur, who was looked upon as an enemy by Sulaiman, was granted asylum in Orissa¹. So, Sulaiman was seeking an opportunity to wreak his vengeance on Mukundadeva who, however, forestalled him and made an expedition into Bengal, before the former could execute his plan. He advanced as far as Satgaon-Triveni near Hugli. He probably expected, or there was an understanding, that Akbar would launch an attack simultaneously. But, as Akbar remained occupied with the siege of Chitor in 1567-68, he could not send an expedition to Bengal. Sulaiman did not let this opportunity to invade Orissa slip out of his hands. While Mukundadeva was relaxing in the north, Sulaiman sent an army through Mayurbhanj to attack Cuttack. Mukundadeva, on receipt of this news, dispatched a contingent of army under two of his officers to drive out the Afghan invaders. But these officers turned traitors, and rose against Mukundadeva who had, therefore, to conclude peace with the Sultan of Bengal. Then he marched against the traitors but was himself killed during fight. Ramachandra Bhanj of Sarangarh who seized the throne after Mukundadeva's death was killed by the Afghans².

This is, in short, the history of the downfall of Orissa. It may be noted that at the time of Afghan conquest, Orissa was still at the

1. Sarkar, *History of Bengal* (H. B.), Vol. II, p. 183.

2. *Ibid*; Mukherji, *Gajapati Kings of Orissa*, pp. 112.

height of her power and prosperity. But it is surprising that such a powerful people could be brought into complete submission with one stroke of blow. No organised attempt on any formidable scale was made after the conquest to curb the invaders. The first shock of conquest was, of course, too much for the people, who, for centuries, had remained independent and extended their sway over wide regions. The conquest, followed by acts of profanation, vandalism and barbarity perpetrated by the Afghans under the leadership of Kālāpāhār with fanatical zeal must have stunned the people, and in the circumstances, they could hardly be expected to think of any organised resistance. But, it is natural to expect that they would have regained their balance of mind with lapse of time, and tried to organise themselves for the liberation of their kingdom from the hands of the conquerors. But history does not record any such united and organised attempt. On the contrary, the people of Orissa seem to have reconciled themselves to the fate and made no serious attempt to recover their independence. During the years 1574-76, the Afghans were hard pressed by the Mughals in Bihar-Bengal region, and at last, they had to withdraw to Orissa for their last stand against the Mughals. This was the most opportune time when they could be hit back by the Oriyas. But this golden opportunity was not availed, though the people, in the mean time, had got sufficient respite to get over the first shock of conquest and muster their strength to make a bid for the liberation of their kingdom.

This leads to the presumption that the shock of conquest had completely upset the people and broken down their morale. The reign of terror that followed the conquest further unnerved them and gave them no respite to organise themselves for any sort of formidable resistance. But, the sudden downfall of Orissa is mainly attributable to the vitiation of the political atmosphere that started from the time of Kapilendradeva who treacherously captured the throne of Orissa during the absence of his master, Bhānudeva IV, from the capital³. From this time onwards till the time of Mukundadeva, the evils of dissension, treachery and jealousy made their appearance in the political sphere of Orissa. After Kapilendra, Purusottamadeva captured the throne in utter disregard to the claims of the rightful heir, Hamvīra, who, in his turn, sought the help of the Bahmani Sultan against

Purusottamadeva.⁴ Govind Vidyādhara's treachery at the time of Hussain Shah's invasion, the murder of two children of Pratāprudra,⁵ assassination of Narasingha Jenā and Raghurām Chhotrāi by Mukunda-deva⁶ and the treachery of two of his officers referred to above are glaring instances of the evils that had long been working to bring about the downfall which, otherwise, appears so sudden.

The want of a military genius, like Kapilendradeva or Mukundadeva, at this critical juncture of nation's life just after the conquest of Orissa was another reason why the Oriyas could not unite in an attempt to overthrow the invaders. The political structure of Orissa that had been disintegrated by internal jealousy and treachery was held together by a strong central authority. Sooner that authority was removed, the whole structure fell to pieces. Had any of the Chiefs of Orissa, like the Raja of Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar or Khurda, come forward to take the lead and attempted to bring all together, the liberation of Orissa could perhaps have been possible.

These are the main factors that led to the downfall of Orissa in 1568 and her complete fading away from the political arena thereafter.

Now we may discuss, at some length, the effects of the conquest on the people of Orissa and their struggle for liberation.

The Afghan invaders under their commander, Kālāpāhār, perpetrated characteristic barbarity and vandalism wherever they went. The people of Orissa who had never had the taste of Muslim conquest were practically overwhelmed when, all of a sudden, they were subjected to extreme severity of the conquest. The people in general were so ignorant about the character and nature of the Muslim invaders that they asked, "What sort of creatures are these Musalman people ? How could they have powers to hurt this deity ?," when the reports of Muslim invasion spread in the city of Puri. People of that city were so lulled into security by centuries of freedom from foreign attack that they disbelieved the first reports that the Muslims were coming. They could not imagine that the invaders could do harm to their gods. According to Niamatullah, Sulaiman pulled down the temple

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 48-49.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 108.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 110.

of Jagannāth, and ordered the image of Krishna which was decorated in elegant and beautiful ways and whose limbs were made up of red gold, and pair of eyes formed of Badakshani ruby to be broken into fragments and cast into gutter. Seven other gold images of various shapes lying near and around this town each of which weighed five Akbari maunds were brought away by the raiders. Continuing the narrative Niamatullah says, "One of the strange occurrences which came to my ear from many god-fearing Moslems who had accompanied Myan Sulaiman in this campaign was the fact that when he issued orders for pillage of Udisa, there was hardly any body who had not collected one or two gold idols and there was scarcely any idol which weighed less than a maund."

These facts go to confirm our presumption that the people of Orissa who had been living for centuries in peace and plenty under their kings were completely swept off their feet by the sudden conquest and the shocking acts of sacrilege and barbarity that followed immediately after. Thus, the immediate effects of the conquest were shock and horror psychologically, and pillage and plunder materially, leading to complete disintegration of the morale of the people and disorganisation of the political set-up of the kingdom. The people, in the circumstances, became more concerned with their own safety than any thing else. Similarly, with the liquidation of the central power, the subordinate Orissan Chiefs took hasty steps to secure their personal interests. Thus, an organised attempt in the circumstances was not possible.

AFGHAN RULE IN ORISSA

As already stated, Orissa was conquered by Sulaiman Karrāni in 1568 A. D. He died in 1572. His successor, Bāyazid was murdered soon after, and Daud, the younger son of Sulaiman, was raised to the throne. He was a foolish hot-headed youngman sunk deep in sensual pleasures. Puffed up with vanity he declared himself independent and issued coins in his name. This attracted the attention of the Mughal Emperor, Akbar, who sent Munim Khan against the Afghans in Bihar & Bengal. Subsequently, he himself conducted the campaign of Bihar

in 1574 A. D. The Afghans, after their defeat in Bihar and Bengal, fled away to Orissa for shelter. Thus the arena of battles shifted from Bihar-Bengal to Orissa much to the misery of the people.

When the Afghans retreated to Orissa, they were pursued by Munim Khan and Raja Todar Mal. The first battle between the Mughals and the Afghans took place in 1575 at Tukaroi, nine miles to the south-east of Dantan and 3 miles to the west of Nanjura. After a keen contest the Mughals won the day, and Dāud retreated to Cuttack suffering great loss in men and money. The Mughal army followed him at his heels. Dāud at last made his submission to Munim Khan.⁸

Munim Khan died shortly after the victory. He was succeeded by Khan-i-Jahan (Hussain Quli Beg). Raja Todar Mal was his lieutenant. On hearing the death of Munim Khan, Daud was emboldened to rise again; he reoccupied Bhadrak, Jalesvara and the whole of Bengal. The Mughal army again moved against him; Jahan Khan, the Governor of Orissa was killed in action, and Dāud was taken prisoner and beheaded (1576).

After Dāud, Qutlu Lohani, one of the leading Afghan nobles, ruled in Orissa till 1592. Akbar sent Khan-i-Azam as Governor of Bengal in 1582. Qutlu Lohani had occupied some portions of Bengal in the mean time. Though the Mughals tried to check his progress, no decisive action took place till 1590.

Man Singh, who was appointed as the Governor of Bihar in 1587, started for the conquest of Orissa in 1590. The advanced Mughal division suffered some loss in their first contact. But Qutlu Lohani died soon after. His *Wazir*, Khawajah Isa, set up Qutlu's son Nasir on the throne and made peace with the Mughals. One of the terms agreed upon was cession of Jagannāth temple and its surrounding districts to the Emperor.

But the peace was short-lived. Soon after Isa's death, the Afghans again defied the Mughal authority. So, Man Singh had to march again from Bihar in 1591. The first battle was fought near the Suvarnarekha in 1592 and the Afghans, after defeat, retreated towards Cuttack. The Mughals persued them. Cuttack fell into their hands without any resistance. The fort of Sarangarh where the Afghans had taken shelter was stormed and taken, and the Afghans were finally

dispersed. Khurda Raja who avoided to tender his submission had shut himself up in the Khurda Fort. But when he found that it was useless to avoid, he came out and waited on Man Singh (1593). Thus the long-drawn fight between the Mughals and the Afghans came to an end.

The above facts are described in outline just to show what has already been stated that during the fight between the two powers Orissa became the main arena of battle. The condition of the people of Orissa, during those uncertain and troublesome days, can be better imagined than described.

Since the Afghan rule was of short duration and it was mostly spent in wars, no system of regular administration seems to have been established. But it appears certain that the people of Orissa had been extorted to the maximum extent to supply money and grains for the army of the Afghans.

MUGHAL RULE IN ORISSA

Details of the Mughal rule in Orissa is beyond the scope of this work; only a few facts throwing light on the condition of the people of Orissa under the Mughals will be stated briefly to show how the people fared under the Mughal rule.

During the *Subahdarship* of Hāshim Kban (1607-11)⁹ one Rajput named Raja Keshodas Maru entered into the temple of Jagannath on the plea of pilgrimage and barricaded himself inside the temple. Purusottamadeva, the Raja of Khurda, tried his best to break into the temple but failed. So he was compelled to make peace on terms which were very humiliating to the dignity of the Raja of Khurda. The Mughal Emperor, Jehangir, rewarded Raja Keshodas's bravery by promotion¹⁰

We may next pass on to the *Subahdarship* of Raja Kalyan Mal, son of Raja Todar Mal (1611-1617). He too persecuted Purusottamdeva and compelled him to agree to the most dishonourable terms.¹¹ If the Hindus in Mughal service could show such fanatical zeal, we can imagine what the Muslims would have done.

9. Banerji, *History of Orissa*, (H O.) 11, p. 231.

10. H O. Vol. II, pp. 34-35.

11. H B. Vol II, p. 231.

The next *Subahdar*, Mukarram Khan (1617), invaded the territory of Khurda and annexed it to the Mughal empire. The Raja fled to Rajmahendri. He was left only with a small portion of his former possession and was reduced to the status of Zamindar.¹²

It was alleged against Baquar Khan (1628-32) that he collected the zamindars of Orissa together and then threw them into prison in order to extort money.¹³

Ihtisham Khan (1659-60), the first *Subahdar* under Aurangzib arrested many prominent zamindars of Orissa.¹⁴

There is a graphic description in *Muraqat-i-Hassan* of the condition of Orissa when Khan-i-Dauran (1660-67) took over charge of *Subahdarship*. He writes, 'All zamindars are refractory owing to slack rule of my predecessor. Zamindars on the further side of Kathjuri have refused tribute and declared war against him. Krishna Bhanj of Hariharapur, the leading Zamindar of this province during the interregnum spread his power over the country from Medinipur to Bhadrak, a distance of 50 or 60 *Kos* seizing the property of the inhabitants and way-farers and severely beating the people. The fort of Machhora or Bachhara (Panchira?) was wrested from Shuja's men by Lakhminārayan Bhanj, the Raja of Keonjhar during the time of disorder. x x x'¹⁵

From the above, it appears, the *Rajas* of Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar had raised their heads against the Mughals, but for want of any organised effort on all-Orissa basis they were reduced separately by Khan-i-Dauran. Krishna Bhanja was treacherously killed when he went to meet the *Subahdar*. Relating to this incident Khan-i-Dauran says: "When I reached Jaleswar which is near his zamindari, Krishna Bhanj saw me after wasting a month on the pretext of choosing a lucky day (for the visit) and offered false excuses (for his late disloyal conduct'. During the enquiry and discussion for settling the amount of revenue to be paid by him, he drew his dagger and rushed towards me. His companions too, unsheathed their swords and made repeated charges. The grace of the Emperor saved my life. We slew Krishna

12, *HO*. II, p. 36.

13, *Ibid*, p. 39.

14, *Ibid*, p. 41.

15. *J BORS*. Vol. II, p. 159.

Bhanj and many of his men. The rest fled. Some Chiefs, such as Udand, the zamindar of Narasinghpur, Chhatreshwar Dhol, the zamindar of Ghatsila and Harichandan, the zamindar of Nilgiri throw away their weapons and delivered themselves up as prisoners”.

“The relatives of the slain Rajah (of Mayurbharj) raised disturbances molesting ryots. So I started for Hariharpur to punish them and halted at Remuna on the frontier of his dominion. His brother, Jay Bhanj submitted, begged pardon, - - and begged the *tika* of the Rajship and zamindari for the son. I agreed, and then started to punish the rebels of near Katak.”¹⁶

Another version of the incident is given in the contemporary records of the Dutch factories in India. According to it; “The Great Raja Kristna Bens with two or three other important chiefs and several thousands of attendants, came to wait upon the new Governnor, Khan Dauran, in order to do homage to him as the Emperor’s representative whereupon they were suddenly attackd with the connivance, it was thought, of the Governor—and a frightful slaughter ensued. The result was a rebellion.” (Foster. *The English factories in India*, 1660-61.) This shows that the incident was deliberately distorted to lay the blame on the Raja of Mayurbahnja for the incident that ended in a bloody slaughter.

Next came the turn of Khurda Rajah who had also taken a defiant attitude. Khan-i-Dauran describes him as “one who is the leading zamindar of the country, whose orders are obeyed by all other zamindars, and whom all other zamindars of this country worship like god and disobedience of whose order they regard as great sin.” Mukundadeva, the Raja of Khurda, duly waited on the Mughal *subahdar* accompanied by his *paiks* and other subordinate zamindars. But as the *subahdar* was confined to bed for two months, the zamindars again caused disorder. Raja Mukundadeva himself “caused lawlessness”. After recovery Khan-i-Dauran started to punish the rebels. He writes; “On the 16th February (1661) I arrived near the forts of Kaluparah, Mutri, Karkahi Khurdiha and (three) others, seven forts close to each other on the side of a high hill, An assault was ordered next day. When our

16. *Ibid*, pp. 160-61.

troops appeared near the forts, the enemy in a numberless host consisting of *paiks* and infantry, both *Khudshan* (?) and zamindars of Banki and Ranpur and other *Bhumiahs* and *Khandails*, offered battle."

"Our men slew many of them and carried their trenches at the foot of the hill and after repeated charges entered their (main?) lines. The enemy fought with matchlocks, arrows, *khandahs*, *sablis*, *duars*, *dhukans*, *sintis* etc., but being unable to resist fled away with their families. A great victory unequalled by that of any former *Subahdar* was won. The seven forts were captured. Two or three days were spent in settling the conquered districts and appointing *thanahs*".¹⁷

Continuing the narrative further he says; "On the 20th February I left for the conquest of Khurda, the ancestral home of Mukund Dev situated in the midst of a dense jungle and lofty hills. On the 23rd I encamped a mile from Khurda. The Raja had fled from it and we seized vast amount of booty and many prisoners at his capital. During the last fifty years no other *Subhadar* had reached these places. They were all conquered by my army and the rustics became the food of the pitiless sword. I gave Mukund Dev's throne to his younger brother Bhunarbal". Khan-i-Dauran halted at Khurda for some days. Boasting over his deed, he further continues, "All lawlessmen are now waiting on me with every mark of abject submission. The Zamindar of Banki and Khand Narendra (the Zamindar of Ranpur) have sent trusty agents to arrange for their interview with me. The path for collecting revenue has been opened in all places and mahals. Raja Mukund Dev who had been ill advised enough to defy my authority and withhold tribute, finding no way of escape from our heroes, saw me penitently on the 18th March. The rebel Burab (Pattnaik) too has done the same." Mukund Dev was afterwards restored to throne.¹⁸

Next, Khan-i-Dauran marched against Lakshminarayan Bhanj, the Raja of Keonjhar who had wrested the fort of Machhra from Shuja's men. His territory was ravaged and the fort was recovered.

17. *J B O R S.*, Vol. II, pp. 161-62,

18. *Ibid*, pp. 162-63.

Khand Narendra, the Zamindar of Ranpur and the Zamindars of Malhipara¹⁹ and Dunparah,²⁰ who had never before waited upon any *Subahdar* saw Khan-i-Dauran and agreed to pay the tribute. "The Zamindars on the further side of the Kathjuri who had withheld tribute and fought the Faujdar, Saiyid Sher Khan were defeated."

The Mughal faujdar of Maluh (Malud), on the southern frontier of Orissa suppressed the rebellion of Pitam, the Zamindar of Andhiari²¹ and Kumar Guru the Zamindar of Maluh.²²

The Zamindari of Kanika was conquered by Mian Muhammed Jan, and the Raja was driven to a fort named Rika. "In order to besiege him there, *chhamp* boats of the river Mahanadi and larger boats too were procured by Mahammed Jan with the help of Gopali, the Zamindar of Kujang".

Rao Tara (Rautray), the Zamindar of Kuyilu Madhupur and Gopali of Kujang were thrown into prisons for heavy arrears of revenue. The fort of Kularh (Kulada)²³ was also taken and its Zamindar Srichandan was thrown into prisons. Chhut Rai (Chhota Ray) of Kalikota²⁴ (Khalikota) was punished by imprisonment of his sons for the fault of having erected a fort in the jungle with evil intentions.²⁵

As the result of these operations the Imperial authority was firmly established. The sign of awakening that had manifested itself in the assertive acts of Orissan Chiefs was ruthlessly suppressed by the Muslim rulers; consequently it died out very soon.

Taking advantage of the chaos and confusion that prevailed during the illness of Shah Jahan the Oriya Chiefs tried to strengthen their positions and assert themselves in defiance of the ruling authority as evident from the facts quoted above. Of them, the Raja of Mayurbhanj

19. Malipada in Khurda Sub-Division.

20. Dompada in Banki Sub-Division of the Cuttack District.

21. Adjoins Manikpatna near the Chilika Lake.

22. Malud between Bejrakot and Parikud near the Chilika Lake.

23. A village of Ghumsar Taluk in the Ganjam District.

24. A Zamindari in the Ganjam District.

25. *J B O R S.*, Vol. II, pp. 164-65.

felt so strong that he extended his arms into the Mughal territory. As already stated, the Raja of Keonjhar wrested one fort from the possession of the Mughal officer. Others exhibited their spirit of defiance by stopping payment of rent. This is probably the first instance of resistance offered by the Oriya Chiefs after the loss of independence but what is most conspicuous in these attempts is the utter lack of cohesion or co-ordination among the chiefs. Had there been a well concerted and properly organised action against the Mughals during the chaotic period of the war of succession following the illness of Shah Jahan, there was every chance of recovery of Orissa's freedom. As we have noted above, the genius of leadership was sadly lacking at this critical period when it was indispensably required in the interest of the nation. Had the Raja of Mayurbhanj acted in collaboration with the Raja of Khurda in the south, the whole history would have changed. But it was not to be. Each tried to act independently and do whatever his means permitted. The result was that the Chiefs were dealt with separately and brought to submission one by one. Thus another opportunity for the recovery of independence by the Oriya chiefs was lost.

Another thing particularly noticeable in this connection is that there was no mass rising in the *Mughal-bandī* area in support of the *garhjat* chiefs who had risen in defiance of the Mughal authority. The common mass seemed to have reconciled themselves to their fates and let their Chiefs do whatever they could. The only encouraging feature of this movement is the manifestation of the first signs of awakening.

The *Muraqat* throws some light on the economic condition of Orissa under Khan-i-Dauran. The *Subahdar* could collect 15 lacs of rupees²⁶ within a short space of time of about one year despite the fact that he had to incur heavy expenses for suppression of the risings. The amount is said to be the accumulated revenue kept at Cuttack and the *parganas*. It is hardly expected that Shah Shuja who was in acute need of money on account of the wars he was involved in during 1657-60 would have left any revenue accumulated in the Cuttack treasury. Thus the amount was raised by Khan-i-Dauran. He must have also collected an equal amount for the expenses of the administration. This could only be possible under extreme extortion, because, under the Marathas or the early British regime, the annual gross assessment

²⁶. *History of Orissa*, Vol. II, p. 47.

amounted approximately to about 13 lacs of rupees. The net amount remitted to Nagpur under the Marathas amounted to about 6 lacs, according to Stirling.²⁷ Viewed against these facts, the net remittance of 15 lacs of rupees within a year by Khan-i-Dauran would certainly seem abnormal. This abnormality can only be explained by extraordinary methods of collection, which is, in other words, resorting to extortion. We reserve further comments on this matter for future when we will be dealing with the Mughal revenue administration.

Khan-i-Dauran was in Orissa upto 1667. Between the period 1668-1713 as many as 15 Governors were appointed in Orissa, some of them for very short durations.²⁸ we have very little details of the subahdarship during this period. However, some little light is thrown about Islamic activities of the rulers during the reign of Aurangzib. A Censor of public morals, or *muhtasib* was appointed in Orissa. Two *gazis* were also appointed to try cases of violation of cannon laws. Besides, Aurangzib ordered destruction of all idol houses, brick or clay, built within a short period of ten or twelve years. The Baladevji temple at Kendrapara was demolished and a mosque was erected on its site during Khan-i-Dauran's subahdarship. During the reign Divyasimha I, Aurangzib ordered Md. Sayed Mahmud of Bilgram to destroy the temple and idol of Jagannāth. Divyasimha was obliged to break one wooden image of a *Rāskhasa* and send the broken parts to the Emperor who was then at Bijapur.²⁹ It is quite likely that lots of Hindu deities might have been mutilated during this period of renewed iconoclasm and vandalism.

REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OF ORISSA UNDER THE MUGHALS.

Now we may turn our attention to the economic condition of the people of Orissa under the Mughal rule. Since the revenue administration determines, to a great extent, the economic condition of the people mainly dependent on agriculture, we have to briefly examine the system of assessment and collection of revenue under the Mughal regime in Orissa.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 244-45.

28. *H. B.*, Vol. II, p. 222.

29. *H. O.*, Vol. II, p. 60.

Unfortunately, we have very few facts and figures in this respect to form a clear idea about the Mughal revenue administration in Orissa, nor have we any means of ascertaining the average revenue of Orissa under her independent kings for a comparative study. However, the most reliable source of our information with regard to the revenue of Orissa under the Mughals is the *Ain-i-Akbari*. It is said that Raja Todar Mall³⁰ surveyed the whole of Orissa under the direct Mughal administration and assessed it accordingly. He divided Orissa into two parts, the *mughalbandi* area of plain land in the coastal region, and the *garhjat* area of hilly regions under the Oriya chiefs who were levied fixed annual tributes.

According to the *Ain-i-Akbari*³¹, the revenue of the three *sarkars* of Jaleswar, Bhadrak and Cuttack amounted to Rs. 40,04,331. This assessment, if it was based on the actual survey, might be taken as the normal revenue of Orissa under the Mughals. As it is expected that the assessment under the indigenous kings of Orissa would have been taken into account, we may reasonably presume that the revenue of Orissa under Akbar was nearabout that assessed under the independent Kings of Orissa prior to the establishment of the Muslim rule.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has brought to light some important facts relating to the Mughal administration of Orissa. The statement containing the revenue figures of Orissa for different years between 1594 to 1707 A. D. provides us with important materials relating to the revenue administration under the Mughal rule in Orissa.³² According to that statement the revenue of Orissa varied between Rs. 31,43,316. in the time of Akbar to Rs. 1,01,52,625, in 1695. Thus the highest amount of revenue of Orissa under the Mughals was 101 lacs, more than three times that in the time of Akbar. The figures from the

30. Stirling *An Account of Orissa Proper*, p. 32.

31. Jarret, *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, pp. 142-44. (There are two figures for the revenue of the *sarkas* of Jaleswar. They are; 50,52,737 *dams* equivalent to Rs. 1,26,318, and Rs. 50052737 *dams* equivalent to Rs. 11,25,000 at the rates 40 *dams* a rupee. In view of the facts that Jaleswar was a big *paraganz* of 28 mahals, and its revenue in the time of Shah Johan was Rs. 15,80,474, the latter figure, that is, 50052737 *dams* has been accepted as correct, vide also Firminger's *Fifth Report*, pp 451-55)

32. *J B O R S*, Vol. II, p. 342.

official sources, that is, the official returns for the years, 1690 and 1707, amounted to Rs. 35,70,500. It was probably the normal revenue of Orissa under the Mughals. Though the figures, Rs. 72,70,000, and Rs. 101,02,625, for the years 1665 and 1695 respectively appear quite inflated, they can not be discarded as totally untrue. Khan-i-Dauran was the *Subhdar* of Orissa in 1665. As already stated he could manage to send 15 lacs of rupees to the Emperor after meeting the expenses of expeditions against the defaulting zamindars all over Orissa in the first year of his *Subahdarship*. A very enthusiastic *Subahdar* as he was, his zealous persecution of the zamindars of Orissa might have yielded much more revenue than usual. Khan-i-Dauran, in a letter to his *diwan* writes: "Balabhadra and Brajanath *quanungos* who have been released from prison, and Paramananda the zamindar of Rahmachan (?) are sent to you in chains under a bailiff as asked for by you. If you fear that before my arrival at Katak the zamindars will carry off the crops, then write urging the *amils* to collect the dues and attach the standing crops. Appoint men to guard the grain."³³ This shows what stern measures he took for collection of revenue. In view of these facts, the figure 72 lacs may not be unreal, though it may not represent the standard revenue of Orissa.

The figure might include exorbitant fines imposed on the defaulters, various fees, like, *nazar* accession fees, realised from the Feudatory Chiefs and Zamindars, various *abwabs*, etc. The figures, Rs. 72,70,004/- and 101,02,625/- for the years 1665 and 1695, can not, therefore, be discarded as all fictitious, though they far exceeded the normal revenue of Orissa which was about 30 lacs and 70 thousands of rupees. The rise above the normal may be attributed to abnormal collection indicated above.

Khani-i-Dauran's letter to the Emperor against the *diwan* Md. Hashim throws some light on the nature of revenue collection, and the hardship the people were subjected to. He alleged that the *khalsa mahals* had been ruined to desolation owing to harsh assessment and villages had suffered the similar fate on account of harsh exactions. Revenue collectors were appointed on the principle of highest bidding. The *rai-yots* or the Zamindars were not communicated about the higher

assessment in consequence of appointment of *Kroris* binding themselves to pay higher amounts.³⁴

Though the above were the allegations against Md. Hashim, the same might have been true of many other unscrupulous *diwans* who could have invented new ways of exactions. So we need not at all be surprised at the figures much above the normal assessment. Then again, *diwans* were frequently changed. As many as seven *diwans* were appointed within the period, 1657-1685,³⁵ it comes to almost one *diwan* per year. The duties of a *diwan* were very intricate. For efficient management of his duties he had to be fully acquainted with the prevailing system, the nature of the country, the condition and nature of the people and the Zamindars. For this purpose he needed sufficient time, but if he expected his transfer any moment, he would not care for acquiring the requisite knowledge, and would carry on with his set ideas. Revenue administration, in such a case, could mean nothing but disastrous to the interests of the people.

As stated above, we have no means of ascertaining the revenue of Orissa under her indigenous kings. Late Manmohan Chakravarty tried to calculate the revenue of Orissa under the Ganga kings on the basis of some facts given in the *Madla Panji*, or the Jagannath temple chronicle. According to his calculations, the revenue of the kingdom of Orissa, covering almost the same area as the five *sarkars* of *Subah* Orissa in Akbar's time, amounted to seventy lacs of rupees in the reign of Anangabhimadeva. The calculation is mainly based on *Madla Panji* which is more in the nature of a compilation of traditions than a historical work. In view of this and certain other difficulties, the figure is not acceptable. Besides, we may reasonably presume that some enquiries were made about the revenue of Orissa under her own rulers when fresh assessment was made in the time of Akbar. Therefore, the revenue of *subah* Orissa under Akbar (Rs. 42,68,3 0/-) was a little more, but never less, than that under Anangabhimadeva. In consideration of these facts we can hardly accept the figure, 70 lacs of rupees, as the revenue of Orissa under the Ganga or the Gajapati kings of Orissa. It might have been about 40 lacs of rupees or thereabout. The revenue of the three *sarkars* of Jaleswar, Bhadrak and Cuttack under Akbar amounted to Rs. 40,04,316. In the time of

34. Sarkar, *Studies in Mughal India*, p. 223,

35. *Ibid*; pp. 220-21.

Shah Jahan the same area was assessed at Rs. 49,61,497 ³⁶, an increase by about 25%. Then it rose to Rs. 50,00,000 in 1648 and to Rs. 56,39,500, in 1654. In Aurangzib's time, the revenue of Orissa touched the peak figures of Rs. 72,70,000 in 1665 and Rs. 1,01,02,625 in 1695.³⁷ These figures, as we have said above, can not be totally discarded though they appear to be untrue. They may not be exact, but they clearly indicate that there was a progressive rise in the revenue of Orissa from the time of Akbar till the time of Aurangzib, when the highest point was reached. It is quite natural to expect, in the circumstances, that the revenue administration of Orissa under the four Mughal Emperors would have resulted in progressive deterioration in the economic condition of the people. So, by the end of the reign of Aurangzib the people of Orissa were virtually on the verge of economic ruin due to heavy taxation and illegal exactions in form of *abwabs*.³⁸

ORISSA UNDER THE NAZIMS OF BENGAL

The dissolution of the great Mughal Empire started almost after the demise of Aurangzib which was followed by a war of succession among his three sons. Finally Muazzam ascended throne under the title Bahadur Shah. On his death in 1712 A. D., Jahandar Shah, the eldest son of Bahadur Shah, became Emperor, but he was murdered by his nephew, Farrukhsiyar who proclaimed himself Emperor in 1713 A. D. His reign is particularly marked by internal intrigues, dissensions and party-factions in the court of Delhi which reduced the hold of the centre on the provincial Viceroys almost to nothing. In consequence, the provincial Viceroys became practically independent of the Imperial control and established their own dynasties in the Provinces.

Murshid Quli Khan, more popularly known as Jafar Khan, is the first provincial governor to give a lead in this direction and was followed by Nizam-ul-Mulk in the Deccan, Sadat Khan in Oudh and Saifudaulah in the Punjab. Though the foundation of independent viceroyalties hastened the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, it was very beneficial to the people Orissa who were spared the harmful con-

36. *J A S B.*, 1892 pp. 43 ff.; *Fifth Report* (1812), II, pp. 454-55.

37. *J B O R S.*, II, p. 342.

38. *H O.*, II, pp. 83-85.

-sequences of rapid change of administrators, As already described, Orissa was hard hit by these frequent change of administrators and their widely fluctuating policies. So, the establishment of a permanent Government in Bengal under Murshid Quli Khan was much welcome to the people of Bengal and Orissa. Hence, the year 1717 A. D., when Jafar Khan became the independent Nazim of Bengal for all practical purposes, is a land mark in the History of Orissa.

Murshid Quli Khan was the *diwan* of Bengal and Orissa in 1700-01 A.D. By his efficient management of the Revenue Department of Bengal and Orissa and regular supply of immense money to the Imperial Exchequer, he won the approbation and confidence of Aurangzib. His power in Bengal was undisputable and he enjoyed supreme influence with the Imperial Court. He utilised those advantages for the best interest of himself and his relations. When he was appointed as *Subahdar* of Orissa in 1703 A.D., he appointed his son-in-law, Shujauddin, as his Deputy in Orissa.

After the death of Aurangzib, Bahadur Shah appointed his son Azim-us-shan as *subahdar* of Bengal and Murshid Quli Khan as *naib nazim* in July, 1707. He was then transferred as the *diwan* of the Deccan in 1708 but was again reappointed as the *diwan* of Bengal in 1710 A. D. When Farrukhsiyar ascended the throne he confirmed Murshid Quli Khan in his appointment as the *diwan* of Bengal, and conferred on him the deputy *subahdarship* of Bengal and the *subahdarship* of Orissa (1713). He became the full-fledged *subahdar* of Bengal in 1717 A. D.⁹ After this he was firmly established in Bengal. The *faineant* Emperors of Delhi were too much involved in their own intrigues and revolutions to be able to control the *subahadar* of Bengal or of any other province situated far off from the capital. Thus Murshid Quli Khan became the *de facto* Sultan of Bengal and Orissa owing only a nominal allegiance to the Emperor.

As we have stated above, this change in the political set up in Bengal and Orissa had direct effect on the condition of the people of those two provinces. The effect of this change has been described thus in the *History of Bengal*. "Hence, Bengal was at last free from the double set of leeches who had been

"sucking the people," one the temporary governor bent solely upon making his own pile before being transferred from Bengal, and the other the diwān loyally trying to collect the revenue to the last pie. The gross fiscal tyranny and illegal exactions which × × made the province depopulated, silver scarce, and trade difficult (as they wrote), were placed under check, because there was only one master to be satisfied." All these remarks apply to Orissa also, and go to confirm our presumption about the ruinous effects of the Mughal revenue administration on the economic condition of the people of Orissa.⁴⁰

Murshid Quli Khan holds a very high position among the Mughal administrators. His abilities were best displayed in the revenue administration of Bengal and Orissa. He organised the whole system of revenue-assessment and revenue collection in such a way as to eliminate chances of overassessment and ensure regular collection. The most interesting thing about the organisation is that Murshid Quli Khan was solely guided by the interest of the department, and did not allow his religious feelings to interfere with it. Since he found that the Hindu collectors, or contractors, were more reliable, than the Muslims, he appointed the former in those posts, and thus, created a new landed aristocracy, not only in Bengal, but also in Orissa. According to Salimullah, Murshid Quli Khan made exact *hust bood* or comparative statement of collection and conformably thereto, his *amils* collected the produce of every harvest. He resumed all extra expenses of the Zamindars and gave them a subsistence allowance. For estimating the real capacity of lands he placed collectors in charge of the Hindu *amils* instead of the Zamindars. He made actual measurement of the cultivated lands, obtained information of the capacity of every husbandman in every village and advanced *taqavi* loan to needy farmers.⁴¹

We do not know the details of reformation brought about by Murshid Quli Khan as *Subaāhar* of Orissa from 1703 to 1707 and from 1714 to 1727 A. D. Orissa must have felt the wholesome effects of his revenue organisation after a long period of extortion and exaction by unscrupulous and avaricious officials. From circumstantial evidence, we

40. *Ibid*, p. 413.

41. *A narrative of the transactions in Bengal during Shoobadaries*, p. 25-26,

are led to presume that Murshid Quli Khan appointed four Hindu *quanungos* at Jaleswar, Soro, Bhadrak and Cuttaek in charge of revenue collection. The *quanungos* bore the title *Mahasay*. They become zamindars under the Marathas and continued as such, until quite recently.⁴²

The people of Orissa must have welcome this change and fared much better under the Hindu Revenue Collectors than they did under the Muslim Officials, majority of whom had little sympathy for the people.

As for the revenue assessment of Orissa under Murshid Quli Khan, it amounted to Rs. 36 07,245 in 1706-07.⁴³ In the 4th year of Muhammad Shah's reign Murshid Quli Khan made a fresh settlement of Bengal and Orissa. This settlement is called *Jama Kamil T'oomry*, Orissa was involved in some territorial loss on account of this revision of settlement. 'Bandar Bulasore and Hijli' were dismembered from Orissa and attached to Bengal, resulting in a reduction in the gross rent-roll by Rs. 5,27,405'-.⁴⁴ The portions of Orissa transferred constituted two *Chaklahs* of Bengal. According to *Riyaz-us-Salatn*, *Chakla* Midnapore was also dismembered and attached to Bengal.⁴⁵ It meant a loss of an area covering 6102 square miles with a revenue yield of Rs.10,33,657 to Orissa. Midnapore, ever since, has remained a part of Bengal. This is the worst effect of Jafar Khan's revised settlement on Orissa.⁴⁶ Thus, Orissa suffered permanent dismemberment of one of the richest and most populous part of her territory.

These are the few facts known to us about the administration of Jafar Khan. From 1714-1727 he governed Orissa through the Naib-Nazim, Shuja Muhammad Khan, his son-in-law. Though we have no evidence of the condition of the people of Orissa under Shuja's rule, the very facts that he was a man of lenient and benevolent disposition and that Bengal fared very well under his rule as the *Nazim*,⁴⁷ lead us to presume that the people of Orissa enjoyed some peace and relaxation from the rigour of collection. This assumption is corroborated by the

42. O H R J., Vol. II, pp. 27 ff.

43. Firminger, *Fifth Report*, Vol. II, p. 456.

44. *Ibid*, p. 189.

45. H O, Vol. II, p. 69.

46. Firminger, *op.cit.* pp. 467-68.

47. HB, II, pp. 424-25.

fact that total collection during fifteen years of his rule in Orissa as the deputy of Jafar Khan amounted to Rs. 38,37,15 922, about 2½ lacs a year. But Taqi Khan, son of Shujahuddin, who ruled Orissa for about 7 years (1727-33) as *Naib Nazim* under Shujah Khan⁴⁸ collected Rs. 11, 31, 40, 338-14-8 in all, amounting to Rs. 1,61,62905 on the average for each year⁴⁹. If we take Rs. 36/- lacs as the standard revenue of Orissa under Jafar Khan, the total amount of revenue outstanding in the time of Shuja Khan amounted to about 504 lacs in 15 years at the rate of 33½ lacs of arrear rent for each year. Total amount due in 7 years under Taqi Khan amounted to 252 lacs, this, together with the arrear rent of Shuja Khan's time amounted to 755 lacs, whereas total collection was 1131 lacs, thus exceeding the total amount due by 386 lacs. If these figures be taken as authentic we have to assume that owing to leniency of Shujah Khan or for any other reason, the revenue collection in Orissa had fallen to an unprecedented scale of only 2½ lacs of rupees a year on the average; under Taqi Khan, it also rose to an unprecedented level of Rs. 161 lacs a year.

The amount is about 4½ times the standard annual rent of Orissa and is far in excess of the revenue of the Bengal *Subah* which, under Murshid Quli Khan, amounted to Rs. 1,42,88,185⁵⁰. The figure is almost unbelievable; if the amount had really been collected we can well imagine what terrible extortion the people would have been subjected to and how it would have expedited their economic ruin.

Unfortunately for us, we have no authentic details of the administration of Orissa under the *Nazims*, so we are not in a position to say why the revenue collection fell to such an unprecedented level in Shuja's time, or what means were adopted by Taqi Khan to realise such incredible amount of revenue. One can hardly doubt that the people of Orissa must have been subjected to ruthless torture and extortion under Taqi Khan. *Madla Panji* records in a confused way Taqi Khan's relation with the Khurda Raja, Ramachandra Deva who was looked upon as the leader of the Garjat Chiefs. According to *Madla Panji*, Taqi Khan came to

48. Md. Taqi Khan is regarded by some as the illegitimate son of Shujauddin (H.O. II, p. 88) He died in the year 1733, (Stewart, *History of Bengal*, p. 247.)

49. *Fifth Report*, II, p. 213.

50. H.O. II, 85; *Fifth Report*, II, p. 191.



Orissa in the 6th year of Ramachandra Deva's reign. He took the forts of Dhauli and Rathipur. Owing to the mutiny of the *paiks*, the commander and the *diwan* of the Khurda Raja could not offer any resistance to him, so, they fled away. At the that time, the Raja was at his headquarter at Khurda. On receipt of information about the conduct of the commander and the *diwan*, he appointed Gadādhara Mangarāj as commander and Bodhu Mia, son of Sk. Abdul Salam as his *diwan*. Then he attended on *Naib Nazim* Taqi Khan, who ordered the Raja to hand him over the absconding commander and the *diwan*. The King of Khurda beheaded the former commander and *diwan*, and sent their heads to the *Naib Nazim*. The Raja again waited on the *Naib Nazim* with his officers and soldiers, most of whom, including the *diwan* and the Commander, were killed by Taqi Khan. Ramchandra Deva, the Raja of Khurda was taken to Cuttack. In his absence Kumar Bhāgirathī performed the duties of the Raja of Khurda. Taqi Khan again led an expedition against Bhāgirathī Kumār who took shelter in Daspalla. Taqi Khan returned to Cuttack leaving Ramachandra Deva in Khurda with some of his soldiers. After this the Raja of Khurda one day secretly took away the images of the Puri Temple to Banpur, from there to Bolgarh and Tikali. At this Taqi Khan called back Kumār Bhāgirathī from Daspalla and made him the Raja of Khurda. After making this arrangement Taqi Khan set out for Murshidabad. After the departure of Taqi Khan, To Ramchandra Deva came back to Khurda, whereupon Bhāgirathī Kumār escaped to Cuttack with the soldiers of the Nawab. Taqi Khan, on his return from Murshidabad, led another expedition to Khurda but as he died shortly after Ramachandra Deva was saved.⁵¹

The incidents described above do not give us any clear picture of the actual events of Taqi Khan's rule. We only come to know that he zealously persecuted the Raja of Khurda who had to carry the image of Jagannath to places of safety. According to Stirling, 'A war occurred between this governor and Raja Ramchandra Deo of Khurda, which was terminated after a long struggle by the capture of the latter and his imprisonment in Cuttack. Temporary possession was taken of Khurda by the Mussalmans who established twenty two thanas from Banpur to Balwunta to repress the turbulent spirits of its rude inhabi-

51. *Madla Panji* (Edited by Prof. A. B. Mohanty,) pp. 75-77,

tants but these were removed by the order of the court on the death of Ramchandra Deva and succession of Raja Birkishore Deo.⁵²

These facts lead us to the assumption that Nawab Taqi Khan followed a policy of repression and persecution in his relation with the Raja of Khurda and other Chiefs of Orissa; in religious matters his policy was one of bitter antagonism towards Hinduism.

Fortunately for the people of Orissa Taqi Khan did not live long to continue his policy of repression, persecution and extortion. On his death about the year 1733, he was succeeded by Murshid Quli Khan II, the son-in-law of Shuja Khan. During his rule, the administration was carried on by Mir Habib who had already proved his mettle as an able organiser and administrator during his former appointment as the Deputy of Murshid Quli Khan, while he was in charge of the Dacca Division of Bengal⁵³. Through Mir Habib's tactful handling of the situation the sullen and antagonistic attitude of the Orissan Chiefs towards the *Naib Nazim* gradually relaxed and changed into friendly feeling. Consequently peace prevailed in the country, the administration improved and the financial position of the Government became better by judicious curtailment of unnecessary expenses and improvement of revenue collection. The Raja of Khurda had removed the deities of the Puri Temple to a place beyond the Chilika lake in the time of Md Taqi Khan. This had resulted in a loss of nine lacs of rupees from the pilgrim-tax. Through Murshid Quli Khan's efforts the Raja of Khurda could be persuaded to bring back the deities and reinstate them in the temple⁵⁴.

Orissa had a little breathing time during 7 years of reign of Murshid Quli Khan II which was marked by peace and tranquillity. The Oriya chiefs were won over by the conciliatory policy of Mir Haqib and his master. So they not only remained peaceful during Murshid Quli Khan's rule, but lent him strong support in his difficult days when he faced Alivardi Khan who invaded Orissa in 1741.

52. Stirling, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

53. *H B*, II, p. 426.

54. *Ibid*, p. 428.

Shujauddin died in 1739 and was succeeded by his son Sarfraz who was an indolent and dissipated man deeply addicted to pleasures of flesh. Alivardi Khan, who was the *Najib Nazim* of Bihar was secretly planning to capture the *Subahdarship* of Bengal in complicity with Haji Ahamad, his elder brother, Alamchand and Jagat Seth Fate Chand. Haji Ahamad, the master-architect of Alivardi's destiny, cherished the ambition of placing his brother on the *masnad* of Bengal, and with that end in view, he started working during the life time of Shujauddin. Howell writes that Haji Ahamad soon found out the great foible of his master, which was ungovernable appetite for a variety of woman, and by indulging and feeding this passion he quickly gained an ascendancy over his master and had the disposal of all places, small or of importance x x x⁵⁵. Thus after securing abiding influence over all key places of the administration he won over the other two most influential personalities of the State, Alamchand and Jagat Seth. Fortunately for him, Alivardi, his instrument, proved to be as capable, ambitious and pushing as Sarfraz was dissolute fickle and imbecile. So, by the time of Shujauddin's death, things were ready for a swift and subtle move. The conspirators did it without any loss of time or without giving any inkling of the undercurrent politic to Sarfraz who, acting on the advice of his father, had confirmed the archtraitors in their respective positions.

Soon after Sarfraz's accession Alivardi completed his preparations for a quick and sudden move. He slowly advanced with an army of 7000 soldiers and a strong contingent of artillery towards Bengal; Sarfraz, when he heard of this move, could clearly realise his precarious position. He had no other alternative but to make a bold stand and depend on his luck. So he marched out of Murshidabad on 6th April 1740, at the head of a large army. The two armies met in the bitterly contested battle at Giria. Sarfraz was killed by a chance shot. After that Alivardi could easily rout his army and come out victorious. Thus, Alivardi became the *Nazim* of Bengal.

But his path was not yet clear of all thorns. Murshid Quli Khan II of Orissa refused to recognise the authority of Alivardi. On the other hand, he started for the conquest of Bengal with a strong army in December 1740. Alivardi also advanced towards Orissa with his force. Raghunath Bhanj, the Raja of Maurbhanj offered the first resistance to

Alivardi at the ferry of Rajghat. It was difficult for Alivardi to cross the the Subarnarekha in the face of the opposition, so he tried to win over the Raja who, however, did not betray his fidelity towards Murshid Quli Khan. But heavy bombardment by Alivardi made it impossible for the Raja's soldiers to stick to their guns; so they retreated towards the jungle. Thus Alivardi was able to cross the first hurdle⁵⁶.

Alivardi marched towards Balasore and encamped at Ramchandrapur at a distance of 3 miles from the camp of Rustam Jang (Murshid Quli Khan II) at Phulwāri. Both the armies lay waiting for each other in their respective entrenchments for about a month; Alivardi was getting impatient of waiting, as the shortage of food stuff had begun to tell upon the morale and efficiency of his army. He was on the point of making some compromise with Rustam Jang and returning to Bengal when he was restrained by his general Mustafa Khan. On the other side, Mirza Baqar, the son-in-law of Rustam Jang could hold himself no longer. Despite his father-in-law's caution and counsel for restraint he came out of his entrenchment and took up the offensive. Then ensued a bloody fight which ultimately resulted in favour of Alivardi. Mirza Baqar was seriously wounded. Rustam Jang fled away to Masulipatam with his son-in-law leaving his family in helpless condition in the fort of Barabati. However, they were escorted safe through the help of the Raja of Khurda⁵⁷.

After conquest of Orissa Alivardi remained in Cuttack for a month. Then he started for Bengal leaving the administration of Orissa in the hands of his nephew and son-in-law, Saulat Jang, whom he appointed as his *Naib-Nazim*. Saulat Jang was most unfitted for the post on account of his licentious habit, lust of money and overbearing manners. Many of his generals like, Salim Khan, Nijamat Khan, Mir Azizullah etc. who formerly served under Rustam Jang were still attached to him. On their invitation, Mirza Baqar returned with a contingent of Maratha army⁵⁸. On his approach great confusion and disorder was created in Cuttack by his supporters. So Mirza Baqar had no difficulty in ousting Saulat Jang and establishing himself in his place. Saulat Jang and his family were imprisoned. The victorious army of

56. *Riaz-us-Salat'in*, p. 327.

57. *H B.*, II, pp. 443-44.

58. Dutta, *Alivardi and his times*, p. 49.

Mirza Baqar advanced towards Hijli and Midnapore and occupied those places.⁵⁹

So Alivardi had again to march towards Cutack for the reconquest of Orissa. There was practically no encounter with the enemy as Mirza Baqar, on the approach of Alivardi, retreated towards south without striking a blow. So Orissa was reconquered without much difficulty.⁶⁰

Alivardi stayed at Cuttack for about three months to settle the affairs. After appointing Mukhlis Ali Khan, the arch-traitor who was instrumental in the betrayal of the cause of Rustam Jang, as the *Naib-Nazim* of Orissa he started for Bengal. But on the way he changed his mind and appointed Shaik Mausum in the place of Mukhlis Ali Khan. Durlabhram, son of Jankiram, was appointed as his *peshkar*.⁶¹

On his way back to Bengal he stopped to punish the Raja of Mayurbhanj who offered resistance to him at the Rajghat ferry when he first invaded Orissa in 1741. In this connection the *Riyaz-us-Salatin* writes; "In as much as Jagat Isar, Bajah of Marbhanj had taken sides with Mirza Baqar and had not submitted to the authority of Mahabat Jang (Alivardi Khan), the latter was in anxiety owing to his insolence. Therefore on arrival at the port of Balasore, he girded up his loins in order to chastise the Rajah. The latter was at Hariharpur which contained his mansion and was at the time plunged in pleasures and amusements. His knowledge of the denseness of the forests that surrounded him, coupled with his command of numerous hordes of chawars and Khandaits made him feel insolent and so he did not pull out the cotton of heedlessness from the ear of sense, nor cared for the army of Alivardi. Alivardi Khan's army stretching the hands of slaughter and rapine, set about looting and sacking the population, swept the Rajah's dominions with the broom of spoilation, captured women and children of the Khandaits and chawars and sowed dissensions amongst them. Rajah seeing the superiority of Alivardi's army, with his effects, followers and dependents fled to the top of a hill, and hid himself in a secret fastness, beyond the ken of discovery. Alivardi Khan then subjugated the tract of Morbhanj, shewed no quarter, and mercilessly carried fire and sword through its limits".⁶²

59. *Ibid*, p. 50.

60. *Ibid*, pp. 51-52.

61. Dutta, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

62. *Riyaz-us-Salatin*. p. 387.

The Raja of Mayurbhanj, according to the author of the *Riyaz*, was Jagadhar or Jagadiswar. But from contemporary records it is authentically known that Raghunath Bhanj was the Rajah of Mayurbhanj at that time.⁶³

Alivardi however could not pursue his campaign of rapine and slaughter to the extent he desired; he had to suddenly wind up his operation against the Raja of Mayurbhanj and march for Bengal which was threatened with Maratha invasion.

A new chapter in the History of Orissa begins with the appearance of the Marathas on the Bengal-Orissa border. As we have already pointed out above, a progressive process of economic disintegration of Orissa resulting in the degeneration of the morale of the people started with the conquest of the kingdom by the Afghans. Since then Orissa found no respite to recover herself. The Afghan-Mughal war which continued from 1574 to 1592 had the greatest devastating effects on the economic condition and the morale of the people. During this period, anarchy and confusion reigned supreme and all vestiges of an established government vanished. The last blow was served by the Mughal-Maratha struggle for 9 years (1742-51) when Orissa became the main theatre of battle. Orissa remained alternately under the occupation of the Marathas and the Nawab of Bengal. During these long nine years civil administration was almost at stand still. The soldiers of both the armies, specially the hired Afghans and the Bargis, unscrupulously plundered the people and wrought utmost devastation in the areas visited by them. Bengal was also reduced to a very pitiable condition due to these wars, but Orissa's condition was worse. The unimaginable acts of barbarity committed by the Marathas on the people are described by the Bengali poets, Gangaram, Baneswara Vidyalankara and Muslim historians, Salimullah and Ghulam Hussain.⁶⁴ The author of the *History of Bengal* (Vol. II) while describing the effects of Maratha invasion on Bengal says that the war affected its trade and manufacture most injuriously, paved the way for its economic decline which became so alarming after 1757⁶⁵.

63. Chanda, *History of Mayurbhanj*, p. 4.

64. Dutta, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-74

65. *H.B.* II, pp. 455-56

The above remarks apply to Orissa more strongly as it was the main theatre of war and was almost a no-man's-land. So Orissa, by the close of the Mughal rule, was at the lowest ebb of her fortune.

It is needless for our purpose to enter into the details of the long struggle between Alivardi Khan and the Marathas. Both the parties at last grew tired of playing hide and seek year after year. Alivardi who was in his 76th year in 1751 was completely worn out by incessant pressure on his frail body. So he was anxious to be relieved of the worries and anxieties. Marathas too had felt acutely the pinch of a long-drawn war. They were also equally anxious for some peaceful settlement. In these circumstances negotiations for permanent peace were carried on by Mirza Saleh on behalf of the Marathas and Mir Jafar on behalf of the Nawab. Treaty was finally signed in May or June 1751. According to the terms of the treaty; "Mir Habib was to be regarded as in the service of Alivardi and be appointed as the Deputy Governor of Orissa on his behalf. He should spend the surplus revenues of Orissa for paying off the arrear salaries of Raghuji",⁶⁶ (ii) from 18th Aswina 1159 B.S. (October 1751) twelve lacs of rupees should be paid annually to the Marathas from the Bengal revenue as *Chauth* of the *Subah* in two *qists* "on condition that the Marathas would never set their foot again within the dominion" of Alivardi, (iii) the river Subarnarekha was to be the boundary of Bengal Subah and Marathas were not to cross it.⁶⁷ Thus Midnapore area was permanently lost to Orissa.

According to the terms of the treaty Habib became first Deputy Governor of Orissa. Though it was mainly due to his extortion that the Marathas were able to cope with Alivardi, he was murdered in 1752 by Januji who was deputed by his father to Orissa as the Head of the Maratha army kept there for defence. Mir Habib was suspected of plotting against the Marathas. After him Mirza Saleh, an officer of

66. There are two versions of the first clause of the treaty. They are : Mir Habib should "pay surplus revenue of the province to Raghuji's army as their salary". *H B.* II, p. 467.

"The entire revenue of that province will be paid by Mir Habib to the Bhunsle" *H O.* II p. 110-

67. *H O.* II, pp. 113-114, Other clauses of the treaty are; (iv) "The province of Cuttack i. e., Orissa as far as the river Subarnarekha was to be ceded to the Marathas. (v) "Twenty five lacs of rupees was to be paid immediately in lieu of black mail (*Khandani*) in cash", *H O.* II, p. 110.

the Nagpur court was appointed in his place by mutual consent of Alivardi and the Marathas.⁶⁸ But he had to resign in 1755 as he found that he could not manage to collect sufficient revenue to keep the government of Orissa going, such was the devastation of the province during the nine years' war between the Mughals and the Marathas. He foolishly agreed to pay four lakhs more over and above the stipulated amount of the *Chauth* and failed to pay it.⁶⁹ The fact that revenue of 16 lacs of rupees could not be collected in Orissa in 1752-54 indicates clearly the extent of economic devastation wrought under the Mughal rule.

ADVENT OF EUROPEAN TRADERS.

A new chapter of the History of Orissa was opened in the year 1514 when the first European settlement in the coast of the Bay of Bengal was established by the Portuguese at Pipli, a natural harbour four miles from the mouth of the Suvarnarekha in the Balasore District. The Portuguese who had established themselves in the Coromandal coast since 1498 had to seek some other places of shelter in time of emergency in view of the growing hostile attitude of the Indians towards them. For this purpose they sailed northward along the coast and founded the first landing place at Pipli. With this beginning, Pipli gradually grew up into one of the busiest centres of the Portuguese activities along the coast from Arakan to Pipli. In the seventeenth century Pipli became a great slave market of the Portuguese and the Arakanese pirates. But expulsion of the Portuguese from Hugli and Hijili in 1632 and 1638 by Shah Jehan completely ruined their commercial activities. Thereafter they gradually faded away from the picture giving prominence to other European traders like, the Dutch and the English. Pipli, however, continued to be a Portuguese trading centre long after their expulsion from Hugli and Hijili. "Bruton in 1683 describes Pipli as a "Port town of the Portuguese where the Portugals are resident" and Fr. Barbier in his description of Episcopal visitation of Bishop Laines in 1723 refers to a large Portuguese or *Topaz* congregation"⁷⁰

68. *Ibid*, p. 115.

69. *H. O. II*, p. 119.

70. Campos, *The History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, pp 97-99.

The Dutch who were keen rivals of the Portuguese followed next. They founded their first settlement in Pipili in the year 1625.⁷¹ But they probably did not find the place quite suitable, specially owing to the constant fear of Portuguese attack. So they shifted the factory to Balasore about the year 1633.⁷²

The English established their first factory at Hariharpur in the Bay of Bengal coast in May, 1633. Next month they founded another factory at Balasore⁷³. The factors at the Balasore were beset with various difficulties at the outset. Their consignments of broadcloth and lead did not find any market at Balasore; consequently they remained unloaded in the ship. Five of the factors died within a year. Mortality among the sailors was also very high and they had to contend against the Portuguese pirates and the Dutch fleet. So the prospects of the Balasore factory were far from encouraging; the Court of Directors looked upon it as an unprofitable concern thrust on it⁷⁴. On account of these difficulties and for want of support either from the Court or from the mother factory at Masalipatam, the idea of any expansion, as entertained by Cartwright, was altogether given up, on the contrary, the problem of somehow maintaining the precarious existence of the factory at Balasore became paramount.

The expulsion of the Portuguese from Hijli in 1636 and consequent ruin of the Portuguese trade in Orissa constituted a great relieving feature for the English at Balasore. In the initial stage of difficulties, the elimination of Portuguese interference was no little a gain by itself. Still the condition of the Balasore factory was far from satisfactory, at last it came to such a stage that the factory was ordered to be abolished in 1641.⁷⁵

In 1642 Francis Day came to inspect the condition of the factories at Balasore and Hariharpur. The factory at the latter place was on the point of dissolution. Francis Day strongly recommended that the factories at Balasore and Hariharpur should be maintained in as much as they offered prospects of future expansion of trade in the

71. *Ibid*, p. 87 f.n.

72. *Bengal Dist. Gazetteer, Balasore*, p. 37.

73. *Bengal Dist. Gazetteer, Balasore*. p. 33.

74. *Ibid*, p. 35.

75. *Early Annals, of the English in Bengal*, pp. 19-20.

Bengal Coast. The Balasore factory was thus retained on the recommendation of Day.⁷⁶

The Balasore factory continued its precarious existence till 1651 when another factory was established at Hugli. In 1652 the English Company obtained the 'letters patent granting them freedom of trade in Bengal without payment of customs duties'⁷⁷. The English adopted a forward policy for expanding their trade in the maritime provinces of Bengal and Orissa and shifted the 'headquarters of the trade in the Bay from Balasore to Hugli'.⁷⁸ But due to various factors the Company's trade in Bengal did not offer any prospect of betterment and so in 1657, the Bengal establishments were proposed to be abolished. But the renewal of Company's charter granting exclusive right for trade saved the situation. In stead of abolishing the Bengal factories a Commissioner was appointed to enquire into the malpractices and to reorganise the whole thing on a satisfactory basis. George Gawton was appointed as chief Agent at Hugli and Hopkins as Agent at Balusore⁷⁹.

The new arrangements had the effect of invigorating the moral tone of the Company's servants in Bay establishment but the problem of providing security against the oppression and harassment of the local officers still remained to be solved. Trade in *colicos*, silk and saltpetre gradually expanded to the advantage of the Company, but uncertainty of political situation and lack of security remained main obstacles in the path of smooth running of the factories.

Aurangzib ascended the throne in 1658; in consequence of this change in the monarchy, the Governor of Hugli considered all the *farmans* issued by Shah Jehan as null and void and demanded annual payment of Rs. 3000/- in lieu of customs. The Governor of Balasore also made exorbitant demands for anchorage.

The governor of Bengl seized some English boats laden with saltpetre. The English expected further troubles from Mir Jumla, but fortunately for them, he was engaged at the time, in the hazardous Assam campaign. His death in 1663 brought about a change in the political situation by appointment of Shyasta Khan as Governor of Bengal.⁸⁰

76. *Ibid*, p. 21.

77. *Ibid*, p. 27.

78. *Ibid*, p. 32.

79. *Ibid*, pp. 32-33.

80. *Ibid*, pp. 32-35.

The renewal of the Company's Charter in 1661 granting the right of 'whole trade with the East India for ever and declaring that no person should trade thither without license' and authorising the Company "to seize unlicensed persons, to erect, fortifications, to raise troops and to make war with non-Christians" brought about a complete change in the policy of the Company.⁸¹ Hitherto the Company had been following a timid policy of avoiding clash with the local authorities and carrying on their commercial activities as smoothly as possible. But the new Charter armed the Company to meet all eventualities with courage and firmness. For all practical purposes the new Charter paved the way for eventual participation of the Company in Indian politics. Another important effect of the Charter was introduction of British law into India, the Governor and Council of several settlements were authorised by the Charter that all persons living under them were to be tried according to the British law,

Thus the year 1661 marks a distinct change in the policy of the English East India Company which had so far kept itself strictly within the bounds of their commercial activities, As a sequel to the new powers conferred on the company by the new Charter, a fresh reorganisation of the Company's establishments in India was undertaken. William Blacke became the Chief Agent at Hugli in place of Jonathan Trevisa who had succeeded George Gawton. Sir Edward Winter was appointed as President at Fort St. George, and the whole of Bengal establishment was made subordinate to his Government. The Court gave orders to the new President to strengthen the fort, to reduce Portuguese soldiers, to reduce the number of out-agencies, to suppress private trade and avoid quarrels with local Governors.⁸²

The new Governor found that it was not possible to push up English trade without enough money and sufficient army to impress upon the local Indian Governors of their capacity to strike if occasion arose. So he did not reduce the Portuguese soldiers or the out-agencies. The Court however did not approve of his bold actions. Therefore they sent George Foxcraft to substitute him. This set in a better rivalry between the two, and ultimately, Sir Winter assumed power after imprisoning Foxcraft and his party. But he was at last compelled to

81. *Ibid*, p. 38.

82. *Ibid*, pp. 38-39.

make room for Foxcroft in 1633. He was succeeded by Sir William Langhorn as Agent of Fort St. George in 1672. Blacke remained as Agent of Hugli.⁸³ With the rise of importance of Hugli as a commercial centre of the East India Company prospects of Balasore as an important trade centre in the North eastern coast took gloomy. In the year 1662 the question of abandoning the Balasore factory in favour of Hugli was considered. It was decided that the English should try to send their small vessels up to river Hugli. If they could succeed in their attempts it would be easier and cheaper for them to send their goods direct to Hugli in stead of Balasore. Thus Balasore's fate was hanging in the balance during the subsequent years till 1668 when the idea was temporarily abandoned.⁸⁴

In the year 1671 during the reign of Aurangzib, Mirza Rafi Khan Bazil, the Governor of Orissa confirmed the privileges of the English granted to them by the Emperor in 1667 and in terms thereof the English were to trade freely in Orissa without any hindrance.⁸⁵ The English trade in India was entering into a new phase. Corruption was rampant among the Company's servants in Bengal. Their trade was greatly hampered by two main factors, the activities of the Interloper and frequent interferences by the local officials. The Directors first applied their minds to effect reformation and set their own house in order. With that view in end they sent Streynsham Master, one of their servants of proved ability and fidelity, to India in 1676. He, true to his nature, tried his utmost to bring about some order into the disorderly state then prevailing in the Company's transactions in Bihar, Bengal and Orissa and to improve the Company's trade. In his official errands he had to come to Balasore many a time and his Diary throws much light on the condition of Balasore in particular and Orissa in general during his time. But that is beyond the purview of this work. It may only be noted that the main exports from Orissa were varieties of textile products, saltpetre and turmeric⁸⁶. Balasore was a great trade centre visited annually by many large ships of the Company.

Streynsham Master, true to his reputation as a sincere and faithful servant of the Company, did all he could to improve the Company's

83. *Ibid*, pp. 40-43.

84. *Ibid*, pp. 47-48.

85. *Indian Records Series, Streynsham Master*, Vol. II, p. 25.

86. *Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 257.

affairs and bringing about order and discipline in the management of Factories in Bengal. But despite sincerest discharge of the responsibilities by him he did not pull on well with the Court of Directors. So, on the expiry of his term in July 1681, he retired from service⁸⁷. The Court of Directors appointed William Hedges as "Agent and Governor of their affairs and factories in the Bay of Bengal." He was instructed to root out all mal-practices prevalent among the Company's servants in Bengal and to combat the activities of the interlopers. Hedges failed miserably in both the commissions, so he was dismissed in July 1684 and was succeeded Mr. Beard as Agent under the control of Gifford the "President of the Coast of Coromandel and the Bay."⁸⁸

A crisis was precipitated in 1686 when the Mughal Court called upon Job Charnock, the Chief of Cassimbazar factory to appear in the Court to answer for the claims of Rs. 43,000/- made against him by Indian merchants. Charnock refused to attend the court, so the Mughal Governor took steps to punish him. Charnock slipped away and came to Hugli. In the meantime the Court of Directors who had been utterly disgusted by the persistent obstruction and interference in their affairs by the Mughal officials decided upon firm military action in vindication of their rights and privileges. So they sent six ships with arms and ammunitions and soldiers under Admiral Nicholson. The English troops arrived in Bengal towards the end of the year 1686. The Mughal Governor of Hugli was alarmed and he also made preparation for meeting the emergency.

The actual fight broke out in October 1686 when the English soldiers raided the portion of Hugli where the Governor was residing and completely destroyed it. The Governor fled away in disguise⁸⁹. After this incident the English left Hugli and took shelter in the Hijili Island. Shayista Khan, the Governor of Bengal issued orders to take all steps to crush the English and drive them away. At this the English thought it prudent to take offensive first.

The first blow was struck at Balasore. Despite all preparation on the part of the Mughal Governor, the British soldiers under Charnock

87. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

successfully raided the city and completely plundered and ransacked it and for two days the town was completely at the mercy of the raiders. They broke into king's customs house, plundered the private merchants and returning to the old town burnt all the shipping as it lay in the docks. Two vessels arriving at the mouth of the river, one belonging to the Prince and the other to the Nawab, with four elephants on board were seized and made prizes⁹⁰.

Next, there was another fight between the English and the Mughals at Hijili which was then under their control by. Ultimately cessation of arms was agreed upon and the English were permitted by the Nawab "to secure themselves at Uluberia and remain in their factories at Hugli carrying on their trade with the merchants."⁹¹

The relation between the English and the Mughal Governor of Bengal continued to be strained. Shaiysta Khan did not grant them permission for fortified settlement, so Charnock was in a helpless position as he expected outbreak of hostilities any moment. In 1688 the Court sent Captain Heath with necessary equipments to capture Chittaganj and establish a fortified English Settlement there. After arrival in India Captain Heath, unacquainted as he was with Indian affairs, could not make up his mind what to do, and his orders seriously interfered with Charnock's attempts to secure some royal sanction for a fortified settlement at Sutanuti. Under the orders of Heath the Company's servants packed up every thing and left for Sutanuti on the 8th November 1688. They started once more "on their wanderings in search of a secure centre for their trade."⁹²

They first came to Balasore, arriving there on the 16th November 1688 A.D. The Mughal Governor of Balasore refused to allow the English factors there to leave the place, or send any of their goods. Heath tried to negotiate with the Governor, but finding it useless, he took offensive. On the 29th November a party of the English soldiers landed on Balasore, silenced the batteries and captured all arms and ammunitions. Next day the soldiers raided the town and committed great excesses. The Governor of Balasore, on the approach of the English, captured all the English factors, burnt the factory and departed with his captives. On

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

91. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

92. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

the 4th December Heath again returned to his ships and left Balasore on the 28th December.⁹³

After this Balasore does not come into picture again. Though Aurangzib was greatly annoyed at the turmoil created by the English factors, he granted them permission to continue as before. The official order in this respect was communicated in February 1691. The English settled down at Sutanuti. The foundation of Calcutta was thus laid which consequently affected adversely the prosperity of the port of Balasore which gradually faded away from the picture. Thus the 17th century witnessed the rise and fall of Balasore as a trading centre of the eastern coast.

Maratha Administration

Maratha rule in Orissa begins from the year 1751. We have very few materials about the Maratha rule in Orissa on the basis of which we can draw a somewhat authentic picture. Of the available sources, the reference in different English accounts, whether of travellers or of administrators, constitute, for the present, the most easily accessible source. These English writers have uniformly painted the picture all in black without any bright spot in it. Consequently we are led to believe that Maratha rule was the worst as compared with that of their predecessors or the successors, and that the people of Orissa were reduced to the state of utmost penury under them.

We can hardly accept such statements without a grain of salt. We have stated before how heavily the people were taxed under the Mughals and how they were bled white to fill the imperial and provincial treasuries and the private purses of the officials. The revenue figures of the Marathas belie exaggerated statements about their misrule; on the contrary they give the impression of rather a sympathetic administration.

There is no doubt about the fact that in the days of Mughal-Maratha war (1741 to 1750 A.D.) the Maratha army, specially the *Bargis*, who were mostly unscrupulous mercenaries, committed excesses. But it is preposterous to assume that the depredations continued even

93. *Ibid* pp. 120-121.

after the regular government was introduced. The British travellers who heard of those tales of woe of the people during the chaotic periods wrote about the Maratha government on that bias, even if they had no other intention of vilifying the Marathas, their keen rivals.

Now we may come to actual facts. The revenue figures for Orissa under the Marathas taken from different sources are given below.

<i>Sources.</i>	<i>Amount,</i>
1. Forrester's account.	Rs. 1700000/- ⁹⁴
2. Rennel, Memoir of a map of Hindusthan.	Rs. 2400000/- (under Rughoji I)
3. Blunt' Narrative.	Rs. 1700000/- ⁹⁵ (do do II)
4. Leckie's account.	Rs. 220000/- ⁹⁶ (in the time of Rajaram Pandit The amount includes customs & Pilgrim tax.)
5. Stirling.	Rs. 1350000/- ⁹⁷
6. Trower. (Collector of Cuttack, 1817.)	Rs. 1578000/- ^{97a} (Average of gross annual collection for the last twelve years submitted by Trower based on Maratha records. According to him net collection was about Rs. 11,00000/-.)

From the above figures it would be evident that the gross revenue assessment under the Marathas amounted to about Rs. 1300000/-, After remission for natural calamity, commission for expenses, the net collection came to about Rs. 11,00000/- as estimated by Mr. Trower. It almost tallies with Stirling's estimate. Over and above, a sum of about Rs. 4,00,000/- was collected from customs charges and pilgrims tax.

We have already discussed about the Mughal revenue administration of Orissa. On comparison with the Mughal revenue assessment

94. Wills *British Relations with Nagpur States in the 18th century*. p. 57 and f. n.

95. *Ibid*, p. 139.

96. *Ibid*, p. 107.

97. Banerji, *History of Orissa*, Vol. II, p. 215.

97a. *Ms. Volume*, no. 387, O S A., pp. 316-17.

the Maratha assessment would certainly not appear rigorous; on the contrary it would appear quite lenient.

The revenue assessed by the British in the first year of their occupation amounted to Rs. 13,66,501/- and gradually it rose to 15,11,979- in the year 1811-12 Compared with these figures Maratha revenue assessment will not be regarded as heavy or oppressive.

These figures, give us, *prima facie*, the impression that Maratha revenue administration was lenient as compared with that of the Mughals and also the British who demanded payment in coins and rigorously punished defaulters by sale of their estates. The Marathas, on the other hand, granted commissions to the Zamindars and allowed them other latitudes in times of natural calamity and endowed many religious and charitable institutions with substantial grants.

It is not possible, within the scope of this book, to discuss, in further details, the merits and demerits of the Maratha administration. We may say this much that the uncharitable remarks of the early European Historians, like, Stirling, Hunter, Toynbee etc. are more sentimental than factual in their basis. They were probably guided by stray remark of the early European Travellers who sometimes made uncharitable remarks against the Maratha administration on the basis of very meagre investigation and facts experienced by them. How misleading such remarks are will be seen from the following instance. Leckie who passed through Cuttack in 1790 says;

“ x x x piles of skulls and bones scattered in and near the town : a miserable spectacle at which humanity shudders, and streets are crowded with beggars starved almost to death. They frequently surrounded my tent, and I could not shut my ears to the cries of wretchedness. I could not help drawing a comparison between the wretched state of these people and those under the protection of the British Government x x x.”

The wretchedness of the beggars alluded to in Leckie's account was not something unusual in Indian cities where they swarmed in large numbers. Skulls and bones are to be found in the outskirts of every town or village. It is mere sentimentalism to draw any conclusion as to the nature of administration from such facts. We have not forgotten the harrowing tales of human misery and death during the famine of 1865-66 A. D. Even in 1942 when famine broke out Bengal and parts of

Orissa, the British Government with all its paraphernalia of the most modern administration could help little to stop the thousands from dying piteously. If a few suffered misery under the Marathas, it can, by no means, reflect discredit, to any extent, on their administration. What is more curious, Motte, who visited Cuttack in 1766 does not say anything about such pitiable sight. So it is possible that two famines that broke out in the times of Babuji Naik (1769-70) and Madhaji Hari (1774-75)⁹⁸ might have worsened the condition of the people of lower order and reduced them to utmost misery.

MARATHA RELATIONS WITH THE ORISSAN CHIEFS

We have very little material to form any accurate idea about the relationship existing between the Maratha administrators and the Garhjat Rajas of Orissa. From the data available at present, on the subject, it appears that some of the principal Rajas, like the Rajas of Keonjhar, Dhenkanal, Mayurbhanj and others evaded payment of tribute and the Marathas had very often to employ force to collect the same from them. I quote below the following remarks of Stirling relating to the subject.

“Notwithstanding that large military bodies were posted all over the district, the Marathas were quite unable to retain the Khandaits and their Paiks in any sort of order. Those of the sea-shore and hills, not only laid the whole of the pargannahs bordering upon them under regular contribution, but frequently the paiks of several small Killahs combining together advanced into the very heart of the district and committed the most ruinous depredations upto the very walls of Cuttack. Every year regularly after Dassara, the Maratha armies took field under the Subadar in person and advanced into some part of Rajwara to chastise some insolence or to enforce the demand of tribute. When successful the most sanguinary punishments and destructive ravages were inflicted, but they were frequently defeated and their weakness was exposed by the Paiks of the Killahs which now scarcely retain a name⁹⁹.”

98. Stirling, *op. cit.* p. 93.

99. *Ibid*, p. 91,

We do not know the authority on the basis of which Stirling made the above remarks, but there is reason to believe that some of the principal Rajas of Orissa defied the Maratha authority whenever opportunity occurred.

From a letter of Ghulam Mustafa, Company's *gumastah* at Balasore dated the 25th Nov. 1763 it appears that Shivaram Bhatta could not proceed to Jaleswar on account of his quarrel with Virakishore Deva (the Rajah of Khurda).¹⁰⁰ But nothing is known of the nature of quarrel and its result. Virakishore Deva I of Khurda, according to an unpublished record in the Orissa State Archives, ascended the throne in 1147 *amlī* and he was deposed by the Maratha Government for his fits of insanity during one of which he is alleged to have murdered two of his sons.¹⁰¹ From another letter of Ray Govind of the 5th January, 1764 we come to know that Sheo Bhat was engaged in rooting out the Khandaits and had sent Govind Ray to settle the affairs of Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj.¹⁰² This gives us just an indication of Sheo Bhat's action against some refractory Rajas and also some trouble in Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj relating to payment of tribute. Probably Ray Govind could not effect any settlement with the Raja of Mayurbhanj, and so, some military action had to be taken as it appears from the letter of the Raja of the date 21st February, 1764, alleging atrocities committed by several people.

Sheo Bhat was dismissed in 1764 and Chimna Sahu was appointed in his place in April of that year.¹⁰³

Soon after Bhawani Pandit was appointed, but Sivaram Bhatta did not make over the charge to him. He formed a powerful party with the Chiefs of Eastern Rajwara.

There was fighting between the two parties. The parganas of Jhankar, Hariharpur etc. suffered most from excesses committed by the Paiks of Kanika and Kujanga¹⁰⁴, who probably took advantage of Maratha weakness and extended their raids into the very heart of the Maratha territory. From the letter of Bhawani Pandit of the

100. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence (C. P. C.)* Vol. I, No. 1951, p. 254.

101. *Manuscript* Vol. No. 387, p. 322, (*Orissa State Archives*)

102. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. I, No. 2012, p. 271.

103. *Ibid*, No. 2173, p. 301.

104. *Stirling*, op. cit., p. 92.

date, 24th November, 1764 we come to know that he was preparing to march to root out the rebellious Zamindars of Hariharapur etc. This shows that the Raja of Mayurbhanj with whom no settlement could be effected by Ray Govind alluded to before was still continuing in defiance of the Maratha authority.¹⁰⁵

Another letter of Bhawani Pandit of 2nd December, 1764, throws very interesting light on the Maratha relation with the Feudatory Chiefs of Orissa. According to it, Raja of Dhenkanal murdered one Bali Khan, adopted son of Sheo Bhat and seized his horses and effects. So Bhawani Pandit was arranging for an expedition to punish that Chief. Further, he states that the Rajas of Nilagiri and Mayurbhanj plundered the Balasore Treasury in complicity with Bhaskar Pandit, the Faujdar of Balasore, who was greatly in arrears. He was carried away by the Rajas with his effects.¹⁰⁶ In another letter of the date 15 December, 1764 Bhawani Pandit informed the Governor general that he intended marching against the rebellious Rajas of Hariharpur and Nilagiri.¹⁰⁷ Motte's account (1766) throws some light on the Maratha-Mayurbhanj relationship. Daeerathi Bhanj with Jehan Mahmud, a commander in Mayurbhanj service, approached Bhawani Pandit for help. An expedition was made into Mayurbhanj in which Manatri, Managovindpur and Hariharpur were occupied. Damodar Bhanj fled to Bamanghati and hid himself there. This expedition is probably the one about which indication was given by Bhawani Pandit in his letter of the 15th December, 1764 referred to above.

The Raja of Mayurbhanj then tried to conciliate the English with the purpose of securing help against the Marathas. He failed in his attempt. So he turned hostile against the English and indulged in open acts of hostility which will be described hereinafter. Damodar Bhanj could not continue in this state of open defiance of the Marathas and the English. Chimaji Bapa had come to Cuttack with a large Maratha army in 1779 in accordance with the plan of crushing the British power in India formed by four confederates : the Nizam-ul mulk of Hyderabad Haider Ali of Mysore, the Peshwa, and Madhoji Bhonsla. Instead of fighting the English, he turned his attention to the rebellious Chiefs of

105. *O. P. C.*, Vol. I, No. 2481, p. 360.

106. *Ibid.*, No. 2184, p. 365.

107. *Ibid.*, No. 2494, p. 369.

Orissa and marched against them in 1781. He first proceeded against the Raja of Dhenkanal. After suppressing the rebellion there he went to Keonjhar, the Raja of which made his submission and promised to help the Marathas in their campaign against other rebellious Chiefs. He then proceeded against the Raja of Mayurbhanj who had to submit; but we have no details of the campaign. Rajaram Pandit in 1785 had sent a force of 5000 Maratha troops to Mayurbhanj to realise tribute from the Raja. Once again a Maratha army invaded Myurbhanj in 1795 or 1796, but it was repulsed with heavy loss.¹⁰⁸

These are the few details we have about the relation of the Orissan Chiefs with the Marathas. The Rajas of Keonjhar, Mayurbhanj and Dhenkanal always tried to defy the authority whenever opportunity occurred.

108. Chanda - *History of Mayurbhanj* (1761-1861), p. 59.

CHAPTER II

BEGINNING OF THE RESISTENCE MOVEMENT.

Northern Orissa was conquered by the English in 1803. But prior to that the District of Ganjam came under the formal possession of them in 1765 by a *farman* of the Mughal Emperor dated the 12th August 1765, under the terms of which the English were to enjoy the Northern Sarkars as *Inam* or free gift.¹ The English took actual possession of it in 1766.

During the period from 1753 to 1759 the District was under the French control as a part of the Chicacole Sarkar which was ceded to the French by the Nizam-ul-Mulk of the Deccan. In the year 1757 De Bussy, the famous French general, moved his army to Ganjam for realisation of rent which had fallen in arrear. The Zamindars of the District tendered their submission and paid up their dues. But the Raja of Ghumsar defied. So, De Bussy had to send an expedition against him. But it was no easy task for the European soldiers or their Indian sepoys to get safely into the fastness of the jungle where Raja had taken shelter. Describing the expedition Orme writes; 'Day by day the troops were employed with excessive toil and fatigue in rooting up, cutting down and endeavouring to make their way through the forest. The whole District is estimated as one of the hottest regions of Hindusthan and peculiarly subject to stroke of sun by which seven Europeans were killed in one day'^{1a}. This gives some idea of the odds the French army had to encounter. The Raja ultimately tendered his submission. Thus the first episode of resistance to a foreign European power ended without much complicity.

THE ENGLISH IN GANJAM AND NARAYAN DEO'S REBELLION 1767-68.

The English took possession of Ganjam in 1766. The Madras Government sent Mr. Cotsford to proceed to Ganjam to survey the factory and submit a report about its condition. Accordingly Mr. Cots-

1. *The Ganjam District Manual*, p. 85.

1a. *Ibid*, p. 83.

ford proceeded early in 1767 to Ganjam where he found the conditions very disturbed. Narayan Deo, the Raja of Parlakhemidi, was in possession of the country and refused to submit to the English. Upon Mr. Cotsford's representation, the Madras Government deputed Colonel Peach in 1768 to reduce the Raja of Parlakhemidi. Col. Peach defeated the Raja of Parakhemidi who took refuge in *mala* area of his Zamindari. His son was made Raja in his place, but the actual management was entrusted to Ramjogi Patro nominated by the Company to be his *diwan*.²

Narayan Deo however was marking his time in his inaccessible retreat. As soon as Colonel Peach's army left Parlakhemidi in December, 1768, he came down to the plain and compelled Ramjogi Patra to retire.

Next, came the turn of the Rajas of Athagad and Khallikot who had also stopped payment of tribute in defiance. Forces were sent against them, and they ultimately surrendered when their forts were stormed. But the Raja of Khallikot offered some resistance before submission. On the 26th October one detachment under Captain Casemore proceeded against the Raja by land, while another party consisting of coffres and 1st Company of grandier sepoy's started by water under Lieutenant Rawles accompanied by the Resident. The first resistance was met by them on the 2nd November near Muruda Sagaram. There was a deep ditch which was defended by the soldiers of the Raja firing from two forts near by. A flanking party, however, succeeded in taking the forts. The progress of the detachment, therefore, continued without much obstruction. But when they began to enter into the thickness of the jungle, they were much harassed by the soldiers of the Raja who fired on them under the cover of woods and jungle. A portion of the baggage and large amount of musket ammunition fell into the hands of the Raja's soldiers. The loss on the English side consisted of one corporal of Coffres killed, three sepoy's wounded and sixteen camp-followers killed or wounded. The detachment under Captain Rawles marching towards Birabatti found the road blocked by felled trees and when they were trying to open up the road, they were attacked in the rear by the soldiers of the Raja. They suffered some loss but, despite these obstructions they maintained their slow progress.

In the meantime Captain Auchmuty arrived at Murda Sagaram by the way of Chilika lake and cleared the road. Another force under Captain Ker took possession of Birabatti. Then the road to Khallikot was opened and the fort was stormed from behind and taken on the 14th November without opposition. The Raja, finding it hopeless to continue resistance any further, paid Rs. 5000/- and offered security for payment of Rs. 21000/- more within a month. The campaign cost the English 24 killed and 28 wounded.³

In 1772 the Raja of Parlakhemidi left his State for alleged intrigues of the Company's renter, Sitaram Raju and placed himself under the protection of Bhim Deo, the Raja of Vijayanagar. The Resident tried to persuade him to come back but failed. So Jaganath Deo, the brother of the Raja of Parlakhemidi was recognised as his successor. The Raja of Vijayanagar had also fallen into arrears and was withholding tribute, So it was found necessary to take action against him.

Accordingly a detachment under Captain Bandinell was sent against him. The Company's forces occupied the fort of Pratapgiri on the 17th April, 1772 without much opposition. Next, they moved on to Alladigam where there was a small fort garrisoned by 200 men. That fort was stormed and occupied on the 19th April at a great loss of 27 killed and 202 wounded. Next, the fort at Siddheswaram was captured on the 9th May. Fifty nine soldiers of the garrison surrendered and were taken prisoners.

These successes unnerved the Raja who sent his *Vakil* to the Resident requesting cessation of hostilities. His request was granted and a reconciliation was brought about according to which Moni Deo, the son of the Raja, was entrusted with the management of the two estates of Vijayanagar and Pratapgiri, and he was to get Pratagiri estate after the death of his father.⁴

GHUMSAR AFFAIR (1778-79)

Krushna Bhanja, the Raja of Ghumsar died in the year 1773. He was succeeded by his son Vikaram Bhanj. The tribute was arbitrarily

3. *Ibid*, pp. 99-101.

4. *Ibid*, pp. 104-107.

raised at the time of succession from Rs. 33,000/- to Rs. 50,003/-. He however withheld payment of tribute to the Company. This necessitated some action against him.

Troops stationed at Aska were ordered to proceed against him. The whole estate of Ghumsar was occupied by the Company's troops and the Raja fled away to the neighbouring Maratha territory for shelter. Though he could not venture on any large scale operations against the Company, nevertheless, he harassed them by sudden and surprise incursions through the help of his adherents. This continued during the years 1773 and 1779. In the mean time the soldiers of the Company suffered from sickness, and the detachment was much reduced in consequence of large number of death among them. Taking advantage of this, Vikrama Bhanja began cutting off small detached bodies and murdering the sepoy. He also succeeded in recapturing the fort of Vishnuchakram, and on that occasion, he murdered twenty three of the Company's sepoy who had surrendered themselves.

These atrocities led to renewal of expeditions against him. He had the luck of escaping capture in two surprise attacks made against him. Thus pressed, Vikrama Bhanja fled away and took refuge with Sitaram Raz of Vizianagram. From there he proceeded to Madras where he represented his case before the Council and procured an order of reinstatement. He was however dispossessed after Mr. Snow was appointed as the Chief of the Ganjam factory in 1783. Lachhman Bhanja, his elder brother, was set up in his place on condition of his paying a revenue of Rs. 1,00,000 -. But the estate had been reduced to such state of impoverishment by constant trouble and mismanagement that Lachhman Bhanj could not meet his engagements till his death in 1788, when he was succeeded by his son Srikara Bhanja ⁵

AFSAIRS ON MOHIRI (1781)

In 1781, 'Roygara' (Rajguru ?) the Patro of Mohiri was murdered at the instigation of 'Moja Deo' (Majhi Deo ?), Raja Narayan Deo's brother, who instead of taking any action on the perpetrators of the crime seized all the effects of the deceased and placed his family in confinement. So Mr. Turing, the Resident, ordered the Raja to make

5. *Ibid*, pp. 110-112.

over the culprits, and on his refusal to comply with his order, Captain Bruce was directed to proceed against the Raja. The fort of Mohiri was taken possession of without opposition. The Raja surrendered and dismissed Gopi Mahapatra, one of the chief culprits in the murder case, and agreed to assign a portion of the Zamindari including the town of Berhampore to the Company's management⁶.

AFFAIRS OF MOHIRI, VIJAYANAGAR, TABALA, JALANTRA,
BUDARSING AND SURANGI—1790-63.

This period is conspicuously marked by internal dissensions among the Zamindars ultimately resulting in the Company taking one side and deciding the issue. In Mohiri, the Raja was dead, and his wife, Krushnapriya Devi had succeeded him. In 1789, Cursojee Lallah, who had taken lease of the Mohiri Estate, was murdered at the instigation of 'Sano Deo', one of the two illegitimate brothers of the late Zamindar. He escaped from Aska and joined hands with his brother, 'roja Deo'. Both the brothers fixed up their residence in some inaccessible recess of the Mohiri hills and started fighting the British. In 1793, Mr Webb, the Haveli Collector, complained that Sano Deo had plundered many government villages near Iohhapur. The Resident could do little to check them for want of sufficient force.⁷

About this time Moni Deo, the Raja of Vijayanagar and Jagannath Deo, his brother, the Raja of Pratapgiri, were carrying on open warfare against each other. Moni Deo was assisted by Sano Deo of Mohiri. In 1790 Moni Deo made an incursion into Pratapgiri Zamindari and plundered twelve villages and burnt 12 others. So action had to be taken against him, but it was not possible to bring him to terms during the period 1791-92. He was at least reduced in 1793 with the assistance of Jagannath Deo. But this had little effect in bringing about peace and amity between two brothers who carried on their bloody quarrels till 1800 when both of them were placed in confinement in the Ganjam fort⁸.

6. *Ibid*, p. 166.

7. *Ibid*, pp. 119-20.

8. *Ibid*, p. 120.

Similarly, the Zamindar of Budarsingi attacked the Mandasa Zamindari in 1799 to feed his some ancient grudge and burnt 16 villages. The Raja of Mandasa, in retaliation, made a surprise attack on the Budarsingi Zamindari. The Zamindar was wounded in the affray and made his escape to *Malia* country to save himself.

The Surangi Zamindar was taken into custody and kept in confinement in the fort of Ganjam for assisting Sano Deo and failing to pay up his arrears⁹.

The younger brother of the Zamindar of Jalandra, on the death of his elder brother, took possession of the Zamindari with the assistance of the Zamindar of the Tarla and Sano Deo. He carried off the minor son of his brother, the rightful heir, and his mother, and kept them in confinement. The Resident could do nothing till 1797 when armed force was sent against the usurper and he was dislodged¹⁰.

The District of Ganjam remained in a state of unrest and turmoil till about the middle of the 19th century and all efforts of the authorities to restore order and bring the refractory Zamindars under control, specially those of Ghumsar and Parlakhemidi, failed. We shall again come to these details later on; in the mean while we may see how things were developing in the northern Orissa under the Maratha rule.

THE CONFLICT OF THE RAJA OF MAYURBHANJ WITH THE ENGLISH.

Genesis of the Conflict :—The Midnapore Chakla was assigned by Mir Qasim to the Company in 1760. This included a portion known as Western Jungles. Nayabasan was a part of it and it consisted of three *parganas*, Nayabasan, Rohini and Munbhandar of which the Raja of Mayurbhanj was the Zamindar. The *pargana* lay on both the sides of the river Subarnarekha. Mr. Fergusson who was deputed in 1767 to settle the revenue of the Zamindaries of the Western Jungle area fixed the revenue of Nayabasan at Rs. 4000/- a year, in place of Rs. 2500/- which the Raja used to pay formerly¹¹. Despite this

9. *Ibid*, pp. 120-121.

10. *Ibid*, p. 120.

11. Chanda, *History of Mayurbhanj* (1761-81) p. 12.

abnormal increase in the revenue assessment, the Raja of Mayurbhanj did not make any protest, on the other hand, he regularly paid the revenue from 1768 to 1776. In 1784 the revenue was reduced to Rs. 3200/-. The Zamindary was held *Khas* by the Company in 1793 and the revenue collection amounted to Rs. 3069-15-5 only¹². Thus the Raja had been paying a much higher rent than the actual yield for about eight years, from 1768-1776 without any grudge. He did so for two purposes, to get English help in his struggles against the Marathas and secondly to get his right over Amarda Zamindary, about which we shall presently discuss, confirmed. But when neither of these two hopes materialised, his mind was naturally embittered against the English and he began to act in defiance of them.

As regards Amarda Zamindari, it was in the possession of the Raja of Mayurbhanj till 1766. But within a year, Amarda with 81 villages attached to it was annexed to the Company's dominions. The Choudhuries of Belorachar under the Company claimed that the Amarda fort and the 81 villages belonged to them and that the Raja of Mayurbhanj had forcibly taken possession of them, together with 52 villages of the Belorachar *pargana*. On this complaint the Resident of Midnapore sent an *amin* with a company of sepoys to take possession of those villages and the fort of Amarda and restore them to the Choudhuries of Belorachar. The order was complied with, and this is one of the reasons of the ill-feeling the Raja of Mayurbhanj entertained towards the English¹³.

BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES—1774-1796.

The Raja of Mayurbhanj started his hostilities from the year 1777. Withholding the rent of Nayabasan constituted his first act of hostility. During the year 1777-79 his dues amounted to Rs. 5000/-¹⁴. But as he was afraid of the Marathas, he could not openly carry out his hostilities against the English. He started regular hostilities from 1781 after the departure of Chimanji Bapu from Orissa.

12. *Ibid*, p. 13.

13. *Ibid*, p. 8-9.

14. *Ibid*, p. 27.

HOSTILE ACTIVITIES OF DAMODAR BHANJ TOWARDS

THE ENGLISH—1781-96.

In March 1781 the Raja of Mayurbhanj entered Amardagarh and plundered the inhabitants. He summoned the agents of the Zamindars before him and compelled them to sign an agreement for raising Rs. 7000/-¹⁵.

In June he overran the *pargana* of Baliabera in Company's jurisdiction. After plundering that *pargana* he proceeded to Nayabasan. Lieutenant Broughton was sent with a company of sepoy for the protection of the people of Balibera. The Council of Revenue authorised the Collector of Midnapore to start judicial proceedings against him for taking possession of Belorachar and three ghats, Rajghat, Multani and Rani Sarai¹⁶.

Lt. Mac Gregor was despatched in July to take possession of the 81 villages of Belorachar forcibly occupied by the Raja. Lt. Mac Gregor proceeded as far as Amarda where the Raja of Mayurbhanj was waiting for him with his soldiers in the fort. A small scale action took place there resulting in some loss to the Company. But the Raja evacuated the fort, and Amarda was restored to the agent of the Zamindar.

But this victory of Mac Gregor was short-lived. The Raja started thereafter his harassing tactics of suddenly breaking into the Company's territory and making his retreat before contact with the Company's forces. On the 29th July there was a face-to-face engagement in which the Raja had to retreat with a loss of 25 soldiers killed and wounded¹⁷.

Major Macpherson was sent with a force to help Mac Gregor on the 1st August to the fort of Amarda which had again been occupied by the Raja of Mayurbhanj and it was taken possession of and restored to the owner. This victory practically had no effect on the Raja, whereas the English forces found themselves in helpless position for want of

15. *Ibid*, p. 81.

16. *Ibid*, p. 33.

17. *Ibid*, pp. 34-36.

supplies and the bad climate of the place. The dense jungle around prevented any decisive action. Captain Fenwick's letter of the 1st August to Major Macpherson gives some idea of the helpless state of the English armed forces in their operations against the Raja. He wrote, " x x x as soon as I march against them at one place, they quietly possess themselves of another out of my reach." "Under all these difficulties it would be temerity to assert that a force even of vast number could keep possession of this Perganah were the enemy inclined to molest them."¹⁸

Despite all military actions Belorachar could not be taken peaceful possession of by the owner. The armed parties of the Raja of Mayurbhanj raided it off and on whenever opportunity occurred from his base at Khunta within the Maratha territory.

From November 1781 to July 1782, there was cessation of hostilities as the claim to Amarda and 81 villages attached to it by the Raja of Mayurbhanj and the Zamindar of Belorachar was being investigated into by the Revenue authorities of Bengal. Though the enquiry proved that the Raja of Mayurbhanj was in possession of the Amarda fort and 81 villages attached to it, the final decision was made in favour of the Belorachar Zamindar, mainly on the ground that he was directly under the Company's jurisdiction. The Governor General in the Council resolved that they could not dispossess the Zamindars who were immediate subjects of the Company's Government "to gratify a vassal who has been so lately in actual rebellion against it."¹⁹

Thereafter Mr. Hastings, Governor General, tried to seek co-operation of the Maratha Government in suppression of the Raja of Mayurbhanj. He proposed that the Raja should be placed under one Government and for that purpose the parganas of the Raja under the Company on the western side of the river Subarnarekha should be exchanged for those under the Marathas in the eastern side of the river²⁰.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-45.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

The Raja, in the mean time, claimed his right over *pargana* Ulmara situated on the western side of the river Subarnarokha. He carried on his plundering raids in that area. Further, he helped the Zamindar of Bagri who rebelled in 1783. Some other Zamindars in the western jungle Mahal became hostile and the Raja of Mayurbhanj helped them in creating disturbances. A Battalion of sepoy under Captain Vincent was sent to quell these disturbances. He also plundered the *paraganas* in the Jaunpur area and obliged some Zamindars to assist him.

These operations of the Raja of Mayurbhanj proved very embarrassing to the Company. They found it beyond their power to bring him under control, Therefore the Governor General in Council advised the Committee of Revenue on the 15th December, 1783, to suggest to Rajaram Pandit, the Maratha *Subahdar*, for a concerted action against the Raja.

While Damodar Bhanj, the Raja of Mayurbhanj was indulging in these hostile actions against the English, he was, from time to time, suggesting terms for cessation of hostilities and bringing about a reconciliation. His main idea was to get his possession over Amarda and the attached villages and other villages in Belorachar *pargana* confirmed. This the Revenue authorities were averse to do for reasons already noted.

In July 1784 Damodar Bhanj again submitted terms of peace for consideration of the authorities. According to them, he agreed to pay Rs. 3201/- as rent for the *pargana* of Nayabasan on condition that all arrears would be struck off, and his claim over of 81 villages attached to the fort of Amarda and those of the *pargana*, Belorachar and the *mauza*, Mauldangry in *pargana*, Ulmera was admitted and he was delivered possession of them.

The Committee of Revenue accepted the first proposal regarding the settlement of the *pargana* of Nayabasan, but rejected the rest.²¹

This decision dissatisfied Damodar Bhanj who again resumed his hostilities. He withheld the rent of Nayabasan *pargana* and made

21. *Ibid*, pp. 46-49.

incursion into the Barajit *pargana*. Lieutenant Dickens sent against him encamped at Gopiballabhpur close to the Nayabasan fort and the Thanadar of Jaunpur was ordered to take charge of collections. These arrangements alarmed the Raja who promised to pay up the rent and requested for recall of the troops²².

The subsequent history of Damodara Bhanja's struggle for the possession of Amarda Zamindary during 1785 and 1786 is not known but the fact he was in possession of it in 1788-89 is clear from other sources. Thus, it seems that the English had ultimately to give up their attempts to keep Amarda Zamindary in possession in face of determined and extremely embarrassing hostilities of Damodar Bhanj, and had to leave it to the Raja. Thus, Damodar Bhanja's determination ultimately last prevailed, and the English had to yield to him. But, with regard to Nayabasan Zamindary, he could not retain it in a similar way, since it was under the direct control of the Company. He kept on his raids in the area and created many disturbances from the year 1786 to 1796 just to oust the English from Nayabasan. But at last, he had to abandon the idea just before his death in 1796.

Damodar Bhanja, the Raja of Mayurbhanj will be long remembered by the posterity as a valiant general, shrewd diplomat and an indomitable personality; Chief of a small state though he was, he fought single-handed against two formidable powers, the Marathas and the English throughout his reign. He had to yield, at times, under great pressure, only to rise again as soon as the crisis was gone. His military as well as diplomatic strategies in dealing with the two formidable powers cannot but excite ones genuine praise for him. What is more interesting, he took all risks and faced all hazards mainly for his love of liberty but for which, he could have enjoyed a peaceful and prosperous life.

The nineteenth century thus witnessed the first phase of resistance to the foreign powers in northern and southern Orissa. The Orissan Chiefs never liked the idea of complete surrender to any overlord. They had always enjoyed full liberty within their estates and offered stout resistance to those who tried to coerce them into abject

submission. In case of the English, they stiffened their attitude to a degree more and offered the utmost resistance, their means and equipments permitted. They, of course, had to yield at times; it was quite natural for them, as the strength and equipment of their forces could hardly engage the disciplined and much better-equipped forces of the English. It goes enough to their credit that they came forward with determination to resist at all hazards and risks.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH CONQUEST OF NORTHERN ORISSA

BRITISH RELATION WITH THE MARATHAS.

Midnapore and Burdwan came under the British rule in 1760. About the same time they occupied the Northern Sarkar which was ceded to them by Salbat Jang in 1759. Thus the kingdom of Orissa intervened between the two British possessions on the eastern coast. So, from the very beginning Orissa loomed large in the plans of the future expansion of the British. Linking up their northern and southern frontiers on the eastern coast was for them an absolute necessity. They set to work for it from the very outset.

The persistent Maratha demand for the *chauth* of Bengal and Bihar in terms of the treaty of 1751 concluded between Raghuji and Alivardi afforded the English, who, were virtually the dictator of the puppet Nawab of Bengal, fine opportunity to play their mischievous political game to the best interest of what they had in view. As early as 1761, the Nawab, Mir Quasim, was instigated to evade the Maratha demand of *chauth* on the plea of the ruinous state of the country¹.

In the same year the English Governor made a proposal to the Nawab for invasion of Orissa to avoid all future troubles with the Marathas; but this proposal ultimately fell through on account of Nawab's passive attitude in the matter². These two facts provide enough indication as to the intention of the British.

From 1761 to 1766 the Marathas were kept in the hope of payment of *chauth* which was never paid. By dangling the hope of payment, the English contrived to keep the Marathas out of their conflict with Mir Qasim, when he rose in rebellion in 1763. Though Mir Qasim sought Maratha help, Januji did not come forward boldly to make a common cause with him against the English, who, he must have known, were at the root of all manipulations to avoid the payment *chauth*.

1. *H O*, II, p. 131.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 134-38.

His own weakness, fear of the English and, above all, risk of losing all chances of realisation of *chauth* actuated him to remain a passive observer.

In 1766 Clive made another attempt in the direction. He sent T. Motte for the purpose of negotiating cession of Orissa in lieu of a stipulated sum. Motte met Bhawani Pandit in Cuttack and made the proposal to him. Clive also wrote to the Court of Directors about this proposal and had obtained their approval to it³. In 1767 Clive sent his *Vakil* to Januji on the mission. Januji demanded 48 lacs, while Clive offered to pay 13 lacs annually as *chauth* on condition Orissa was restored to the Company⁴. But the negotiation could not materialise as Januji did not consent to the terms. After this, the question was confined to numerous correspondences between the Raja of Nagpur and the authorities of the Company till the year, 1781. The Marathas alternately coaxed and threatened the Company for payment of the *chauth*, but to no effect. The English authorities knew well enough that the Marathas could hardly venture to march on Bengal; even in that case, they felt quite strong to meet the emergency. So they stuck to their gun and did not move an inch from their original position in respect of the payment of *chauth*.

The years 1779-80 was a critical period for the English. In 1779 a confederacy of Indian powers consisting of the Peshwa, Nizam, Haidar Ali of Mysore and Mudoji of Nagpur was formed with a view to fight the English in a combined way. Mudhoji (the father of Raghuji II) was assigned the task of invasion of Bengal. In stead of cooperating with his colleagues Mudhoji sent secret information to Hastings, the English Governor, about the plans of attack. But ostensibly he sent Chimnaji Bapu with a large army to invade Bengal. Chimnaji deliberately moved too slow to reach the place of action in time. He took 8 months to come from Nagpore to Orissa. Even then, he lay quite passive without showing any inclination for fighting. The English managed to keep the Marathas inactive in the Bengal front by some secret monetary deal. It is said that the Company promised to pay a blackmail of 30 lakhs and thirteen lacks of rupees every year for allowing passage to Col. Pearce's army through Orissa. Hastings paid the Marathas Rs. 13 lacs in cash and helped Chimanji to raise a loan of another 10 lacs in

3. *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1949, p. 247.

4. *Ibid.*

1781. This is the only amount the Marathas could realise after years of cajoling and threatening, and that too, as the price of their treachery to the confederacy⁵.

PREPARATION FOR CONQUEST OF ORISSA.

British diplomats knew well that a war with the Marathas for supremacy was inevitable. So they began their preparation for the ultimate fight much ahead. So far as Orissa is concerned, they maintained their factory at Balasore more for political than commercial purposes. The factors at Balasore kept a strict eye on the course of events within Orissa and probably sent secret information to the headquarters in Bengal. Besides, the British had stationed agents at Balasore and Cuttack and Malud on the Ganjam frontier for forwarding their daks from Bengal to Madras. These served as their spies and furnished important information⁶ on the affairs of Cuttack. On two occasions the English detachments had passed through Orissa, so they had detailed account of the route⁷. The English also tried to influence Maratha officers by offer of bribe. The conspicuous success of English diplomacy was provided by the apathy exhibited by Januji to Mir Qasims request for help against the British⁸, ousting of Sivaram Bhatta, the energetic Maratha officer from the *Subahdari* of Orissa by manipulating to poison the minds of the Maratha authorities against him⁹ and the winning over of Madhoji in the most critical period. So, all through the 19th century the characteristic subtle diplomacy of the English was constantly at work for the ultimate achievement of their aim of annexing Orissa and they had further adopted various other means to get all information necessary for successful military operations in Orissa. The accounts of journeys left by Motte, Leckee etc. were primarily intended for military purposes. By adopting these measures with wise foresight much ahead of the eventual clash, the English were ensured of their victory over the Marathas. They were so sure of the victory that Lord Wellesley had prepared the terms of peace before the actual clash. According to these terms, the whole of the province of

5. *H.O.* II, pp. 201-203.

6. *H.O.* Vol. II, pp. 143-45.

7. Hunter, *Orissa*, Vol. II, p. 54

8. *H. O.* II, p. 148.

9. *Ibid.* p. 175.

Cuttack was to be acquired from the Raja of Berar, so as to unite the Northern Circars by a continued line of sea-coast with Bengal.¹⁰ These facts show how thoroughly the British had prepared for the crucial fight with the Marathas

THE SECOND MARATHA WAR

The year 1798 is a landmark in the History of India. With the appointment of Lord Wellesley as the Governor General of India an aggressive policy of political domination was launched in India. In 1799, Tipu, one of the most formidable foes of the English was killed, and his kingdom was liquidated. The Marathas constituted the next target for elimination from the political arena. The achievement of this aim was greatly facilitated by the death of the great Maratha politician, Nana Fadnavis in 1800 A D. With his death the cohesive element in the Maratha confederacy was gone, and it became at once split up into separate independent units without any commonness of purpose. The English did not fail to take advantage of this situation, and they succeeded in winning over the Peshwa, Baji Rao II, to their side. In 1802 the Treaty of Bassein was concluded between the English and the Peshwa who entered into Subsidiary Alliance with the English. This was construed as direct interference in the internal Maratha affairs; consequently, the Maratha Chiefs looked upon the event as a direct challenge to their national prestige. So they planned retaliation. But even at this critical hour of their national life, the Marathas failed to make a common cause among them, and consequently, they had to suffer defeats in the hands of the English and accept the terms dictated to them. These facts are too well-known to the students of Indian History to be detailed here even in bare outline.

PREPARATION OF CONQUEST OF ORISSA.

Orissa constituted one of the fronts in the 2nd Maratha war. Attempts were made by the English to seduce the Maratha Officers¹¹ and soldiers. Preparations were made to attack Orissa from the Bengal and Ganjam sides. Lt. Col. Campbell was entrusted with the Command

10. *J K H R S.*, Vol. I, Pt. IV, p. 277.

11. *O H R J.*, Vol. III, p. 53.

He was instructed to conciliate the inhabitants, grant protection to those who were peaceful and to the Brahmins and pilgrims, take all precautions for maintaining the respect of the pagoda, etc.¹²

Further, he was instructed by the Governor General to try to see if some Zamindars under the Marathas who might have in their power to clog his operations be won over by flattering their interests without requiring their absolute submission to the British authority. He was also authorised to open negotiations with the administration of Cuttack with a view to peaceable transfer of the province to the British authority, on condition that they should receive a permanent pension or a sum of money from the British Government.¹³

The Governor General consequently addressed letters to two individuals who exercised the first authority at Cuttack and ordered Lt. Col. Campbell to forward these letters to the addressees and to open negotiations with the persons to whom they were addressed; they were authorised to offer to each of the principal Marhatta officers a sum of money, not exceeding two lacs of rupees. Similar negotiations were also to be set on foot with all those whose situation and influence held out the means of facilitating the peaceful occupation of the province of Cuttack by the British troops.¹⁴

These instructions by the Governor General to the Commander leave no doubt about the fact that attempts were made in advance of the actual campaign to pave the ground for a peaceful transfer of authority by winning over all elements of resistance by offer of sumptuous bribes. The assumption that the key-officers of the Maratha administration in Orissa were actually won over by the English is confirmed by the little resistance offered by the Maratha army in Orissa to the British invading forces. So sure were the English about their success in Orissa that Mr. Melvill was appointed as Civil Commissioner to accompany the army 'for progressive organisation of the revenue of Cuttack' and to arrange for introduction of 'the system of British laws and regulations into Cuttack,'

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

THE CONQUEST.

As Lt. Col. Campbell fell seriously ill just after the army had begun marching on the 8th September 1803, Lt. Col. Harcourt was entrusted with the command. He took over charge of the command on the 11th September, 1803.

The plan was to invade Orissa from three sides, North, South and East. Lt. Col. Harcourt and captain Dick were to proceed from Ganjam. Captain Morgan was to proceed to Balasore by sea and occupy the town. Col. Fergusson was to march from Jalesore on land and to proceed to Cuttack after occupation of Balasore which was to be left in charge of Captain Morgan. Col. Fenwick, the Commander of troops at Midnapore, was ordered to occupy the Maratha Districts north-east of the Subarnarekha to eliminate the possibility of any attack from the rear, thus to ensure safe marching of Lt. Col. Fergusson's detachment to Cuttack to form junction with Lt Col Harcourt's army coming from the Ganjam side. So all precautions were taken against any determined stand of the Maratha army contrary to their expectation. A total of 4916 soldiers were employed in the campaign.¹⁵

The forces began their March on the 8th September 1803, from the Ganjam side. Lt. Col. Campbell was relieved by Lt. Col. Harcourt three days after. The British forces marched upto Manikpatna in Puri District without any opposition. From there Harcourt sent a message to the priests of the Jagannath temple. On receipt of a favourable reply from the priests on the 16th September,¹⁶ the army marched towards Puri which was occupied on the 18th September without resistance. On the 20th September, the British forces marched towards Cuttack. On the way they were harassed by the Maratha cavalry by petty skirmishes, and consequently, the progress was very slow. It took the British army 14 days to reach Mukundpur situated at a distance of only twenty miles from Puri. The Marathas made their first stand at that place but, despite their superiority in number,

15. *Ibid*, pp. 55-56.

16. According to Hunter, Harcourt was met by a deputation of priests who begged to spare the temple (of Jagannath) and to place it under British protection. Hunter, *Orissa*, Vol. II, p. 56.

they broke up and retreated towards Puri after only a minor skirmish.¹⁷

Thereafter the British forces marched to Cuttack without any opposition. They entered Cuttack town on the 10th October, 1801. They at once proceeded to the Barbati fort where Maratha soldiers had assembled to offer resistance. A 12 pounder battery with two howitzers were set up at a distance of 500 yards from the fort. After completing all arrangements for storming of the fort, bombardment was started on the 14th October, 1803. By 11 o'clock the southern part of the fort had given way. Thereupon Lt. Col. Clayton advanced with a 6 pounder and a party of artillery men to force the front gate. Despite stiff resistance, they succeeded in effecting entry from three sides. This shattered the morale of the Maratha army, and the soldiers fled in confusion to save their lives. Many were drowned in the ditch in trying to escape. Maratha loss was considerable, while, on the side of the British, only two Europeans and three Indian soldiers were killed and 29 were wounded.

The detachment under Capt. Morgan reached Balasore on the 18th September, but the landing on the town was effected on the 21st September 1803. The Maratha soldiers put up some resistance to the invaders when they entered into the town, but it was not strong enough to stop the progress of the English soldiers. They advanced through the town despite firings from house tops and entrances of the lanes. They reached the Factory House where they encamped for the night. Next morning it was found that the Maratha soldiers had evacuated the town during the night. So the town was occupied without any further opposition.

Soro was next captured on the 4th October by Lt. Slye deputed by Captain Morgan. The troops under Lt. Col. Fergusson reached Balasore on the 4th October and marched unopposed to Cuttack in support of the troops under Lt. Col. Harcourt.

After the fall of the three principal towns of Orissa, the Marathas evacuated the province and retreated precipitately towards Badamul pass through which the road leading to Nagpur ran. Harcourt deputed

17. Toynbee, *History of Orissa*, pp. 2-3.

Major Forbes to force the Badamul pass. There the Marathas made the last stand, but they were completely routed.¹⁸

Thus ended the campaign for the conquest of Orissa. The English had a smooth-sailing with almost no resistance from the enemy.

REDUCTION OF THE RAJAS OF KUJANG, KANIKA AND HARISHPUR,

After deputing Major Forbes to Barmul to intercept the retreating Marathas, Lt. Col. Harcourt himself marched against the Raja of Kujang who was suspected of carrying on correspondences with the Raja of Khurda and Kanika for forming an offensive and defensive alliance against the English. Raja of Kujang fled away on the approach of the English forces. His elder brother who was kept in confinement in the fort of Paradip was released and set up on the throne. His fort was dismantled and cannons taken to Cuttack. Next Harcourt reduced the Rajas of Kanika and Harishpore and dismantled their forts. These operations were carried on almost without any opposition. Thus the most turbulent of the Chiefs of Orissa who had formerly been a terror to the English ships plying on the coast of Orissa were completely reduced, and any chance of there ever making an united stand to offer resistance to the English in future was eliminated. English position in Orissa was much consolidated. Raja of Kujang who was subsequently apprehended was kept in confinement in the Barabati fort.¹⁹

Now we may turn our attention to the affairs of the Sambalpur-Patna region. Vyankoji Bhonsla, the brother of Raghuji Bhonsla II, was the Governor of the Chhatisgarh region. He wanted to be independent of the control of his brother Raghuji II and carried on some secret overtures with Mr. Colerbrooke, the Resident at Nagpur. When the war became a certainty, The Governor General wanted to open up the negotiations with him again. Lt. Col. Broughton commanding the battalion at Ramgarh was entrusted with this work. The Commanding officer at Dinapur was ordered to help Broughton. Governor General issued detailed instructions to Lt. Col. Broughton about the works he had to do. He was instructed to open up

18. *O H R J.*, Vol. III, p. 57-58; Toynbee, *Orissa*, pp. 5-6.

19. Toynbee, *Orissa*, pp. 5-6.

negotiations with the discontented subjects of the Raja of Berar for 'exciting them to revolt against the authority of the Maratha Government and attaching them to the interests of the British Government.'²⁰

He was particularly ordered to procure information about Sambalpur adjoining Orissa, like, the Chiefs dissatisfied with the Marathas, the strength of Maratha forces etc.

In compliance with the orders, Broughton started negotiations with the Raja of Sambalpur and with other Chiefs in that area. After securing necessary information which, he thought, were favourable, he started towards Sambalpur in December, 1803.²¹ He arrived at Sambalpur on the 31st December 1803 and had no difficulty in occupying the fort as the Maratha garrison agreed to evacuate it on conditions that they would be permitted to retain their arms and they with their families would be escorted by the British troops out of Sambalpur. Broughton accepted the terms and the fort was taken possession of on the 2nd January 1804.²² On the 8th January Lt. Fountain was despatched to disperse some Maratha troops carrying on depredations in the Sonepur area. He succeeded in completely routing and dispersing them.²³

When Major Forbes arrived at Badamul, the Rajas of Sonepur, Baud, Sambalpur, patna etc offered submission to the British authority and sought British protection. Major Forbes referred these cases to Lt. Col. Harcourt, who concluded treaties with them.²⁴ In the meantime Treaty of peace and friendship was concluded between the English and the Raja of Berar on the 17th December 1803 at Deogaon in terms of the 2nd article of which the Sena Saheb Subah Ragojee Bhonslah ceded to the "Honourable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty the Province of Cuttack, including the port and the district of Balasore."²⁵ The intimation of the conclusion of peace was received by Broughton on the 24th January 1804, when engagements with the

20 *History of all the Events & Transaction of the British Government in India*, (1805), pp. 207-208.

21. *Ibid*, p. 212.

22. *Ibid*, p. 214.

23. *Ibid*, pp. 214-15.

24. O. H. R. J., Vol. III, pp. 59-60.

25. *Notes relative to the peace with the Maharatta Chieftains*, (1805), p. 68.

Chiefs of Sambalpur area had already been signed. According to the terms of the treaty of Deogaon, Sambalpur-Patna region was retained by the Raja of Berar. But since the Chiefs of that area had been given solemn assurance of British protection it would constitute a breach of public faith if they were again transferred back to the control of the Raja of Berar. So Governor General proposed to the Maratha Government that the Chiefs of the Sambalpur-Patna area with whom the Company had already concluded treaties of friendship should continue to remain under Company's protection but they should pay tribute to the Marathas for which the Company would stand security. He further pointed out that this was in terms of the tenth article of the treaty of Deogaon according to which the Raja of Berar was to confirm the treaties already concluded by the British Government with certain tributaries of the Raja of Berar.²⁶ Raja of Berar did not consent to the proposal of the Governor General. At this the Governor General threatened to resume war if the Raja did not fulfill the conditions of the treaty.²⁷

With the appointment of Cornwallis as the Governor General, the forward and aggressive policy of Wellesley was given up and a pacific one was adopted. So Captain Rughesde who had replaced Lt. Col. Broughton in 1805 was asked by the Governor General to persuade the Rajas of Sambalpur-Patna region to go back to the control of the Marathas, or to leave the Maratha territory and accept grants of lands in the British territory. They were to be given to understand that in case they chose to remain under the Marathas, they would be compensated by money grants 'for deterioration of their condition by transfer of the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna to the authority of the Raja of Berar'. Rughesde accordingly carried on negotiations with the Chiefs who expressed their willingness to leave their possessions under the Marathas and settle down under the British protection in the lands to be assigned to them. Accordingly arrangements for assignment of lands to the Chiefs of following States were made.²⁸

(1) Sambalpur (for Rani Ratna Kumari and Chhota Rani), (2) Baigarh, (3) Sonapur, (4) Gangpur, (5) Sarangarh, (6) Bamra, (7) Bonai, (8) Bargarh, (9) Sakti, (10) Saraikala, (11) Patna, (12) Khariar and Nowrangpur and (13) Lalgah.

26. *Ibid*, p. 65.

27. *O H R J.*, Vol. III, p. 60-61.

28. *O. H. R. J.*, Vol. III, pp. 61-63.

The States were made over to the Raja of Berar in 1806. The Chiefs probably altered their mind and did not leave their Estates. They remained in a semi-independent state under the Maratha Government. From a letter of R. Jenkins, Resident at Nagpore to Roughsedge of 29th Nov. 1803, it appears that troops of Nana Saheb (son of Vyankoji) under Ramchandra Wagh occupied the fort of Sambalpur and that Rani escaped to Hazaribagh for British protection. Jenkins wanted Roughsedge to persuade the Rani to quit the British territories, otherwise to detain her under his jurisdiction until he heard from the Government.²⁹ Roughsedge in his letter dated the 21st Jan. 1803, informed Mr. Jenkins of the circumstance under which Marathas occupied the fort. According to Rani's statement, an amicable settlement was reached between the Rani and Maratha Sardars. Then the Marathas suddenly attacked the Rani's forces. So she had to make her escape secretly and after much hardship arrived in the British territory.³⁰ From another letter of Mr. Edmonstone, Chief Secretary to Government, to Roughsedge it appears that the Marathas demanded surrender of Rani, but the Governor General in Council instructed Mr. Jenkins to resist the demand.³¹ Rani Ratna Kumari was ultimately given asylum in the British territory and was granted a pension of Rs. 600/- per month. Another Rani, Mukta Dei, was granted the *pargana* of Panchgarh in Kharurda for her maintenance.

29. *Selections from the Nagpore Residency Records*, Vol. II, p. 76.

30. *Ibid.*, p. p. 77-79.

31. *Ibid.*, pp 81-92.

32. *O. H. R. J.*, Vol. 11, Nos. 3 & 4, p. 95.

CHAPTER IV

FOUNDATION OF BRITISH RULE IN ORISSA.

RELATION WITH THE STATES OF ORISSA.

After conclusion of the treaty of Deogaon, Col. Harcourt and Mr. Melvill who constituted the Board of Commissioners for settlement of the affairs of Cuttaok, directed their attention to civil administration of the newly acquired Province. First, they wanted to finalise their relations with the Chiefs of the Tributary States of Orissa by entering into engagements with them. The treaty engagements executed by the Orissan Chiefs and the *Qaalnama* granted to them by the 'Special Commissioners for the Soobah of Orissa, Messers Harcourt and Melvill' are recorded in Vol. I of Atchinson's book, '*A collection of Treaties Engagement and sunnuds relating to India and neighbouring countries.*'

Feudatory States were divided mainly into two categories, those subject to British rules and regulations, and those exempt from it. Under the first category were included the States of (i) Darfan, (ii) Sukinda, (iii) Madhupur, (iv) Ali, (v) Kujang, (vi) Patia, (vii) Harishpore, (viii) Mariobpur and (ix) Bishnupur. Of these, the Chiefs of the first three States were granted *Sanads*, while with the rest, engagements were concluded. The following is the list of 15 States under the second category with whom elaborate engagements were concluded and to whom *Qaalnamas* were granted in return.¹

(1) Nilagiri, (2) Banki, (3) Jorumen,* (4) Narsingpur, (5) Argul, (6) Talcher, (7) Athgarh, (8) Keonjhar. (9) Khandpara, (10) Nayagarh, (11) Ranpur, (12) Hindol, (13) Tigris, (14) Badamba and (15) Dhenkanal.

The Rajas of these States undertook to be loyal, to hand over, on demand, any person of British territory residing in their areas or any of their subjects who might have committed crimes in the British

1. Toynbee, *Op. Cit.*, Appendix, pp. ccx-ccxi.

* Jorumu or Dasapalla.

territory, not to allow passage to troops hostile to the British interests and to pay the fixed rent regularly according to the *qists* fixed.

In the *Quaulamna* the Commissioners, on behalf of the Hon'ble Company, undertook to guarantee possession of the territory of each Chief on payment of the rent fixed, not to make any other demand except the tribute and to pay due attention to any just representation.²

It is needless for our purpose to detail the amount of *peshkush* or the ordinary transactions between the Commissioners and the Orissan Chiefs in 1804-05. We shall note only such points as reveal the attitude of the Orissan Chiefs towards their new Master and the reactions thereof which are recorded in the *manuscript volume I (1803-1804)* of the Revenue Board.

EARLY RESISTANCE TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITY AND DEPOSITION OF THE RAJA OF HARISHPUR.

Nilakantha Mangaraj, the Raja of Harisipur seems to be first to offer resistance to British authority. He executed agreement to abide by the terms laid down therein on 1st December, 1803.³ An explanation was called from him for having forcibly collected revenue from the *Raiyats* of Kothmool.⁴ He was directed again on the 23rd June, 1803 to leave the place occupied as the *Raiyats* were oppressed.⁵ The Raja of Haris-pore did not pay his tribute despite reminders. So the Commissioners in their proclamation dated the 26th January, 1805, informed the residents of the killa and the revenue collectors that Nilakantha Mangraja was dismissed from his Zamindary as he did not submit to the British Government and did not pay his *peshkash*. The estate was made *khas* and Dadu Govind was appointed as the *Tahasildar*.^{6a}

Nilakanth Mangraj remained in confinement till April, 1805 when orders were issued to the Collector, Jagannath, for restoration of his Zamindari to him on conditions that he would make good the

2. Atchinson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 181-199.

3. *Mss.*, Vol. 1, p. 35.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

6a. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 30.

balance due, provide sufficient security for regular payment of revenue in future and reimburse the Government for the expenses incurred in the management of Estate during his period it was held *khas*.⁶

KUJANG AFFAIRS.

Birabhadra Sendh Narendra Bahadur was the Raja of Kujang in October 1803. He was informed by the Commissioner that Col. Knox who was appointed as Surveyor was proceeding to Kunjang for survey.⁷ On the 6th April, 1804 the Raja was informed that his people were protesting against the survey of his killa on the ground that it was the residence of the Raja's family. He was asked to instruct his men not to do so. It seems, Raja Birabhadra died sometime in September. The Commissioner in his letter (No. 466 dated 30-9-1804) to Chandradhvaja Sendh, the brother of Birabhadra, expressed his sympathy for the death of Raja Birabhadra, and requested him to send an authorised agent to decide the appointment of his successor. Eventually Chandradhvaja was allowed to succeed his brother. The Commissioners in their letter dated the 1st Nov. 1804 assured him that he would be nominated as the Raja of Kujang, but the delay was due to non-receipt of *Khilat* from Calcutta.⁸ In another letter dated the 26th January 1805 the Raja Chandradhvaja was informed of troops proceeding towards his killa and was warned that any disobedience on his part would cause his deposition.⁹ This shows Chandradhvaj was recognised as the Raja some times between 1st November, 1803 and 26th January 1804 and that the Raja had shown signs of refractoriness necessitating sending of troops to his estate. We are in darkness as to the events that led to the deposition of Chandradhvaja about the 22nd February, 1805. A letter of that date to Raja Madhusudan Sendh, who was another brother of Birabhadra conveyed his appointment as the Raja of Kujang.¹⁰ One Sadasiv Jena was directed to root out evil and notorious men from Kujang and to make arrangements for arresting Chandradhvaja and Padiram Naik on a reward of Rs. 1,000/-.¹¹ From the contents of

6b. Ms. Vol.7 (Bd. of Rev.), T. Fortescue to C. Grieco dated 5-4-1805.

7. *Ibid*, p. 26.

8. *Ibid*, Vol. II; p. 153.

9. *Ibid*, p. 161.

10. *Ibid*, p. 31.

11. *Ibid*, p. 41.

the letters of the Commissioners to Sadasiv Jena (No. 617 dated 11-2-1805 and 256 dated 20-3-1805) it appears that Chandradhvaja rose in rebellion against the British. Sadasiv Jena, who was probably appointed as the manager or *Diwan* of the Raja of Kujang (vide No. 616 dated 11-2-1805) and Fatah Muhammed were deputed to quell the disturbances. Chandradhvaja was eventually arrested in the month of May, 1805.¹² Two persons, Bhawat and Jagusi, were awarded reward of Re. 2,0 0/- each for arresting him.¹³ The heavy amount of the rewards indicates the serious nature of trouble created by Chandradhvaja and the anxiety of the Commissioners to arrest him. The troops were withdrawn from Kujang in July 1805 on the request of Raja Madhusudan Narendra.¹⁴

Chandradhvaja, it seems, probably petitioned to the Government claiming the right of succession. The Governor General in Council referred the matter to Robert Ker, Magistrate of Cuttack for his opinion on the 28th March 1807.¹⁵ On receipt of his report the Governor General decided in favour of the Raja in possession and Chandradhvaja was asked to establish his claim in the court of law.¹⁶

It may be noted here that there appears some discrepancy in the facts stated by Toynbee and also those mentioned in the record relating to Raja of Kujang.

According to Toynbee, Col. Harcourt proceeded to Kujang to bring to submission the Raja of that estate who had been suspected of carrying on correspondences with the Rajas of Kanika and Khurda 'with a view to entering into a triple alliance, offensive and defensive'. The Raja of Kujang fled away on the approach of the British army and Colonel Harcourt set up his brother, who was in confinement in Paradip, on the throne.¹⁷

A letter of the 17th Feb. 1805 of Colonel Harcourt¹⁸ contains much information about the Kujang affairs. According to it, Raja

12. *Ibid*, p. 67.

13. *Ibid* p. 166.

14. *Ibid*, p. 14.

15. Ms. Vol. 10 (Bd. of Rev.), p. 122.

16. *Ibid*, Dowdeswell to Robert Ker, Sept, 1807.

17. Toynbee, *Orissa*, pp. 5-6.

18. Ms. Vol. 10, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 183-83.

Birabhadra Sendh died in the month of October, 1804 by being poisoned by his *diwan* who had wished to usurp the throne. But he failed in his attempt. The brother of the deceased Raja (name not given) succeeded him. He was anxious to be recognised as the Raja of Kujang by the Commissioner. But Colonel Harcourt delayed the matter deliberately as he wished to see for himself the actual situation there and arrange for suppression of piracy in the sea in that part. So he proceeded to Kujang. On Col. Harcourt's arrival, the Raja wanted to have an interview with him, but he was put off, as Colonel Harcourt wanted to examine first the nature of defence and ascertain the other resources of the Raja before meeting him and granting recognition to his succession. After Col. Harcourt had examined the defences and procured all information relating to the estate, he decided that three more clauses should be added to the original agreement and accordingly conveyed the terms to the *Diwan Bebartha* who accepted them. Then Colonel Harcourt crossed the Mahanady from his camp on the south bank of it. The agreement was to be executed next day. But suddenly the information reached him that the Raja had taken to flight. This unexpected conduct on the part of the Raja was as much surprising to the Colonel as to the officers of the Raja.

Soon after this, the principal officers of the estate informed Colonel that the Raja who took to flight had an elder brother who was the rightful heir and who was kept in confinement in Paradip. The Raja was produced before the Colonel who recognised him as the Raja of Kujang and appointed some respectable persons to assist him in the administration.

The following four extra clauses were added to the original agreement.

(a) Arrangements made in the Mughalbandi area for the manufacture of salt should extend to the Kujang estate.

(b) The Raja should account to the British Government for all property saved from wrecks of any vessel on the coast within his territory.

(c) Raja should carry out all orders he would receive from the British Government,

(d) The family of the previous Raja should be taken care of and provided with suitable maintenance.

After making those arrangements Colonel Harcourt proceeded to Kanika. He brought away with him the guns that were found there, including two brass guns newly cast for the Company.

He further stated in the letter that the Raja of Ali had conducted himself properly but the conduct of the Raja of Kanika was uniformly unfriendly and consequently he had been placed under guard in camp.

It is clear from this letter that Colonel Harcourt marched to Kujang only after the death of Raja Birabhadra Sendh in September or October 1804, not just after occupation of Cuttack as stated by Toynbee. The letters addressed by the Commissioners to Birabhadra Sendh between the 25th October 1803 to 28th September, 1804 contained in the manuscript volume No. I of the Board of Revenue prove clearly that Birabhadra Sendh was recognised as the Raja of Kujang after the British occupation of Cuttack and that he paid a revenue of Rs. 4933-7-10 during the period.¹⁹ So the incident referred to by Toynbee relates to the events that took place in 1805, not to 1803. Further, there was no dismantling of the fort of Kujang. The suspicion about the triple alliance which is mentioned in the letter of Col. Harcourt relates to the year 1804 when the Raja of Khurda rose in rebellion.

There are some other discrepancies between the facts recorded in Col. Harcourt's letter and those in the Ms. Volumes, Nos. 1 and 2, referred to above.

That Chandradhvaja had been recognised as the Raja of Kujang after the death of Birabhadra is beyond any dispute in view of the letters addressed to him by the Colonel on the 26th January 1805²⁰. Madhusudan Sendh was recognised as Raja on 22nd February, 1805²¹. It is not to be assumed therefore that Chandradhvaja did not rule, the impression created by Colonel's letter discussed above. Further, Colonel's letter does not refer to any hostile actions on the part of Chandradhvaja, while the facts contained in the Ms. Vols. 1 and 2 give clear indication of Chandradhvaja's hostile activities in consequence of which he was hunted down, ultimately arrested and heavy rewards were given to those instrumental in the arrest as discussed above.

19, Ms. Vol. I, (Bd. of Revenue) p. 140.

20. Ms. Vol. II, (Bd. of Rev.), p. 151.

21. *Ibid*, p. 32.

The facts thus gleaned from all these sources may be summarised as follows:

Raja Birabhadra Sendh of Kujang executed agreement with the British Government after their occupation of Cuttack. He continued to rule till about the 28th September 1804. He was murdered by his *diwan* some times in the last week of September 1804, as the information of his death had reached Cuttack by the 30th September, 1804. After that Chandradhvaja was recognised as the Raja sometimes in November-December 1804. This Chandradhvaja was probably the youngest brother of Birabhadra, and he, in complicity with the *diwan*, had placed his elder brother, Madhusudan Sendh, in confinement and had usurped the throne. Col. Harcourt was unaware of this fact. The rising in Khurda in 1804 aroused suspicion in the mind of the Colonel about some secret understanding between the Rajas of Kujang, Kanika and Khurda. The Rajas of Kujang and Kanika probably indulged in some hostile acts that led to strengthen the suspicion. So, after the suppression of Khurda rising, Colonel turned his attention to Kujang and Kanika. Chandradhvaja was apprehensive of the intention of the Colonel, and so, took to flight; consequently Madhusudan Sendh was recognised as the Raja of Kujang.

AFFAIRS OF THE RAJA OF KHURDA.

We may now turn our attention to the affairs of the Raja of Khurda. During the Maratha regime the Rajas of Khurda were almost independent of the Maratha rule. The Maratha Governors found it hard to realise tribute from the Rajas of Khurda and had to take recourse to arms for realisation of their dues. During the reign of Virakishore Deva I (1742-1780) Khurda was invaded by Narayana Deo of Parlakhimedi in 1760. Virakishore Deva sought the help of the Maratha Governor. With the help of the Marathas Virakishore Deva could expel Narayan Deo. But as he could not pay the expenses of the military campaign, he had to mortgage to the Maratha Governor the best portion of his territory including Limbai, Rahang and Puri town²². Since that time those *parganas* remained under the Maratha control causing great financial loss to the Raja of Khurda who was

22. B. & O, District Gazetteer, Puri; p. 52.

very anxious for recovery of those *parganas*. The opportunity came soon. As discussed above, the English had been preparing for a final clash with the Marathas much ahead of the date when the second Maratha war broke out. They had started negotiations with the Orissan Chiefs who could offer resistance to them during the campaign. With that end in view, the Collector of Ganjam had sent a *Vakil* to the Raja of Khurda who also sent his agent to Ganjam. As Mukund Deva II was a mere boy at the time, the administration was carried on by Jayi Rajguru as his regent or guardian. Just on the eve of the campaign, Col. Harcourt, Melvill and the Collector of Ganjam negotiated with Raja of Khurda for a safe passage through his territory during the campaign. The Raja of Khurda who was anxious for the recovery of the *parganas* mentioned above, agreed to the proposal on condition that his *parganas* under Maratha occupation would be restored to him. The British authorities named above in their anxiety to gain the support of the Raja of Khurda agreed not only to restore those *parganas* to him, but in additions, offered to pay one lac of rupees in cash.

Agreeable to the terms of agreement the Raja of Khurda remained a passive spectator during the campaign resulting in the English occupying the Puri town without any opposition. Orissawas conquered and the Raja of Khurda expected restoration of his *parganas* to him on termination of the hostilities. Rajguru, his regent, met Col. Harcourt and Mr. Melvill at Cuttack to remind them of their promise. But Harcourt plainly told him that he would not part with those lands, evidently because they were under the direct possession of the Marathas at the time of the conquest, and as such, they belonged to the English by right of conquest. Rajaguru was given some cash and the remainder was promised to be paid in future.²³ Naturally, the Raja of Khurda was greatly shocked and felt aggrieved at the *volti facie* of the British authorities. So he bore a grudge against the English and did not come forward to execute the treaty agreement.

The Commissioners in their letter of the 29th November, 1803²⁴ requested the Raja him to send his *Vakil* to them. In another letter of

23. *Ms. Vol.*, 10 (Bd. of Rev.), Petition of the Raja of Khurda,

24. *Ms. Vol.* I, (Bd. of Rev), p. 3.

the 23rd November 1803 they requested for acknowledgement of Rs.40,000/.^{24a} This is probably the amount which was paid to Rajguru who met the Commissioners at Cuttack in connection with the restoration of the four *parganas* of the Raja of Khurda. The Commissioners informed in the same letter that the remaining Rs. 50,000- would be sent afterwards. It is recorded in the petition of Mukund Deo that a lac of rupees was to be paid in cash. If it be a fact, Rs. 10,000/- had probably been paid in the first instalment before the campaign started. They paid Rs. 4000/- in the second instalment. So, Rs. 50,000 - remained to be paid.

The Commissioners in their letter of 16th December, 1803 regreted that the Raja was under ill-advice of some persons and requested him to execute the agreement and return the papers.²⁵ In the another letter to Govind Ray Maharay, who was probably the *qanungo*, the Commissioners informed him that the Raja of Khurda who was a young man was under ill-advice and so his stay at Khurda should not be continued. He was informed that Khurda Raja had been requested to make over the agreements to him. On the same date another letter was written to the Raja of Khurda informing him that Rs. 50000 had been deposited in his name and he would get it if he removed his evil-advisers. He was asked to return the papers of agreement should he not want to sign them. He was warned that he would incur the displeasure of the British Government by such attitude.²⁷

'The evil-advisers' indirectly meant Rajguru, the man at the helm of affairs then. The Commissioner probably expected that the Raja, out of fear and out of greed for the balance amount, would seek the intervention of the British in his attempt to make himself free of the influence of Rajguru. In other words, they were trying in their characteristic diplomatic way to drive a wedge between the young king and his regent, thus to avert a danger of rising.

The Commissioners in their letter of the 20th February, 1804 again warned the Raja that he was still under ill-advice and requested

24a *Ibid*, p. 72.

25 *Ibid*, p. 12.

26. *Ibid*, p. 60.

27. *Ibid*,

him to send Rajguru to meet them, and assured him that Rajguru would not be treated badly.²⁸ On the same date they wrote another letter to Rajguru requesting him to meet them for consultation on the private affairs of the Raja. He was also assured of good treatment.²⁹

From these correspondences it appears that the treaty agreement had not been executed by the Raja till February 1804. But the Commissioners in their letter of the 2nd August, 1804 directed the Raja to send his *peshkash* without delay in accordance with the terms of the agreement and inform him that his *khilat* would be sent to him when received from Calcutta.³⁰ So the agreement was executed sometimes between February to July 1804. In their letter of the 1st October, 1804, the Commissioners informed the Raja that his due of Rs. 3,000 - would not be paid unless the Government directions were complied with.³¹ They also sent one agent of theirs (Golam Amin ?) to advise the Raja and he was requested to comply with the advice.³²

The Commissioners in their proclamation of the 7th December 1804 declared that Raja Mukund Deva of Khurda had been deposed owing to his ill-treatment towards the British Government with effect from the 5th December, 1804 and all his subjects were required to submit to the British Government and carry out their orders. The Commissioners in their letter of the 9th December, 1804 to Morar Pandit, the Head Parichha of the temple, directed him not to mention the name of Mukunda Deva at the time of worship of Jagannath, as he was the greatest foe of the British Government. In another proclamation of the 7th December, 1804, addressed to residents Zamindars, *Sarbarhars*, etc. the Commissioners declared that owing to the oppression in Khurda and illegal actions made by him, Mukund Deo had been deposed and that all the debts taken by any one through the suggestion of Mukunda Deva would not be realised, as the late Raja had forcibly done so.³⁵

28. *Ibid*, p. 61.

29. *Ibid*,

30. *Ibid*, p. 62.

31. *Ibid* p. 42.

32. *Ibid*, p. 144.

33. *Ibid*, Vol. 2, p. 8.

34. *Ibid*, p. 8.

35. *Ibid*, p. 9.

The oppressions and illegal actions alleged to have been committed by Mukunda Deva are not detailed in the letter above. But from other sources we come to know of the nature of the activities of Mukunda Deva that incensed the British authorities in Orissa, and ultimately led them to take the drastic action of deposing him. As a matter of fact, a cold war was being fought out between the Commissioners for Orissa and Rajguru, the guardian of the young king, Mukunda Deva. The Commissioners attempted to drive a wedge between Rajguru and Mukunda Deva by seducing him to their side. Side by side they also indulged in brow-beating as an alternate measure. But they did not succeed; Mukunda Deva was firmly within the clutches of Rajguru who, on his part, was trying to coerce the British into restoration of the four most productive *parganas* of the Raja of Khurda under British possession, viz., Rahang, Lembai, Sirai and Chabiskud. He probably thought that stiffness on their part might induce the British authorities to make a compromise with the Raja of Khurda for the sake of consolidation of their newly established power. But he misjudged the stamina of the English; they were too hardened in Indian politics to be brow-beaten or coerced into foregoing their material interests by a petty Chief. So the diplomacy of Rajaguru was not availing, and ultimately the bitter consequences of it had to be borne by the puppet king Mukunda Deva.

The strained feeling started in consequence of the refusal of the Commissioners to hand over the four *parganas* under reference to the Raja of Khurda who, in his turn, refused to execute agreement with the English. Further, he wanted to establish his claim by force. In March 1804, Raja of Khurda sent a *parwana* to Morar Pandit, *tahsildar* of Chabiskud to supply 2000 coolies, carpenters, etc. for the construction of cars of the deities of Jagannath temple. He threatened that he would get them by force if not voluntarily supplied³⁶. The Raja of Khurda claimed the right of collection of revenue from Batagaon in the British territory and appointed Achyut Barik as *maqaddam* for collection³⁷. In September the Raja of Khurda sent Dharmu Harichandan to collect revenue from the villages of Barpada, Kharad and Matiapara. He actually collected 250 kahanas of cowries³⁸. Again, in the same month

36. Ms. Volume, No. 2, Bd. of Rev., Hunter to Hartwell dated 10-3-1804.

37. *Ibid* Collr, Jagannath to Secretary to Commissioners dated 28-7-1804.

38. *Ibid*. Vol. 2, Hunter to Hartwell, dated 4-9-1804,

Raja sent a letter to Morar Pandit demanding sheep, goats from the *parganas* of Rahang, Chabiskud and Sirai³⁹. Hunter, Collector, Jagannath, in his letters dated 21-10-1804 and 7-11-1804 sought instructions about the settlement of the *parganas* of Rahang, Chabiskud, Limbai, Sirai and Purusottam, the property of the Raja of Khurda⁴⁰. The Commissioner in their letter of 10-11-1804 instructed the Collector to make settlement with the *padhans* or *bhois* direct⁴¹.

The Commissioners in their letter of the 3rd December 1804, informed the *Khandaits* and *watandars* of Kotdes that they should provide *paiks* and *dandawasis* to the dak-runners who were being troubled by the Raja of Khurda⁴². In October 1804, some troops of the Raja raided some villages near Pipli⁴³.

These are the hostile actions of the Khurda Raja towards the British Government. As discussed above, the Raja wanted to establish his right by force and expected that the British authorities who had just established their sway in the province would ultimately make a favourable compromise with him.

But the things did not take the turn in the expected direction. The British authorities, on the other hand, found a plea, they were looking for, to take strong action to eliminate the danger at the beginning before it assumed formidable proportion. So they decided to strike at once, specially in view of the lurking suspicion about a Maratha attack on Orissa.

So military action was taken forthwith. A detachment moved from Cuttack towards Khurda. They contacted the troops of the Khurda Raja at Pipli and drove them out of it. The troops of the Raja of Khurda retreated towards Khurda. In the mean time troops had been called from Ganjam side. The Raja had taken up position in the fort on the of Barunai hill, which, by its nature of situation, was very difficult of approach. Consequently after three weeks' labour the

39. *Ibid*, Hunter to Hartwell, dated 12-9-1804.

40. *Ibid*.

41. *Ibid*, Vol, I.

42. *Ibid*, Vol, 2, p. 8,

43. Toynbee, *Oriassa*, p. 8.

English forces could storm the fortress and carry it. The Raja escaped southward with a few of his trusted followers⁴⁴.

Mukunda Deva was arrested in about January, 1805. The Commissioners in their letter of the 5th January, 1805 to Srikrishna Deva, Treasurer, directed payment of a reward of Rs. 3000/- to Sk. Fateh Muhammed who arrested Mukunda Deva⁴⁵. Major Fletcher was appointed to make settlement of Ktorda in January 1805⁴⁶. Raja of Khurda was kept in confinement at Midnapore till 1807. During his confinement in Midnapore he submitted a petition⁴⁷ to the Government stating all the facts relating to the rising in 1804 and praying for restoration of his estate to him in view of his innocence.

According to the facts stated in the petition Raja had agreed to remain passive and withdraw his alliance from the Marathas during the British campaign to conquer Orissa on the condition of four *parganas* of his estate under Maratha possession being restored to him. The Commissioners had agreed to the terms and promised to pay a lac of rupees in addition. After the conquest was over, Rajguru met Col. Harcourt and Mr. Melvill and requested them for restoration of the four *parganas* as promised by them. But the Commissioners refused to hand them over to the Raja of Khurda. So Rajguru was greatly displeased; when the Commissioners pressed for execution of the agreement and disbanding of troops, the Raja of Khurda wanted to comply with those directions but for Rajguru who was greatly displeased at the suggestion. In stead of disbanding the troops he instigated them to demand their pay from the Raja who was helpless in the matter. Mukunda Deva was almost kept in confinement for two or three days. Thereafter Rajguru led the troops to the four *parganas* under dispute and plundered those *mahals*. They fought with the Company's troops there. After this Col. Harcourt marched on the fort of Khurda. The Raja of Khurda wanted to have an interview with the Colonel but he was prevented from doing so by Rajguru who kept the king in confinement and got ready to give a fight. The fort was taken and Raja's property was plundered. The Raja had to take shelter in the jungle,

44 *Ibid*, p. 8.

45. Ms. Vol. 2 (Bd. of Rev.), p. 22.

46. *Ibid*, p. 25.

47, *Ibid*, Vol. 10.

Rajguru was then captured and brought before Colonel Harcourt who asked him if he caused the disturbance himself or at the instigation of the Raja. Rajguru replied that he did it all himself. After this Raja wanted to see Col. Harcourt; for that purpose he sent an agent who was imprisoned. Then he sent his *diwan* who suffered the same fate. So Mukunda Deva sought the help of Fateh Muhammed. Despite his soothing and encouraging words, the Raja was arrested and kept in confinement in Cuttack and was subsequently removed to Midnapore. Mukunda Deva in his petition prayed for indulgence of the British Government for his release.

This petition clearly reveals that Rajguru was the real man who fought with the English. It also gives us an insight into the nature of Rajguru who, doubtless, had a brave heart and proud disposition. Despite the fact that he had little chance against the vastly superior force of the English, he did not flinch from his determination of fighting out the case; and for that purpose, he had to keep in confinement his master, a timid soul. He revealed himself in his best trait of character when he bravely took upon himself the whole responsibility of the disturbance in the presence of Colonel Harcourt after his arrest. He certainly strove for no mean end of self-gratification, but what he did, he did it for the sake of the prestige of the Gajapati dynasty of Khurda at all hazards to his own interests. Mukunda Deva has done Jayi Rajguru the greatest honour by trying to put all blame on him to prove his innocence. Though the resistance offered by Rajguru was not of formidable proportions, yet it did perturb the British authorities in their new situation and kept them alert.

Mukunda Deva's petition was favourably considered by the Governor General who issued orders for his release in his letter dated the 5th March 1807 addressed to the Collectors of Midnapore and Balasore.⁵⁸ But his estate was not returned to him and he was granted a pension amounting to one tenth of the revenue of his estate and was entrusted with the management of the Puri temple.

RAJA OF KANIKA.

Raja of Kanika, was another Chief whom the British authorities looked upon with suspicion on account of his previous activities in

interfering with the Company's trade along the coast of Orissa.⁴⁹ They were fully aware of the fact that the Rajas of Kanika, Kujang and Harispur were very turbulent Chiefs and should be brought under full control for the maintenance of peace. Hence their attitude towards them was biased with suspicion from the beginning. This is evident from the facts contained in the letter of the date, 11th, October 1803, from Colonel Harcourt to Captain Morgan, Commanding the troops at Balasore. Captain Morgan was informed that there was an apprehension of Maratha attack and that the activities of the Raja of Kanika appeared suspicious. The Captain was directed to despatch a detachment to keep a watch on the Raja and check him.⁵⁰ This clearly manifests the bias Colonel Harcourt entertained towards the Raja of Kanika.

However, the apprehension of Maratha attack proved to be without any real foundation. So the Commissioners in their letter of the 10th November, 1803 to Raja Balabhadra Bhanja of Kanika requested him for the deputation of his *Vakil* to them for consulting on the affairs of his estate.⁵¹ The agreement or *ekrarnama* was executed by the Raja of Kanika on 22-11-1803.⁵² The Commissioners then tried to conciliate him by recognising him as the Zamindar of the *pargana*, Utikan Bisi.⁵³ The relation between the Raja and the Commissioners continued to be satisfactory as appears from the fact the Raja of Kanika executed the agreement on the 7th April, 1804 promising to sell all salts produced within his estate to the Government and not to other persons.⁵⁴ On 12th April of the same year the Raja of Kanika paid Rs.6000 into the Government Treasury as his tribute. The relations between the Raja and the Commissioners continued to be satisfactory till September 1804. A letter of the Commissioners to the Raja of 19-9-1804 gives the first indication of some strained feelings between them. The Commissioners expressed their displeasure on the illegal and unjust treatment by the Raja in respect of Utikan Zamindari and requested him not to make any objection to the settlement to be made by Haladhar Das⁵⁵ who was deputed by the Commissioners to enquire into

49. Banerji, *History of Orissa*, II, p. 179.

50. *M. S. Vol. 2*, (Bd. of Rev.)

51. *Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 4.

52. *Ibid*, p. 10.

53. *Ibid*, 43.

54. *Ibid*, p. 91.

55. *Ibid*, p. 138.

some complaints made by some *raiyats*⁵⁶. The Raja of Kanika probably resisted the Government orders relating to settlement of Utikan *pargana* as indicated above. The open defiance of the Raja of Khurda in October-November, 1804, had alerted the British authorities. Similar acts on the parts of the Rajas of Kanika and Kujang about the same time led the British authorities to suspect the existence of some secret understanding between the three parties. We have already referred to the arrest of Raja Chandradhvaja of Kujang on this suspicion. While Col. Harcourt was proceeding to Kujang for settlement of the affairs there as noted above, Robert Ker, the Collector of Balasore, was deputed to Kanika with necessary military assistance to arrest the Raja of Kanika on the same baseless ground of suspicion of a secret understanding with the Raja of Khurda. Col. Harcourt in his letter of the 27th February, 1805 to Robert Ker, ordered assumption of the charge of Kanika estate for revenue collection and assertion of the British authority. He was further directed to remove the Raja to Balasore with a part of his family where he was to reside⁵⁷. In his letter dated the 28th February 1805 to Siba Prasad, *Subahdar*, Col. Harcourt asked him to act according to the orders of Major Andrew and Captain Blunt who were evidently deputed to Kanika for assisting Robert Ker in the settlement of the affairs of the estate and arresting the Raja. Siba Prasad was further asked to allow the Raja of Kanika to take any thing he liked⁵⁸. The Raja was brought over to Balasore where he stayed till September 1805. The Commissioners in their letter of the 11th April, 1805 to Robert Ker sanctioned Rs. 281/- incurred for purchase of a house for the accommodation of the Raja and for erection of a mud-wall around it for security of the person of the Raja⁵⁹. The Raja was removed to Midnapore in about September, 1805. The Commissioners in their letter dated the 13th September, 1805, sanctioned the charge incurred for removal of the Raja to Midnapore⁶⁰.

From the contents of some letters received and issued by the Commissioners it appears that there was a rising in Kanika by the

56. *Ibid*, p. 72.

57. *Ibid*, Vol. 2.

58. *Ibid*,

59. *Ibid*, Vol. 7.

60. *Ibid*, Vol. 9.

supporters of the Raja. Colonel Herbert, Surveyor in charge of the Gun-vessel, informed the Colonel in his letter of the 3rd March, 1805 that he had received information about a rising in Kanika⁶¹. There-upon Col. Harcourt in his letter dated the 7th March, 1805 ordered Robert Ker to take immediate steps for ensuring the person of the Raja. He further asked him to impress upon the Raja that he would be responsible for the activities of Murad Khan and Shah Beg Khan and the necessity of Raja's communicating with them with a view to bring home this point to them. Ker was asked to permit the Raja to send one or two persons for the communication of his instructions to his supporters. Colonel further informed that the Raja's *diwan* was at the head of the insurrection and that a suitable force would be sent if needed.⁶² Soldiers were sent to Kanika for suppression of the rising. Subahdar Siba Prasad was originally in charge of operation and Capt. Macarthy (?) was sent later on. The Commissioners in their letter of the 15th March, 1805 approved the arrangements made by Siba Prasad for rooting out evil-doers from Kanika.⁶³ In their letter of the 19th March, 1805, Siba Prasad was directed to make over all weapons, evidently those seized from the people of Kanika who rose against the British, to Captain Macarthy⁶⁴ (?). That shows that by the 12th March, 1805, the rising had been put down.

The Raja who was incarcerated in Midnapore made an application to the Governor General sometimes in December 1805. In that application the Raja complained that the officers appointed by the Government had seized some of his property and requested for investigation and necessary action for the redress of his grievance. Further, he requested the Governor to release him from imprisonment⁶⁵

The activities of the Rajas of Khurda, Kujang and Kanika can hardly be termed as rebellion against the British authority. They constituted manifestations of deep resentment against the British policy towards the Rajas of the States of Orissa, specially towards

61. *Ibid*, Vol. 2

62. *Ibid*.

63. *Ibid*. p. 43.

64. *Ibid*, p. 54.

65. *Ms.* Vol. No. 4, (Orissa State Archives), pp. 161-53.

those three who were looked upon, from the very outset, as hostile elements needing extra attention and special treatment. The Chiefs of Kanika and Kujang had incurred the displeasure of the British authorities long before the conquest of Orissa on account of their interference with the British ships plying along the Orissa coast. So the Government were just seeking some pretext to control them effectively and they had not to wait long for a suitable opportunity. They adopted the principle of giving the dog a bad name and hanging it. They could scent a secret tripartite alliance between the Rajas of Kanika, Kujang and Khurda, so they lost no time in pouncing upon them and putting them behind the bars. Thus, in fact, the early risings detailed above were mere expressions of a sense of resentment and frustration by the three Orissan Princes named above against the treatment meted out to them.

CHAPTER V.

THE RISING IN PARLAKIMEDI. (1799-1800)

We have described the rising in the Ganjam District during the period 1767-93. Now we shall see how the events shaped themselves thereafter.

Gajapati Deo continuously resisted the orders of the Collector, Mr. Scot, and neglected to pay tribute. Government took up arms against him, issued proclamation warning inhabitants against the risk of helping him and ordered all to refrain from paying revenue to him.

Col. Muat prepared to move against him. Gajapati Deo repaired to Chicacole. The Government due on him amounted to Rs. 82,203/-, a further sum of 14,398-6-34 per month being the punitive fine on account of military expenses the Government was involved on account of him was also charged. As the Raja made no attempt to liquidate the Government dues, he, along with his son Purusottam Deo and his cousin, Durga Raj, who possessed great influence on the town peons were kept in confinement, and Collector took charge of collection of revenue.¹

1799-January...Supporters of the Raja broke into rebellion and began to make inroads in the British territory.

February...Town peons and inhabitants of the town joined the movement. Gajapati Deo with his son and nephew were transferred to Masulipatam. Mr. Scott, had hoped that this action would have some effect on the insurrection. But he was bitterly disappointed. The insurgents attacked the detachments at Baranasi and Kimedi who capitulated to the supporters of the Raja led by Octansing (Uttam sing ?) The insurrection spread from Kimedi to Tekali. The Thanadar of Tekkali was seized and the peons at that place joined the rising.

March...Jagannath Deo, brother of Gajapati Deo who was formerly in possession of the Zamindari and who was dispossessed in

1. *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government, No' XXIV, Russel's Report, Vol. I, p. 8.*

2. *Ibid, p. 4.*

1780, had long been applying to the Government for his reinstatement. But representation was not given any consideration to an account of his doubtful fidelity. He now found a suitable opportunity to prove to the British authorities the influence he still possessed and the extent to which he could be a source of danger to the Government. So he too joined the rising.

A force consisting of 8 companies of native infantry, a detachment of cavalry and a brigade of six-pounders under the command of Col. Fotheringham was sent to quell the rising.^{2a} The number of the supporters of the Raja in arms had by that time swelled to 5000. So, Mr. Scot, the Collector did not consider it safe or prudent to take immediate military action. He tried to browbeat the people into submission. Jagannath Deo was asked to surrender himself, otherwise he would be treated as an 'enemy to the Company'. People were warned not to be misled by Jagannath Deo, and that they would suffer punishment unless they become peaceful. The Collector also offered the people to allow them all privileges and rights they had been enjoying hitherto.³

Mr. Scott also tried another stratagem. He sent for Purusottam Deo and his cousin whom he intended to use against the influence of Jagannath Deo. Before their arrival, Jagannath Deo's people overran Tekkali Haveli, made surprise attack on the military camp at Heramandalam and took away Lieutenant Youngson as prisoner. When Mr. Scott demanded his release, Jagannath Deo replied that he had come to defend the right of his house and would not release Lt. Youngson until his brother and nephews were set at liberty.

May...With the arrival of Purusottam Deo and Durgaraj, the situation took a turn for better. Many Bisoi sided with Durga Raj, and thus, information about the movement of the ensurgents could be procured. Another force under Col. Vigors arrived to supplement that already in the camp. Col. Vigors started action immediately and cleared the whole area without much difficulty. 'Lachminnursoo Patrodoo' who had captured Lt. Youngson was arrested and the family of Gajapati Deo who had been kept in confinement by Jagannath

2a. *Ibid.* p. 4.

3. *Ibid.* P. P. 6-7.

Deo were released. Jagannath Deo took refuge with the Bisoi of Jeringi.⁴

Thus peace was restored, the Bisois who were given guarantee about the security of their possessions returned to their Zamindaris. The management of the estate was entrusted to Durga Raj. A reward of Rs. 10,000/- was declared for the capture of Jagannath Deo.

September—Jagannath Deo returned again in September and made some attempts at reviving the insurrection against the British, but since the management was in the hands of Durga Raj the *bisois* and people did not join him in his attempt. So he returned towards Cuttack. He was at last apprehended in 1804 through the help of the Zamindar of Sorada and was sent as a prisoner to Masulipatam.⁵

Thus the British authority had to yield to the peoples' will of being ruled by their own Raja. They hated being governed by an alien power, and for that reason, they strongly resisted when the British authority was imposed on them. They stood firm together in the achievement of their aim and the attempts of Mr. Scott to drive a wedge between the *bisois* and Jagannath Deo met with failure. So he had to secure the services of Purusottam Deo and Durga Raj for controlling the situation which had passed beyond his control. However, the British diplomacy of setting one against another from among the leaders of the people prevailed at last.

It is very difficult to assess correctly the value of the services of Jagannath Deo rendered in the cause of the peoples' resistance to the British authority on the basis of meagre facts at our disposal. Of course the incentive to join the rising of the people was provided by Jagannath Deo's feeling of frustration and resentment on account of his deposition as described above, yet it can not be denied that he was inspired, to a great extent, by his love of freedom and hatred of an alien authority on the soil of his forefathers. His brave rejoinder to Mr. Scott's order for release of Lt. Youngsen clearly indicates his mission in joining the peoples' resistance to the British authority. He replied,

4. *Ibid*, p. 8.

5. *Ibid*, p. 9.

‘I came here to defend the right of my house, and not otherwise, it is true that the Company have used me well and favoured me, but as my brother and four persons are kept at Mausaliapatam fort, I demand that they be liberated.’

If you do not let them go, I have got a gentleman in return and have kept him upon a hill, and we are in search of three gentlemen more.” These brave words give us an insight into the patriotic feelings that actuated him in his fight against the British. He forgot his differences with his brother while fighting a common foe and his brotherly feeling and the sense of the prestige of his family prevailed over his petty jealousy towards his brother who had supplanted him on the throne.

After this rising, peace and tranquillity reigned in the Parlakimedi area till 1813. Gajapati Deo expired in February 1802 and his son Purusottam Deo was declared as the Zamindar. The management, however, was carried on by Durga Raj as before. In 1803 a deed of permanent settlement of the Zamindari was concluded. Purusottam Deo died in October 1805 and was succeeded by his minor son, Jagannath Gajapati Narayan Deo. The Zamindar¹ was placed under court of wards and Durga Raj was entrusted with the management. He resigned his post in 1813 and went on a pilgrimage. During his managership of 7 years the Zamindari was free from any trouble or agitation and his remarkable ability coupled with his popularity brought back peace and order to that part of the much-disturbed land. The British Government were also much gainer on account of his wise and sound administration. They were not only spared of the trouble and huge expenditure of maintaining a military post in the Zamindari, they received their tribute regularly and when Durga Raj resigned, the surplus in the hands of the Collector amounted to Rs. 1,19,332/-²

During Durga Raj's absence Srikanth Patnaik and Gopinath Patnaik two *muzmadar* discharged the duties of the manager. But when the news of Durga Raj's death became known, the Collector appointed Padmanabh Deo, Durga Raj's son, as manager.

THE RISING OF 1814.

Padmanabh Deo's appointment as the manager of the Parlakimedi Estate revived again the old feeling of resentment against the British in the minds of the people. Padmanabh Deo, unlike his father, was hot-headed, arrogant, and consequently, inattentive to the sentiments of the people under him. His inordinate love of women induced deep system of intrigues.⁷ Thus he evidently offended the sentiments of the *Bisois* who demanded his immediate removal. With a view to bring home to the authorities their deep feeling of resentment and making them do justice to their demands they took up arms in October 1813.⁸

The civil authorities tried to control the situation but they found that it was beyond their means. They reported the whole matter to the Government in March 1814 moving them for immediate military reinforcement. Accordingly, 5 companies of the 10th Regiment from Vizianagaram and three companies of corps at Berhampore were directed to proceed to Kimedi.⁹ These forces were attacked on their way and suffered some losses.

The *Bisois* "seized upon the Police Darogah: the Custom Tanadar and his establishment, and kept them all in confinement, and surrounded the Sibendies with a very superior force and sent in a statement of grievances, all tending to the removal of Padmanabh Deo and appointment of Patta Maha Devy."¹⁰

Padmanabha Deo with his family was removed to Chicacole to pacify the people, and declaration was made to the effect that the alleged grievances of the people against Padmanabha Deo would be investigated into.

7. *Ibid*, p. 18

8. *Ibid*, p. 12

9. *Ibid*, pp. 13-14

10. *Ibid*, p. 14.

Accordingly a meeting between the Collector, Magistrate, of Ganjam, and the *bisois* of Parlakimedi was held in the village Narayan-puram in April 1814.¹¹ The *Bisois* put forth their allegations against the manager verbally and in writing. The meeting was broken up on the understanding that they would meet again after two or three days when the Government authorities would have made a preliminary enquiry into the allegations.¹²

In the second meeting the *Bisios* again made it plain to the authorities that they would not tolerate Padmanabha Deo as manager under any circumstances. The civil authorities took twentysix days' time for the Government decision in the matter.¹³

After enquiry, the Magistrate reported that the dislike of the people towards the Manager, though universal and deeply rooted arose "rather from his overbearing disposition, the violence of his temper, and his inordinate love of women, which induced deep systems of intrigues, than from any any acts of positive guilt capable of being visited with the punishment of the law. x x x." Thus on the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate, Padmanabha Deo was removed and a general amnesty was granted. Karukurti Narsingarow was appointed as Manager.¹⁴

THE RISING OF 1816-17.

After a lull of about six months troubles started again as the result of intrigues of Padmanabha Deo and his two associates Godeyapauty Lutsanah and Durga Raj (II), son of Jagannath Deo. In a letter to the Collector, Lutsanah, popularly known as 'Godeyapaud', demanded reinstatement of Raja, Gajapaty Maharaj. He further alleged that revenue collected was being embezzled.¹⁵

On the 19th October Mr. Spottiswoode entered the Zamindari with 4 companies of Sepoys Though the pasess were stockaded, no

11. *Ibid*, p. 15.

12. *Ibid* pp. 18

13. *Ibid*, p. 18.

14. *Ibid*, p. 21.

15. *Ibid*, p. 23.

opposition was offered to their progress. On being satisfied about the guilt of Padmanabh Deo, he arrested him. But Lutsanab escaped. A reward of Rs. 1000/- was offered for his apprehension. Durga Raj II was arrested in April 1817 and executed.^{15(a)}

From 1817 to 1822, troubles broke out now and then as the result of partifaction among the two queens of the deceased king, Gajapati Deo, and the *Bisois*. Pata Mahadevi (first wife of Gajapati Deo) was supported by Gomoh *Biso* and his adherents, while the second queen of Gajapati Deo, the minor Raja, his mother; Jheringi *Biso* and his followers constituted the other party. Government interference in these quarrels was very little, as they allowed the parties to settle among themselves. The manager Narasing Row was a clever diplomat who managed to keep peace despite these menacing quarrels between the *Bisois*.

We may now turn our attention to the affairs of Ghumsar after accession of Srikara Bhanja in 1788, the facts prior to which have been briefly outlined in Chapter II.

GHUMSAR REBELLION OF 801.

Srikara Bhanja found the situation out of control. He found himself and his state completely in the hands of the money-lenders. So, out of disgust he resigned his Zamindari and went on a pilgrimage. His son Dhananjaya Bhanja succeeded him. But Srikara Bhanja came back in 1795 and assumed the charge of the estate. His son was expelled by him. But he could hardly control the situation. Liabilities had been increasing. He was not in a position to clear up the debts and pay up the arrear or current revenue. Almost nothing was paid during the years 1797-1800. So he absconded and declared that he had to resign his Zamindari on account of fraud and illtreatment of the Agents employed by the Collector, Mr. Snodgrass. In the mean time Jagannath Deo of Parlakimedi and Mani Deo of Vijayanagram had escaped from their confinement and collected their followers to continue their resistance against the British.

15.(a) *Ibid*, pp. 23-24.

Srikara Bhanja also made preparation for a fight with the British authorities. Other Zamindars of the District who were always alert to avail themselves of any opportunity of rising against the British came forward to join hands with Srikara Bhanja. Thus, Aska and Berhampore were threatened on one side by the force of Mani Deo, and on the other, by the Ghumsar Paiks.¹⁶ The junction of these two forces would have rendered the situation very precarious for the British authorities. So Lt. Col. Smith was deputed to prevent this junction. The combined forces of Mani Deo and the Zamindar of Sergada were marching to join that of Srikara Bhanja when they were intercepted at Sergada by Smith. One shot from a six-pounder hit the Zamindar of Sergada whose head was severed from the body. This incident had a very demoralising effect on the forces who took to flight in confusion. The other Zamindars who were contemplating to come forward were terrified into passivity.¹⁷

Srikara Bhanja, in the mean time, had been joined by Jagannath Deo of Parlakimedi. So it became necessary to reduce them. But as the troops in the *sarcar* were, at that time, insufficient to meet the situation, Col. Marley was ordered to proceed at once with two battalions of the 6th Regiment of B. H. I.¹⁸ He was vested with high powers of summary trial and awarding punishment with death to persons acting in arms against the Company, or aiding or abetting the enemy. His forces were further reinforced by the first battalion of the 17th Regiment of M. N. I. and one detachment of artillery.

The operations started on the 2nd May 1801 when Col. Marley reached Ganjam. On the 9th he reached Gogu and issued proclamation declaring Srikara Bhanja as a rebel and offering a reward of Rs. 10,000- for his arrest.¹⁹ The first action took place at Kallada on the 14th May 1801. Here they attacked a very strong stockade of the enemy who had to retreat to jungle on account of heavy firing of the British force.

Then the troops proceeded towards Durgaprasad. During their march through jungle they were fired upon at every point of vantage.

16. *Ganjam District Manual*, p. 126.

17. *Ibid*, pp. 126-27,

18. Government to Col. Marley, dated the 21st and 24th April 1801.

19. From Lt. Col. Marley dated 9th May, 1801.

The loss amounted to three killed and five wounded. On the 23rd May the stokeade at Durgaprasad was attacked and carried after some resistance. After establishing posts at different points, Lt. Col. Marley returned to Aska in June. He published the proclamation of Government about dethronement of Srikara Bhanja and setting up of Dhananjay Bhanja in his place.²⁰

In September the peons of Ghumsar made surprise attack on the Raja's force at Kallada and almost destroyed the whole party. By October troops had been withdrawn from different posts. Taking advantage of it the peons renewed their activities and retook Kallada but they were soon dislodged. Srikara Bhanja could not be apprehended despite offer of reward. At last Brown induced him to acquiesce in the accession of his son by allotting certain Mutahs in the Zamindari for his support. Despite these arrangements the Zamindari continued to be in a disturbed condition owing to presence of Srikara Bhanja.²¹

GHUMSAR DURING 1815-1818.

Ghumsar remained quiet till 1814. Srikara Bhanja got into troubles with the Khonds in 1807-08 and had to quit the state as his son Dhanajay Bhanj also intrigued against him. He wandered as a *Sanyasi* visiting places of pilgrimage for seven years. He came back to Ghumsar in 1815 with the permission of the Governor of Madras.²²

In 1814 Dhananjay Bhanj was accused of murdering his mother and various other atrocities. A criminal case was started against him and he resisted the process of the criminal court. So his Zamindari was declared as forfeited to the Government on the 21st May 1815. But as the Raja still resisted, Colonel Fletcher was sent against him. The force took possession of Kalada. Dhananjay Bhanj surrendered himself to the Collector. Then he was committed to trial before the Court of Circuit. But he was ultimately acquitted and sent as a State Prisoner to Chingleput.²³

20. From Mr. Brown, dated 15.9.1801.

21. *Ganjam District Manual*, pp. 127-28.

22. *Ibid*, p. 185.

23. *Ibid*, pp. 139-40.

Srikara Bhanja who had been placed under military guard at Berhampur since 1815 escaped in 1818 and returned to Ghumsar. He soon gathered followers and practically acquired control over the Zamindari. During the period from 1815 to 1817 the Zamindari was managed by Dora Bisoi and Bahubalendra who had successfully managed to pass upon the authorities a female child as Balabhadra Deo, son of Dhananjay Bhanja. Srikara Bhanja, on his return to Ghumsar, got hold of this child and sent her to the Collector. Thereafter he took possession of the Zamindari and managed it,²⁴

Besides these major risings in Parlakimedi and Ghumsar, troubles in some form other continued to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the district from time to time and cause annoyance to the British authorities. The people of Ganjam, specially their leaders, the Zamindars, *bisois* and the *paiks*, were of very independent character. They hated any imposition curtailing their liberty enjoyed for centuries. Even during the period of Muslim domination of about 180 years they were practically left to themselves excepting the demands of a formal acknowledgement of authority and payment of a fixed tribute. With the establishment of foreign rule in Ganjam in 1753, their attitude stiffened and they started fighting against foreign domination from the very outset. We have described how the French were harassed by the Zamindars of Ganjam. When the British came to substitute them, they reacted all the more violently. The British authorities tried to introduce their system of administration in place of that the people were accustomed to, and that too, without allowing sufficient time to the people to get used to them. The result was violent reaction on the part of the Zamindars, *Bisois* and peons who were determined to assert themselves and have their own way. So they fought with all their might against imposition of foreign rule on them. Though they could hardly make a successful stand against the disciplined and well equipped British forces, they, nevertheless, did not bend their heads in abject submission. They yielded when overwhelmed by superior force only to rise and resist at the next available opportunity. Despite all hazards and risks to their own interests, and the fact that they had little hope of success in the field against the British forces they never gave up the attitude of fight. Almost continuous resistance to British power for about half a century from 1766 to 1818 by the

24. *Ibid*, p. 141.

Zamindars and *Bisois* of Ganjam prove their mettle, their inordinate love of liberty and their strong determination for retaining it at all costs. But unfortunately, their resources and equipments were too meagre to give them even the least chance of a sustained stand against the British forces. What they achieved was mainly due to their courageous disposition, strong determination and the help rendered by the difficult nature of the region that afforded little scope for easy manoeuvre for a modern force. Though they have not to their credit any singular or very conspicuous achievement in their fight against the British, their names, nevertheless, will go down in History as brave and determined fighters against foreign rule in this country. ✓

We have not yet come to the end of the story. What we have described in this Chapter constitutes the second phase of their resistance movement. We shall again take up the thread after we have discussed how things were shaping in the northern part of Orissa.

CHAPTER. VI

EARLY BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN ORISSA AND PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE.

We may turn our attention to the nature of early British administration in the ceded province of Orissa and its effect on the people. One thing is worth noticing in this connection. The British spoke of the Maratha administration in the most disparaging terms. We have already shown that such remarks were either actuated by a deliberate attempt to disrepute the Maratha administration and create a feeling of aversion in the minds of the people towards it; or they were simple misstatement of facts. However that may be, the British administrators with all their enlightened ideas and encouraging professions could hardly raise themselves higher in the estimation of the people than those of the Maratha Government. People of Orissa looked upon the new regime as more unsympathetic and oppressive than that they were formerly under. Even the English Officers, like Trower, Ewer etc., criticised their own policy which brought on the conquered people misery and unhappiness. Ewer in his report on Khurda settlement candidly records the reaction of the people to the British Government in the following words: "I am persuaded that many of the natives think that the Maratha Government, with its entire absence of system, was better adapted to the State of Society in which they exist than the British Government with its enlightened, humane and refined one"¹.

The reason of this failure on the part of the early British administrators is not far to seek. They wanted to set up a new order overnight and to impress upon the people how superior their government was to what people had been subjected to. They did not consider it worth while to stop to study the peculiar features of the country, the special traits of the character of the people or the administrative history of the past, nor did they move slowly to allow the people to settle down to the new state of things and get used to them by slow degrees. They thought, in their overzealousness, the only melody the people suffered from was the Maratha mal-administration, and the only remedy to it

1. O. H. R. J., Vol. III, No. 4, App. p. xvi

was British regulations of Bengal. They took it for granted that their diagnosis was as accurate as their choice of medicine and they doubted not that the treatment would bring immediate relief to the suffering patient. But the result was otherwise, as it was bound to be, if a medicine is prescribed and administered without going thoroughly into the history of the case and the constitution of the patient. The result of this precipitous and careless action was acute misery and unhappiness of the people of Orissa as we shall see hereinafter.

REVENUE ADMINISTRATION.

The first thing that hit the people hard was the Revenue administration of the early British rule.

During the Maratha regime, annual assessment of revenue was made on the basis of the land under actual cultivation, or expected to be brought under cultivation, but if it was found that the assessment made at the beginning of the year was in excess of land under actual cultivation, proportionate deductions were made from the assessed amount. But the British authorities based their assessment not only on the lands under cultivation but those capable of being cultivated within the period of lease². It often happened that cultivable wastelands could not be actually brought under cultivation though they had been assessed. From this point of view, the lands were assessed at a much higher rate than they were under the Marathas whose assessment conformed to actual yield. Besides, the Zamindars under the Maratha regime were allowed various deductions on account of cesses, expenses of repairs of embankments etc., on the final adjustment of revenue.

But the British did not allow any deduction, and their demand was based on the average of three years' receipt³. Thus the Oriya Zamindars were denied the privileges they had been accustomed to under the Maratha regime. They were, on the other hand, over-taxed by heavy assessment, harassed by demands of payment in coins, and that too, strictly in the scheduled time. Thus, their plight was rendered serious, and one by one, they faded out of the picture to make room for those who designed their exit.

2. Ms. Vol. 13 (O. S. A.); pp. 201-02,

3. *Toynbee's Orissa*, pp. 44-45,

As we have indicated above, the British Revenue authorities wanted to introduce forthwith the Bengal Revenue Regulations in Orissa without proper study of the system the people were long accustomed to. They probably were cocksure that the people of Orissa would welcome the enlightened British rule substituting the Maratha system under which, as they thought, people were groaning. The Bengal Regulations were suitable for Bengal with permanently settled and rather lightly-assessed estates. But in Orissa, where the people were accustomed to a completely different system, the introduction of the Bengal Regulations proved to be a source of torture and harassment to the Zamindars rather than a blessing.

As regards overassessment, Mr. Ewer, who was appointed as a Commissioner in 1818 for enquiring into the cause of disaffection among the people of Orissa culminating in the Paik Rebellion of 1817 opined: 'The assessment of the Province for the year 1223 stands at Rs. 15,20,409/- from which Rs. 1,38,000/- being subtracted leaves Rs. 13,82,409/- The excess of this beyond the Maratha net Jumma for the same extent of country (in 1210), or Rs. 10,80,770/- is the precise increase under the British Government, or about three lakhs sicca rupees.'⁴ Comparing the assessment per square mile in Bengal and Bihar on one hand and Orissa on the other, he came to the conclusion that Orissa was heavily assessed, the assessment per square mile in the former place being Rs. 171/-, while in Orissa, it was as high as Rs. 232/- per square mile⁵. These conclusions were arrived after detailed investigation. Thus, it leaves no room for doubting the fact that Orissa was over-assessed.

There were many other factors that added to the distress of the Oriya Zamindars caused by over assessment. The Zamindars were made to pay their rents in coins after the year 1809. This constitutes the hardest stroke against the Zamindars of Orissa. For centuries the rent was collected in kind or in cowries. The official accounts were also maintained in cowries. Their *raiya*s could never pay in coins. Besides, with the declaration of the Government that cowries would not be accepted in payment of the Government revenue, there was heavy

4. O. H. R. J., Vol. III, No. 4, App. p. xxi.

5. *Ibid*, p. XXIV.

depreciation in the value of the cowries. The conversion of cowries into coins involved Zamindars in great loss. This aspect of hardship of the Zamindars has been very elaborately dealt with by Mr. Trower, Collector, Cuttack and Mr. Ewer, the Special Commissioner⁶. The depreciation in the cowry not only hit the Zamindars hard but it affected the condition of the poor *rai-yats* too, who had to ultimately compensate the loss of the Zamindars to the best of their might, though not fully. Ordinary people, who were neither Zamindars nor *rai-yats* concerned with payments of revenue, also suffered owing to the rise of prices of food stuff due to the depreciation in the value of cowries. Thus the effects of depreciation of the value of cowries were distressing to all classes of people, though the Zamindars were the worst sufferers.

Sale of Zamindaries for default of payment of revenue in time was simply devastating in its effects so far as the Oriya Zamindars were concerned. Long accustomed to payments of revenue adjusted more or less to their convenience, and that too, mostly in kinds or the cowries, they could hardly adjust themselves to the new situation occasioned by the introduction of Bengal regulations. Very few Zamindars had independent means to make regular payments irrespective of collections. Most of the Zamindars depended mainly on their collections for payments. The *rai-yats* who, were also poor, could hardly pay their revenue in time. With the demand of coins for revenue payment, collection became more irregular. Consequently the Zamindars found themselves in precarious position in respect of payment of revenue. 1011 estates were sold by auction between 1806-1816. The average sale comes to about 101 estates per year. Since most of the Zamindaries with a *Jama* of Rs. 5,100/-, or above, were sold at Calcutta where they were purchased by non-Oriyas, a very large section of the Oriya Zamindars were ousted from their possessions by public sales. Mr. Ewer's remarks in this connection is worth noticing. He says, 'The original proprietors therefore of lands paying only a *Jumma* of about Rs. 30,05,00/- are in possession of their estate at the present moment, when the *Jumma* of Mogulbundee is 13,93,000 a statement which evinced strikingly the extensive ruin which had overwhelmed the ancient landed interests of the country under the British admini-

6. *Ibid*, No. 3, Appendix, pp. VII-VIII, No. 4, App. pp. xxxiii-xiv and Vol. IV, Nos. 1 & 2 App. pp. xxxv ff.

stration.”⁷ This shows how devastating was the effect of public sales which virtually extinguished the Oriya aristocracy.

The occasional occurrences of natural calamities in the forms of inundation, cyclone, drought etc. rendered the people too poor to meet the demands of the Zamindars, who, on their part, felt quite helpless to meet the demands of the Government. Under the former Government the Zamindars were granted remissions in such circumstances. But under the new regime, they were not granted this privilege. There was failure of crop in 1806-1807, for which the Zamindars failed to pay their revenue. But this fact was not taken into consideration by the authorities who resorted to the sale of estates as usual resulting in sale of more than two hundred estates but, unfortunately, the sum realised by sale did not cover the balance due. What was more pathetic, in addition to this loss of estates through public sale, some of the Zamindars suffered imprisonment in civil jail for failure to meet the Government dues. The pitiable plight of the Oriya Zamindars did not end here. They had more distressing hardship in store for them. Next year, (1807-1808) the crops were completely damaged by heavy floods. So the condition of the Zamindars became worse still. They petitioned to the Government for remission of rent but “it was looked upon by the local officers as pretext for evasion of the Government demand and it met with but little favour in the eyes of the higher authorities.”⁸

Machination and avarice of the *amlas* or clerks constituted another distressing feature of the early British regime. Many of them contrived to purchase estates during the public sales through their friends and relatives. In the words of Mr. Trower ‘they had made a practice of trafficking in lands to a great extent in the district, of purchasing estates without any view of retaining possession, and disposing of them again at the first good opportunity, particularly the Mussulman *amlah*, so as to turn a penny’.⁹

The Zamindars were practically in dread of courts as it involved huge outlay of money in the shape of bribes to different *amlas*. So they tried to keep away from it, even when they felt injustice was

7. *Ibid*, Vol. 4, No. 4, App. p. xxvii.

8. Toynbee, *Orissa*, pp. 41-45.

9. O. H. R. J., Vol. III, No. 4, App. p. xxviii.

done to them. Mr. Ewer writing on the topic says, 'Sums notoriously and undeniably received by the dewans and others at each successive settlement of the district, the regular collections of police darogahs and heavy outlay of all land-holders having any business to transact in the courts must be taken into account in the present discussion. It is obvious that if the sums paid at different times by land-holders to the numerous amlas who have amassed wealth in the district, had gone to the treasury of the Government x x x. would have avoided the sale of their lands for trifling arrears of revenue.' Elsewhere he remarks again, "x x x many of ignorant infatuated Oriah Zamindars have been at different times fooled and cheated out of their estate, to which cause should be partly ascribed their very extensive dispossessions xx xx xx." ¹⁰

Thus the maladministration in the revenue department of the early British regime brought about a virtual elimination of the Oriya landed aristocracy with consequent ruinous effects on the tenantry whose welfare was indissolubly bound with that of their own landlords. This calamitous event could have been easily averted, had the authorities tried to study the situation sympathetically and understood the real grievances of the land-lords of the soil. If half the understanding exhibited by their own officers like Mr. Trower had formed the basis of administrative proceedings of the authorities, much of the injustice would have been avoided. But that was not to be; the authorities in their overzealousness for introduction of humane and enlightened rule in place of crude and barbaric administration of the Marathas shut up their eyes to the hard realities and went on committing blunders after blunders, till the whole thing came to a head in 1817. The incident of 1817, the Paik rebellion, opened up the eyes of the authorities to the Realities of the province and thereafter they moved cautiously, but the mischief had already been done; by the Oriya aristocracy was almost gone.

Next we may examine the condition of the people in general. As we have pointed out above, the condition of the *raiya*s depended largely on that of their Zamindars. They could approach their own Zamindars in times of difficulties and get remissions, or other helps from them. But under the new Zamindars who mostly purchased lands on

10. *Ibid*, Vol. III, No. 4, App. pp. xxviii-xxix.

speculation, their condition became miserable. These new Zamindars had no sympathy with their tenants, and their sole object was to exploit them as much as they could to satisfy their avarice and greed of money. Very few of them meant real business; even those who were disposed that way had to entrust the management of the Zamindari to persons who unscrupulously carried on their work of exploitation. Mr. Ewer after detailed investigation into the condition of the *raiyyats* records in his report, "I do not remember a single instance of complaint on the part of a *royat* on the estate of an original proprietor against his zamindar, but those from the *ryots* and *moquddums* on estates held in farm, or belonging to foreigners were numerous and distressing. The ryots as generally described themselves and were so reduced to extreme poverty and misery by operations of the causes above mentioned, and certainly the wretchedness of their garb and appearance, the ruined, roofless, straggling, filthy, deplorable state of most of their villages, coupled with the fact that desertions of late years into Garjaut countries have not been uncommon, support in some degree their assertions of great actual, if not comparative, penury and misery. Many of the ryots complained of their zamindars having constantly increased the rate per *bigha*, so as even to double it, while the zamindars again asserted that it is the revenue authorities and not they who have augmented the *nerikh* of lands"¹¹ These remarks throw ample light on the condition of the peasantry under the early British regime; further details are needless.

The heavy assessment and unsympathetic exploitation were not the only factors under which the peasantry groaned. The high price of the common salt and the introduction of coins added to their misery. We have discussed before how the introduction of coins and abolition of cowry currency adversely affected the condition of the zamindars and the tenants alike. The common people who were not connected with revenue did also feel the acute pinch of it. Coins were not available in the market in abundance so as to be freely used by all. There had been lots of correspondences between the authorities on the subject of the cause of depreciation in the value of cowries and its effect on the people.¹² Though, in theory, it was almost proved that there was no scarcity of coins as to hamper transactions being carried on by the people in them,

11. *Ibid*, App, p. xv-xvi.

12. *Ibid*, Vol. III, No. 3, App. pp. XIV-XXV.

nor was there superabundance of cowries as to depreciate its value in relation to silver, the fact remained, nevertheless, that people suffered, business in the country-side was paralysed and prices of commodities rose. Naturally the condition of the common run of the people can be well imagined. Mr. Ewer has tried to analyse the situation as thoroughly as possible.¹³ Despite all the thoroughness of his investigation and also those of others, the simple fact that cowry currency constituted an important element of the economic structure of Orissa and that peoples' association with it for centuries made them mentally and sentimentally unable to cut off all connections with it and take to the new currency in a matter-of-fact way, was overlooked. The people could only think in terms of cowries, assess the value of their crop or other things and make all payments in that currency only. Even when the coins were introduced, and cowry was not accepted as a currency for government transaction, people continued to use the currency for a long time afterwards. So for a time, more than a quarter of a century at least, there were two currencies, the popular currency of cowry for non-government transactions in the interior, and silver and copper currency for government transactions. *Raiyats* converted a portion of their produce into silver for payment of rent, and the rest they disposed of in old currency. This dual system wrought havoc in the sphere of currency so far as the people were concerned and produced natural chaos and confusion leading to the deterioration in the condition of the people in various ways.

So this aspect of sentimental attachment of the people to what the English termed as 'barbaric currency' the association of which with the people of this province might be traced back the 6th—7th century, if not earlier, was overlooked by the authorities who dealt with the subject purely from the point of view of economists, that too, with little practical knowledge.

Again, cheapness of principal commodities of food in those days made it imperative for the common mass to adopt a currency that would enable them to make their purchases in very small quantities. For example, common rice sold at 45 seers a rupee (each seer measuring 105 tolas) *mung dal* at 13 seers, wheat at 18 seers etc. in June 1810.¹⁴ Salt was available at 15 seers a rupee. A labourer wishing to purchase a seer

13. Ibid, Vol. III, Nos 4 and Vol. IV, Nos. 1-2, App. paras, 97-124.

14. Ms. Vol. (O. S. A.), No. 21, p. 19.

of rice, 1/8 seer of dal, 1/16 seer of salt, 1/16 seer of mustard oil could hardly find a copper coin suitable for his petty purchases of this sort, while the cowries provided him ample scope for ready purchases of his small needs without any difficulty. It was one of the reasons why people found this currency so helpful and stuck to it even after it was not accepted by the Government. This aspect of the question, though it was very closely related to the realities of the situation, did not attract due attention of the authorities.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the British authorities, while introducing the drastic change in currency, were actuated by considerations that would suit their own interests rather than those of the people. They never cared to take into consideration the hard facts and the realities of the situation when they took the step, nor did they take the trouble of studying the effects of this innovation on the common mass. Their conviction in the soundness of their theory of currency and its universal application with invariable good consequences, and their deep hatred for the barbaric currency, blinded them to the real effects of their action on the people. While the people were feeling bewildered by the rude impact of the shocking innovation, the zamindars of the soil were losing their estates in consequence of the havoc wrought by it; the authorities were complacently appreciating their scheme of doing away with the barbaric currency completely oblivious of the distressing effects their rash act had produced. The net result of this measure was expedition of the process of extinction of the Oriya landed aristocracy.

There was another factor that hit the common mass of Orissa very acutely. It was the introduction of Salt Monopoly. On the 4th May, 1804, temporary Regulation for the salt department was enacted. The Government, according to the Resolution, reserved to itself the exclusive privilege of manufacturing salt in the Northern Division. Mr. Trower, in his letter of the 20th April, 1813, to the Commissioner wrote, "During the Maratha period salt was in such plenty as to be an article of little value. x x x Only since the province has been in possession of the English that salt has been an article of value." ¹⁵ Salt was not only cheap but abundant during the time of the Marathas. Its market rate varied between 4 to 14 annas per maund. ¹⁶ But with the introduction

15. Ms. Vol. (O. S. A.), No. p. 32.

16. O. H. R. J., Vol. III, No. 3, p. 158.

of salt monopoly, the retail price of salt shot up to Rs. 3/4/- per maund. ¹⁷ According to Mr. Ewer, the rate of salt during the last four years of Maratha rule was 3 *kahans* 3 *pans* per Calcutta maund while in 1817 it sold at 24 *kahans*. ¹⁸ Thus there can be hardly any doubt that the price of salt had been more or less prohibitive for the common people.

Apart from the high price of salt, its scarcity in the market made the conditions of the people very distressing. They could put up with other hardships, but not with the scarcity of the most common item of food, next in importance to rice. So they clamoured every where to attract the attention of the authorities. But the Salt Agent, in this case, as it was in other cases too, relied on his theory and statistics, and was quite satisfied that enough salt was released to the market, and there was no scarcity of that commodity. But the real fact was that while Orissa required about $3\frac{1}{2}$ lacs of maunds of salt per year, the annual sale amounted to $1\frac{1}{2}$ lac only. So the annual sale of salt did not even reach half the requirement at moderate calculations. So it would appear that there was really scarcity of salt in the market, and it was due to wrong calculation on the part of the Salt Agent who was, of course, more interested in export of salt to Bengal than its sale inside Orissa. Because, he was receiving a commission over and above his pay on the amount of sale of salt. The gross profit per maund of salt in Orissa amounted to Rs. 1/4- while that on the salt exported to Bengal was Rs. 2/12/- Naturally, he was more interested in the sale of salt in Bengal than in Orissa, as in the former case he got more commission.

Thus the scarcity of salt in the Cuttack market was undoubtedly a fact and it brought on to the poor mass the utmost hardship, as they were deprived of the most indispensable commodity of food. This scarcity was due to unrealistic handling of the supply of salt to the market, the high price which discouraged the retailers to carry the commodity to the interior, the stopping of privilege of manufacturing small quantity of salt by the people of coastal areas for their consumption and the sale of the surplus and many other factors.

Thus the early British administrators, far from helping amelioration of the condition of the people of Orissa, as they loudly professed at

17. *Ibid*, p. 159.

18. *Ibid*, Vol. IV, Nos. 1-2, App. p. LI

the time of conquest, helped it to deteriorate to the lowest level when people cried for a pinch of salt, a thing that could have been hardly worth credit, had it not been recorded in the reports of administration of the time. The people felt to the core of their bones what was meant by Foreign Rule.¹⁹

The facts stated above provide ample indication as to the progress of economic condition of the people during the first two decades of the British rule. The zamindars were reduced to begars, *raiylats* groaned under heavy taxation caused by thoughtless assessment and the depreciation of the value of cowries, the trade and commerce declined and the price of food articles rose. A large number of Oriya *amlas* served the former Government in various capacities, specially in the revenue department. But with the coming of the English they were thrown out of employment, since they were not used to the English system of administration. Mr. Ewer pointed out the fact to the Government in his report. He says, "an almost systematic exclusion of all Hindoo natives of Orissa from every situation about the courts in Police, in the Revenue and salt Departments, has prevailed from the very beginning. x x x. The *amlas* mostly, the numerous *tehsildars* under them, the *dewans* and the *sherista* were native Ooriaks and from among them some might have been selected qualified to fill the secondary posts whilst undergoing a course of training for the most important ones afterwards."²⁰ Many Oriyas were holding responsible posts under the Maratha Government but they were not given a chance to serve under the English administration even as a measure of trial. This policy of the English had far-reaching effects. First, the upper middle class people who constituted the bulk of service holders were greatly distressed by being thrown out of employment. Secondly, owing to absence of Oriya officials in the early British administration, the courts and offices were looked upon with dread as notorious places of harassment and extortion, as the staff of them were all outsiders without even a sprinkling of Oriya among them. Thirdly, this widened the gulf between the administrators and the subjects who could, otherwise, have been initiated into the new system of administration through their own men.

19. *Ibid*, Vol, III, No. 3, pp. 159-60.

20. *Ibid*, Vol, III, No. 4, App. pp. xvi-xvii.

The dispossessed Zamindars with their retinue of servants swelled the bulk of the unemployed. The extinction of Oriya zamindars was a serious blow to the economic structure of Orissa. They were the main resorts of the poor people in their difficulties and during calamities. Many charitable institutions were run by them. They were the main stay of the people, their tenants; their extinction was a severe blow to the economic condition of the agriculturists.

The sharp decline in Orissa's trade and manufacture during the chaotic period accentuated the deterioration of the economic condition of the province. Formerly, export trade in rice and salt formed two main sources of Orissa's income. Rice was exported in abundant quantity to Madras and other southern provinces which constituted the principal market for Orissa's rice trade. Next came Bengal in this respect. Salt was another item in which a thriving trade, both overland and maritime, was carried on. Salt was exported to Nagpur and the Central Indian provinces overland and Orissa imported cotton in exchange.²¹ Salt was also exported to Bengal in large quantity. According to Stirling, more than three lacs of maunds of salt were being exported annually from Orissa along the roads via Sambalpur and Bamanghati to Berar. Under the British regime the quantity of salt transported by private individuals, in course of open and legal traffic, did not exceed 20,000 maunds.²²

It will not be out of place to discuss here, in brief, the main cause of Orissa's sharp economic deterioration. The standing monuments in hundreds and the ruined ones in thousands, bear eloquent testimony to the great economic prosperity of Orissa in the past. But in view of the present economic condition of our State we can hardly conceive of its past glory or prosperity.

One wonders how this incredible deterioration in the economic condition of Orissa could happen. For a detailed discussion on the subject we have to take into account a large number of facts dating back from the times of the Hindu rule in Orissa right upto the first phase of British rule consisting of the first two decades of the 19th century. Since it is beyond the scope of this work, we would confine

21. *Early European Travellers in the Nagpur territories*, pp. 21-22.

22. Stirling, *Orissa*, p. 21.

ourselves here to one aspect only, that is, the salt trade in Orissa. Orissa being a sea-board province, salt manufacture was a natural industry in the coastal regions from very ancient times. In one inscription of Chodaganga Deva (1078-1141 A. D.) there is mention of '*lavana-karadhikari*' or the owner of salt tax, meaning probably the officer in charge of the salt tax.²³ This is probably the earliest evidence of salt trade in Orissa which was subject to a tax. This corroborates our assumption that the history of salt-trade in Orissa dates back to very ancient times. The imposition of tax on salt indicates unmistakably that the salt was manufactured not only for internal consumption, but of also for export to other kingdoms. Since Orissa carried on maritime trade with the kingdoms, like Java, Borneo, Sumatra, it is quite likely, salt was exported in large quantities to those islands and also to other parts of India. According to Stirling, the salt of Orissa was of the finest type produced India.²⁴ Secondly, salt of Orissa was looked upon as sacred by the people of upper India. For these two reasons Orissa salt was preferred to the salt produced in other parts of India. So, huge quantity of salt was exported annually from Orissa to different parts of India and kingdoms beyond it. Thus Orissa was being enriched by the constant flow of wealth into the state mainly through this source.

We can just from an idea of the quantity of Salt manufactured in Orissa in ancient times and the amount of money that was derived from that source from the following facts. The average manufacture of salt in Orissa was more than 5 lac maunds per year between 1814-1816. We do not know what was the quantity produced in the Ganjam District during this period, but from the figures of the quantity of salt manufactured in Ganjam between 1870-81 given in the *district Manual* we can assume that average production amounted to about $9\frac{1}{2}$ lacs and net Government income was about 20 lacs of rupees at the rate of Rs. 2/- per maund, while the actual sale price was Rs. 2-11-0.²⁵ According to Stirling, Government income from salt manufactured in Cuttack, Puri and Balasore amounted to 18 lacs of rupees,²⁷ about 3 lacs of rupees more than the gross income from land revenue. Thus the total quantity of salt manufactured in Orissa in the British period

23. *S. I. I.*, V, No. 1036.

24. Stirling, *p. cit.* p. 5.

25. *O. H. R. J.*, Vol. III, No. 3, p. 159.

26. *Ganjam District Manual*, p. 231.

27. Stirling, *Orissa*, p. 3.

Period was not less than 18 lac maunds bringing an income of Rs. 38 to 40 lacs per year. Though it is not possible to calculate with any degree of accuracy the income derived from salt manufacture and salt-trade in Orissa in the ancient times on the basis of the figures above, yet we may assume, without much risk of mistake, that salt brought to Orissa an amount not less than the gross income from land revenue, of course, inclusive of Government tax and trader's profit. So, we may take that income from the salt trade constituted the chief source of nation's wealth in those days. The past prosperity of Orissa was mainly built upon the foundation of prosperous salt-trade. But with the loss of independence and the dwindling of maritime trade following the chaotic and disorderly period from 1568 to 1803 under the Muslim and Maratha regimes the prosperity of Orissa began to take a downward trend till it reached the lowest level when the British Government took over salt-manufacture and sale as their exclusive right. Of course, salt was not the only article of export of Orissa in ancient times. The margin of profit, it must be understood, from trade in other articles is much less than that in salt. In the British period, the average cost of manufacture per maund amounted to 12 annas, while the sale-price per maund in Bengal was Rs. 3/8/-; thus gross profit per maund was Rs. 2/12/- if we deduct Rs. 12 as the cost of transport and wastage, the net profit per maund amounted to about Rs. 2 -, that is, more than 2 times the cost of production. This wide margin of profit cannot be had in any other commodity of trade, like, paddy, calico etc. which constituted the main articles of export. Thus Orissa, in the past, utilised the Nature's gift to the fullest extent to build up her prosperity. With the decline of the salt trade began the fall of Orissa's prosperity till it almost vanished after the introduction of Salt Monopoly. The economic breakdown of Orissa and its poverty in the 19th century, the effects of which linger even to this day, was mainly attributable to gradual dwindling of salt-trade and its final transfer to the British hands. Commenting on the dwindling of Orissa's salt-trade Mr. Ewer writes, "A lucrative commerce also existed in the quantity of salt exported from Cuttack to Hidgelle and particularly in the Raja of Berar's dominion of which the former has been absorbed by the salt monopoly and the latter is scarcely to be traced now at all, excepting in the smuggling traffic carried on to a great extent with the countries to the west ward, from the border of Chilka lake."²⁸

28. O.H.R.J., Vol. IV, No. 1-2, pp.p. xxx.

Orissa was also carrying on a brisk trade in rice with Madras and Bengal, two deficit provinces so far as that commodity is concerned. Madras was regularly furnished with rice from Orissa. Rice-trade constituted another important source by which Orissa was enriched. But, due to some reason or other, mostly due to failure of crops in Orissa in 1806, 1807, 1809 on account of drought, inundation, and chaotic conditions caused by the British revenue administration as discussed above the rice-trade of Orissa was much reduced. In the year 1805-06 the export of paddy to the Madras Presidency amounted to 3,98,000 maunds, in 1807-08 and 1808-09 it amounted to 5,44,400 maunds and 4,70,400 maunds respectively. In the year 1810-11 it reached the lowest level of only 48,560 maunds. After that year though there was slight temporary rise in figures, the decline continued. In 1814-15 only 1,61,000 maunds were exported²⁹. From these figures it is apparent that the surplus stores with Zamindars were probably disposed of during the years 1807-08 and 1809-1810, and thereafter very little remained for export, specially in view of the calamities that followed in succession between the years 1806-1807 to 1809-1810. Thus Orissa's economic structure was further damaged by this fall in export trade. Mr. Ewer writing on this point says, "The accompanying (No 13) statement procured from Mr. R. Becher, the gentleman at present officiating in charge of the Custom House, at Balasore shows how great has been the falling off of late years, in quantity of grain exported from the only port where trade was ever very brisk, to the countries to the southward and this too from permanent causes, which leave no room for hope that the old market will ever again be available to any great extent for the disposal of surplus produce of the district"³⁰.

Manufacture of Orissa, during the first two decades of the 19th century had declined to the lowest level. The manufacture of fine calicoes for which Orissa had earned celebrity in the 17th and 18th centuries had almost been extinct. According to Stirling, "The manufacture and trade of Orissa proper are very inconsiderable and unimportant. A sufficiency of coarser cloth is made for the use of the inhabitants in all parts of the District. The calicoes of Balasore, Soro, Bhadrak, Janjipore and Hariharpur, were once much prized and

29. *O.H.R.J.*, Vol. I, No.2, p.176.

30. *Ibid*, Vol. IV, Nos. 1-2, App. p. xxxix.

son ht after under the name Sannals but the demand for the finer fabrics of that description having long since greatly declined, the quantity now manufactured is very trifling.”³¹ Thus was find that there was decline to unprecedented scale in the trade and manufacture of this province during the first phase of British administration. The economic condition of the people had reached the lowest level and the once opulent province, whose stores of grains and salt supplied the needs of the neighbouring provinces and whose manufactures of calicoes had earned an India-wide celebrity, had been reduced to almost to a state of penury and indigence. Though we may not attribute this state of affairs wholly to the maladministration under the early British regime, nevertheless, it was responsible, to a great extent, in expediting the process of economic deterioration of the people of Orissa.

The records relating to the early British administration in Orissa unmistakably point to the fact that the British authorities were extremely careful not to wound the religious feelings of the people. Non-interference in religious matter was their guiding motto. The contents of a letter from the Secretary to the Board of Commissioners to J. Hunter, of the 3rd July, 1804, clearly shows how solicitous the British authorities were in maintaining *status quo* in the religious matter. The Board conveyed their desire that there should be no interference with the Pagoda of Jagannath by any act of authority and steps should be taken to see that the former ceremonies and customs were permitted and supported on every occasion. Because, “It has been the the express order of His Excellency the Most Noble Governor General that no interference or innovation should be experienced at the Pagodah of Jagurnnauth by any act of their authority and that former ceremonies and customs should be permitted and supported on every occasion.”³²

The above quotation shows the strong injunction issued to the local authorities in Orissa about their dealings with the management of the affairs of the temple of Jagannath in which was concentrated the the whole religious belief and activities of the people of Orissa and which was considered as a great religious institution in India.

31. Stirling, *Orissa*, p. 12.

32. Ms. Volume, A (O, S. A.), No. 1, pp. 11-14.

Accordingly A Groome, the Collector of Jagannath of Puri was asked by the Board of Commissioners to submit a detailed report about the establishment and customs of the temple of Jagannath. The Collector, in his letter of the 10th June 1805 submitted a lengthy and comprehensive report about the establishment and customs of the temple of Jagannath for the information of the Board³³ in which he dealt with the different deities and occasional activities inside the temple, the servants of the temple, their appointment, dismissal and duties, festival, the receipts and expenses, endowments to temple etc., Equipped with these information the authorities proceeded with their work of management of the temple which the British Government had taken up as successor to the Marathas under whom the temple was directly managed by the Government. Till the years 1806, the management continued according to the Maratha system. Government made up the difference between the receipts and expenditures of the temple. But the British Government was nervous of any direct connection with affairs of the temple for two reasons; (1) their direct connection would mean Government's sanction of idolatry, and (2) they were afraid, they might be accused of wounding the religious susceptibilities of the Hindus through any act done inadvertently. For these reasons they made over the management of the temple to an Assembly of three Pandits (*Parichhas*) nominated on the recommendation of the Collector of Pilgrim's Tax under Regulation IV of 1806. This too was not found suitable, as the Government was still actively attached to the affair of the temple. So, by the Regulation IV of 1809, the management was vested in the Raja of Khurda who was appointed hereditary Superintendent of the temple. But his authority was restricted by appointment of three *parichhas* as his assistants, who, however, were authorised to bring to the notice of the Government any order or action of the Superintendent which was inconsistent with the recorded rules and customs of the temple. Raja had no power to dismiss them except with the sanction of the Government³⁴

Pilgrim-tax continued to be collected as before and the authorities tried to systematise the collection and regulate access of pilgrims into Puri during great festivals. The tax collected was received by the Government who made up the deficiencies of the Temple

33. *Ms. Volume*, (O. S. A.), No. 3 pp. 68-123.

34. B. & O. Dist. Gazetteer, Puri, pp. 131-32.

income out of it. The deficiency varied from year to year. For example, total receipts of the temple for the 1812-13 amounted to Rs. 12,466/- (fractions of a rupee omitted) and expenditure by the Government for making up the deficiency was Rs. 38,686/-. Besides a wall at Atharanala was built at a cost of Rs. 6,804/-. Thus the total expenses of the Government amount Rs. 45,490/-. The net amount credited to the Government on account of Pilgrims-tax was to Rs. 34,026/-, thus the net loss amounted to Rs. 11,464/- in the year 1812-13³⁵. In the two previous years, i.e. 1810-11 and 1811-12, net Government gain from the pilgrims tax after meeting the deficiency amounted to Rs. 12,645/- and Rs. 49,194/-³⁶ respectively. Total temple expenditure as shown in the statement for the years 1811-12 and 1812-13 is the same amount of Rs. 56,375-5-18-0, that was probably the standard annual expenditure of the temple³⁷. The temple collection during the 1811-12 from the temple lands and sale of *bhoga* amounted to Rs. 26,570/- and 5,590/- respectively, the total amounting to Rs. 32,160/-. The corresponding figures for the year 1812-13 are Rs. 15,162, Rs. 5,364 and Rs. 20,566/- respectively³⁸. From these facts it is evident that the British Government maintained the old standard of temple expenditure, made up the deficiencies between the temple receipts and the standard expenditure and credited to their account the tax levied on the pilgrims, which, in most years, constituted one principal source of income.

The following points taken from the letter of the Chief Secretary to the Government, Fort William, dated the 18th February, 1814, to John Richardson conveying the sentiments of the Governor General in Council relating to pilgrims-tax, casualties during festivals etc. will clearly show the Government policy towards the management of the Jagannath temple. Regarding the proposal of abolition of pilgrim tax, Governor General opined that the tax was not established by the British Government, it existed under the Mahratta Government and that the unceasing object of the British Government had been to free it from exactions, vexatious, oppressions with which it was attended under the former Government "If a Hindoo Government

35. Statements of account of the temple of Jagannath, Accountant General's office, Fort William, dated 13-11-1913.

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*

thought it consistent with the principles of religious persuasion to provide in some sort for the exigencies of the State by a tax of that description it is impossible to discover any substantial reasons why another Government professing a different religion should discontinue a tax which had already received the sanction of the authority most competent to judge a question of that nature."³⁹

Mr. Richardson had urged upon the Government for abolition of the Pilgrims tax on the ground that the net gain of Government on that head was trifling amounting to Rs. 2,514/- in 7 years and 4 months. In reply, the Governor General pointed out that though the gain was trifling, the abolition of the tax would mean a huge drain on the public resources.⁴⁰

The facts clearly indicate the religious policy of the early British authorities towards the Jagannath temple affairs. They were very careful not to wound the religious susceptibilities of the people, nor to bring in any innovation in the management of the temple, however good it might be, for fear of wounding the religious sentiments of the people. So, in reply to John Richardson's suggestion for appointment of a learned Brahmin in place of the Raja of Puri who was found guilty of neglect of his duties as the Superintendent, the Governor General disagreed with him and permitted continuance of the system unless circumstances deteriorated to such extent as to take such drastic step. It is also a fact that they systematised the collection of pilgrim tax to a great extent to lessen the sufferings of the people. In their anxiety to conciliate the people, the Government transferred the Superintendence of the temple to the Raja of Khurda, the most appropriate person for the office. Thus, the religious policy of the early British rulers in Orissa was characterised by circumspection, so far religious sentiments of the people were concerned, and toleration of the customs and usages though repugnant to their own religious belief.

In relation to another socio-religious custom, that is, the *Sati* system, they followed the same policy. They did not actively interfere in the performance of *Sati* rites, though it was looked down upon as an obnoxious system revolting to humanity. The Government maintained

39. Chief Secretary to John Richardson.

4. *Ibid*

vigilance and watch to see that no force or compulsion was used. In 1820, 33 women committed *Sati* in Orissa, while in 1821, the number was reduced to twenty eight. The Sadar Nizamat Adalat reviewing the report of *Sati* for the year 1821 expressed the view. "In the case of Mussamant Kumulah No. 18 of the Satee statement, it was clearly competent to the Magistrate to have punished as for a misdemeanour the washerman Rajeb who pushed the woman into the fiery pit as assisting at a sacrifice not wholly voluntary."⁴¹ From the above remarks it is clear that the Government allowed *Sati* rites to be performed if there was no compulsion behind it; they interfered in cases when any person or persons forced any woman for committing herself to fire against her voluntary wishes. The Governor General's remarks in reviewing *Sati* case in India in 1820 are worth noting in this connection. The number of *Sati* cases had dwindled from 707 in 1817 to 597 in 1820. The Governor General thought that the decrease in the number was due to, "in some degrees to the operation of the rules now in force in regard to the performance of that rite." He further remarked, "while the Hindoo must perceive in those rules a distinct proof of unwillingness of the Government to interfere with their religious prejudices, and must be sensible that its authority has been interposed only to prevent practices not sanctioned by their own institutions, they cannot fail to recognise the extreme regret with which the continuance of a custom so revolting to humanity is viewed by the Government and to be conscious of the gratification with which it would witness any disposition on the part of the people themselves to discourage and discountenance it. xxx. The Governor General in Council cannot concur in the policy or expediency of the measure proposed by the Second Judge of the Nizamat Adawlat, he is of opinion, that the authoritative interposition of the Government, with a view to abolish the rite of Satee either in the manner, recommended by Mr. Smith, or by adoption of partial measures, respectively suggested by Mr. Leycester and Mr. Lerin, would not only fail of success but would tend to excite a spirit of fanaticism and eventually produce very injurious consequences."

These remarks of the Governor General leave no doubt as to the attitude of the British authorities to the custom of *Sati* and their policy of guarded and cautious interference with it.

41. Extract of the proceedings of the Nizamat Adalat of 24.5.1822, Ms. Volume No. 27, (Bd. of Rev.).

Two instances of stiff resistance of the people of Cuttack to imposition of two new taxes, namely the House tax and the Chaukidari tax are worth mentioning here. We have no details of the incidents leading to the imposition of House tax in Cuttack in 1811 under Regulation XV of 1810. From a passing reference to it in the letter of Mr. Ainslie, Acting Magistrate of Cuttack, to G. Dowdeswell, Chief Secretary, of the date 2nd October, 1814, we come to know that the people of Cuttack organised themselves to resist the imposition of the detestable tax. Mr Ainslie wrote, "I did not at this time perceive any thing in the conduct of the multitude to lead me to suppose that they had entered into any regular combined plan to resist the Enforcement of the Regulations above cited.⁴² I was not aware then of the resistance evinced by the inhabitants of this town of Cuttack when Regulation XV of 1810 regarding the tax on Houses was attempted to be enforced. The same principle now deceit them which was in that instance the rule of their conduct. Whilst persuing the same tumultuous conduct which they have now adopted an order was received from Government rescinding the Regulation just quoted. Their ignorance led them to draw an inference which has undoubtedly induced them to persevere so long in their unlawful combination. They ascribe the repeal of that Regulation to their clamour and disobedience instead of to the lenity and wisdom of Government."⁴³

These remarks clearly indicate the steps taken by the inhabitants of Cuttack to prevent the imposition of House tax. They organised themselves, on that occasion, into what is termed above as unlawful combination, with the intention of resisting enforcement of House tax. They clamoured and persevered in their disobedience and made the authorities yield to them. While rescinding the Regulation in 1812 the Governor General remarked, "the Governor General in Council is anxious to promote ease and convinience of the inhabitants generally by releiving them from the payment of the above mentioned tax."⁴⁴ So this is first instance of an organised no-tax campaign in northern Orissa under the British which brought about the desired result.

⁴². Regulations relate to imposition of Chaukidari tax on the inhabitants of Cuttack,

⁴³. *Ms. Vol.* (O.S.A.), No. 34, pp. 111-12.

⁴⁴. Toynbee, *Orissa*, p. 63.

Another instance of organised no-tax campaign took place in the year 1814 when Choukidari tax was levied in Cuttack under Regulation 13 of 1813 and 3 of 1814. When the Acting Magistrate Mr. Ainslie introduced the tax in August 1814, the people protested against the assessment of Choukidari tax. They assembled in great numbers under the trees on the bank of the Mahanady. The agitation which started from the 19th September continued till the 30th September when all the shops were closed, grain merchants were not allowed to bring their grains into the town and labourers desisted from their work. So, along with no-tax campaign, complete *hartal* also was observed. Magistrate declared the assembly as unlawful and unauthorised and warned the people to disperse peaceably. But the people remained adamant despite persuasion and threatenings. The Magistrate sent a police force against the people but they were surrounded by the mob and overpowered. At last military help was sought. Even at the sight of the military, people remained adamant. But ultimately they were dispersed. Only one man was wounded in the eye. Thereafter there was no resistance. Cuttack was divided into six *mahalas* and 55 Choukidars at Rs. 3/- P. M. each were appointed. This tax was ultimately abolished in 1818. However that may be, the facts unmistakably show that people were solidly organised to offer the stiffest resistance to the British for imposition of an obnoxious tax. The closure of all shops in the bazar and people abstaining from their work as a mark of protest for days together reflects no little credit on the organisers.⁴⁵

We have briefly described the condition of the people under the British regime. With all their enlightenment and broad outlook, the British administrators could not ameliorate the condition of their subjects who, they thought, were rotting under the barbaric Maratha rule and would find themselves much happier under their enlightened administration. But they were illusioned; the people, as admitted by some of the British administrators, looked back with fondness to the former days when they were comparatively happy and comfortable. We may quote here some lines from Ewer's report to show how he candidly admitted the deterioration of peoples' condition under the

45. Ainslie to Dowdeswell—Ms, Vol., No. 34 (O. S. A.)

British rule. He writes, "I am persuaded that many of the native think that the Maharatta Government, with its entire absence of system was better adopted to the State of the society in which they exist than the British Government with its enlightened humane and refined one. They seem unconcious of any particular benefits which have resulted to them from the operation of the British law and regulations, whilst it is very apparent that they have increased the assessment of revenue in silver instead of cowries, augmented the price of salt to six times its former rate, and dispossessed upwards of two thirds of the original proprietors from their estates. The people of the interior seemed also to have thought all applications to the court vain and fruitless of late years, unless besides the legal authorised overwhelming expenses of stamp papers, fees etc. they could further produce a considerable sum to purchase the favour, or at least the forbearance of the sadder Amlah."⁴⁶

Toynbee in his book on the History of Orissa writes, 'It is with unfeigned regret that we contemplate the policy of the first fifteen years of our revenue administration, and we doubt if the people had not good reasons to think themselves better off under the Marathas than they were under their conquerors.'⁴⁷ Hunter, Stirling, Ker, etc., have directly or indirectly admitted their own failure in administration of Orissa in the early stage, thereby they have contradicted themselves or their historians, in their condemnation of the Maratha administration as a barbaric one.

However that may be, the facts discussed in this Chapter go to prove unmistakably the pitiable condition of the people of Orissa under the British regime. They virtually were groaning under the evil effects of maladministration, in the circumstances, a sudden rising of the people against the British would have not been unnatural. But it never came to pass. The people, the common mass, under centuries of oppressive rule of outsiders had sunk to the lowest level of economic depression and had lost all stamina to rise and strike against the oppressors. They could only manifest inexhaustible patience of silently putting up with all that were thrust on or hurled against them and exhibiting wonderful capacity to adjustment to the

46. *O H R J.*, Vol. III, No. 4, App, pp. xvi-xvii.

47. Toynbee, *Orissa*, p. 7.

worst situations as was occasioned by the early British maladministration, when they were reduced to utmost penury and indigence.

In the midst of this pervading gloom there glimmered faintly the light of spirit and courage exhibited by the Chiefs of Orissan States and their followers, the *paiks*. They still had in them some fighting spirit and love of liberty despite adverse circumstances extending over centuries. They fought with the Afgans, Mughals and the Marathas. They kept burning the torch of freedom and liberty through all these regimes, but the glow and warmth of it was gradually dwindling till it reached its lowest level under the British rule, the octopus of whose administration slowly but steadily spread out its tentacles and sucked up all that was left last in the race of the brave fighters and laid them flat on the ground.

CHAPTER VII

THE PAIK REBELLION OF 1817.

We have discussed in the previous Chapter the distressing conditions that hit hard all classes of people of Orissa who were virtually groaning under the maladministration. The common mass, as we commented in the last Chapter, had lost all stamina to rise and strike. They put up with all that came in the way. But the descendants of the warrior class among the people had still in them some spirit of fighting, a reminiscence of that of their brave ancestors. The repeated blows of maladministration, the pinch of hunger, sense of frustration at the loss of what they possessed for centuries warmed them up to make a stand and demonstrate their grievances not by lying low at the feet of the designing *amlas* or their puppet masters, but by an attitude of aggression and defiance. In fact, the Khurda insurrection of 1817 was not premeditated or preplanned. It was just a spontaneous outburst of spirit of resistance by such section of the people as still retained in them traces of the traits of their ancient warrior race. Though we cannot imagine at present how things would have turned out if the *paiks* and *dalbeheras* group of *paiks*. His position corresponded to that of a Jamadar of the sepoye, of all the States of Orissa had joined their hands together to make an organised attempt at throwing off the foreign yoke, we can say this much that the British authority would have been very badly shaken and things would have worsened still if a conjunction with the Raja of Berar could have been effected, a possibility that could not be ruled out at that time. However that may be, the insurrection was neither preplanned nor properly organised to deal with such a formidable foe as the British authority. As we have pointed out before, the inhabitants of the plains were hardly expected to join hands with the *paiks* owing to the main fact that they had neither the capacity nor the mood to do it. Mr. Ewer is absolutely correct when he remarks, 'No attempt indeed was ever made by the leaders of the insurrection to render their cause popular among the people of the plains x x x. x x x They knew well that the timid, spiritless, imbecile unmanly ryots of Moghlbundee could afford them no effectual aid x x x. The rising in Khoordah was quite an isolated movement prompted by despair hatred and a thirst for revenge

on the part of Jugbundoo and the misery beyond endurance under which the people of Khoordah were sinking.”¹

Though the people of every class and status were affected by the distressing circumstances detailed in the last Chapter, it is very doubtful if there would have been any insurrection of the magnitude as it was in 1817 had not Jagabaudhu Bidyadhara taken the lead and inspired the *paiks*. The insurrection, therefore, may be mainly ascribed to the spirit of revenge aflame in Jagabandhu Bidyadhara on account of the wrongs done to him. Other causes were there already; the *paiks* were seething with discontentment and anger on account of the resumption of their paikan lands; the oppression and extortion of the officials on one hand, and the agents of the new farmers on the other, had embittered their feelings in the extreme and had awakened a feeling of revenge in them. The high rate of assessment, rise in the price of salt and its scarcity and the chaotic state of currency had all combined to drive them almost to a state of starvation and penury. These facts have been very elaborately dealt with by Mr. Ewer, who is the only officer among the early British authorities to hit on the right points relating to the causes of the Paik rebellion.² Now we may see how Jagabandhu Vidyadhara was wronged.

Jagabandhu Vidyadhara was the *Bakhshi* or commander of troops of the Raja of Khurda. The post was held by his ancestors on hereditary basis. The Bakhshi was assigned large *Jagirs* by the Raja for his maintenance. These were known as *Bakhsibar*. Kila Rorung was bestowed on his family by the Emperor of Delhi. The other *Jagir* of the Bakhshi known as the *Backshibar* lay in the four parganae of Rahang, Chabiskud, Lembai and Serai and constituted the most valuable possessions.

When the British conquered Orissa Jagabandhu was one of the first to offer submission to Colonel Harcourt.³ He was allowed to engage for Kila Rorung for the first three successive years after the

1. *O B R J.*, Vol. III, No. 4, App. pp. ii-iii.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. ii-vi.

3. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

British conquest. But Major Fletcher in 1804 resumed all his rent-free *Jagirs* in the four parganas referred to above, despite the fact that he specified those lands as being the hereditary property of his family. Even he was dispossessed of Kila Rorung in consequences of deep and intriguing machination of the *diwan* of the Collector Groome. His estate was put on sale, auctioned and given in farm to a relative of the *diwan*. When the new farmer tried to take possession of Rorung, Jagabandhu resisted violently. Jagabandhu made representation to the Commissioner against the illegal attempt at possession. At this time his cousin Gadadhar Vidyadhara filed a suit in the civil court claiming a portion of the Zamindari; so the Commissioner ordered not to take any engagement from Jagabandhu until he had established his right by a regular course of law.⁴ Thus Jagabandhu Vidyadhara, who once occupied the highest position in Khurda, next to the Raja, was reduced to penury. In his own words, 'He became in consequence reduced to a state of beggary and compelled to depend for his subsistence upon the bounty of certain Zamindars.'⁵

Referring to the condition of the *raiyats* of Khurda he says, "Had the Maharaja been placed in authority over his country according to former usage, a population of 30,0000 would have prospered and been happy but from the Guddee being vacant they have perished. Such was the deplorable state of the ryots that they were obliged to subsist on herbs and water and scarcely one amongst them had a vessel left to drink his water of. Yet not withstanding the extremity of wretchedness no one took any notice of their condition." These statements are by no means, exaggerated. Discussing on the same subject Mr. Ewer remarks, "It was evidently as late as 1804 populous and in many parts well cultivated country. x x x Its inhabitants, however, seem as far as their condition can be traced to have lived always in ease and contentment under the Government of their native princes. x x x. It is now well known and generally admitted that, previous to the insurrection Khoordah was becoming strikingly depopulated. At best 5,000 to 6,000 houses of ryots

4. *Ibid*, pp. viii-x.

5. Application of Jagabandhu enclosed with letter of Secretary to the Commissioner of Orissa to Chief Secretary, dated 21-7-1819, Vol. 19A (Board of Revenue).

were deserted. The miserable remnant after disposing of their little all, their clothes, furnitures, bullocks, cooking utensils, and sometimes even their wives and children, existed of course in state of desperate misery and irritation which well prepared them to rush blindly into the project of bettering their condition proposed to them by a leader of high commanding influence.”⁶

Thus, Ewer's remarks fully corroborates what Jagabandhu has complained of in his application. In view of these facts the immediate cause of the outbreak of the Khurda Paik Rebellion of 1817 was the dispossession of Jagabandhu of his property and consequent degradation of his economic and social status. Jagabandhu's call for revenge against the injustice and atrocities perpetrated on the people of Khurda served as a spark to the smouldering fire of discontentment and desperation of the people of Khurda, especially the *raiya*s, as explained before.

In March 1817 a large body of Khonds from Ghumsir entered Khurda. It is not known whether they crossed over to Khurda area on the usual predatory excursions, or at the instigation of Jagabandhu Vidyadhara or some of his partisans. However that may be, it was the occasion for the unfurling of the banner of revolt. These Khonds were joined by the Khurda *paiks* under the leadership of Jagabandhu. They began their operations in the Banpur area where they killed upwards 100 men and looted about Rs. 15,000/- of Government money. The Thana and other Government buildings in the area were targets of their attack. From Banpur the *paiks* moved towards Khurda. Their number was reinforced by the *paiks* of the localities through which they passed. The Government officers at Khurda took to flight in panic. All the civil buildings in Khurda were burnt and razed to ground. A party of the *paiks* proceeded to Lembai where they killed Charan Pattnaik, a *sarbarakar* of Khurda, who had falsely reported against Jagabandhu about his secret connection with the Pindaris, and upon which report the *darogha* tried to arrest him.

On receipt of these informations the Magistrate of Cuttack at once sent one detachment of soldiers under Lt. Col. Prideaux to Khurda

6. O H R J., Vol. III, No. 4, App, pp. xi-xiv.

and another under Lt. Faris to Pipli for the protection of the pargana Lembai. The Magistrate Impey himself left for Khurda on the 1st April, 1817 with a contingent of 60 sepoys under Lt. Trevis with the object of joining Col. Prideaux.

They reached 'Gangpara' in the evening that day. There they found that the *paiks* had erected a barricade and were ready to defend it in case any attempt was made to cross it. The British troops were fired upon when they arrived at the spot. So they halted there for the night and sent a letter to Lt. Prideaux to charge the defenders of the barricade from the rear so that they might find themselves between two fires. But the messenger through whom the letter was sent, came back next morning with the information that the village Khurda was totally destroyed and Lt. Prideaux was not found in the neighbourhood. So they were left with no alternative than to retreat. The *paiks* continued firing on the British troops during their retreat. However, there was no loss of life on the British side and after continued march for 10 hours from 5-30 A. M. to 3-30 P. M. the party reached Bakati village where they rested and refreshed themselves. Impey reached Cuttack on the 4th April, 1817 and reported to the Government that the Khurda territory was in a complete state of insurrection and the officer who commanded the soldiers accompanying him was killed. He recommended that the Raja of Khurda should be removed to Cuttack and Martial Law should be proclaimed.

Lt. Predeaux received the letter of Impey on the 2nd April, 1817. He also came to know that the *paiks* had captured Rani Mukta Dei of Sambalpur who was residing in her Panchgarh *jagir* and were advancing to meet him. He received further information that Captain Wallington had proceeded to Puri and had left instruction for Lt. Faris to attack the rebels at Gangpara.

Lt. Faris with fifty sepoys attacked the Paiks at Gangpara in compliance with the instructions of Captain Wallington. He and an Indian *Subahdar* were shot dead. Two messengers who were sent by Lt. Faris to Lt. Prideaux were captured by the Paiks who cut off their noses. Lt. Prideaux and the detachment of Lt. Faris lost all their belongings and retreated to Cuttack via Pipli. Later on Pipli fell into the hands of the *paiks* who sacked it and burnt the thana.

Captain Wallington reached Puri on the 2nd April 1817 and found everything quiet there. His progress was not hampered by any action of the *paiks*. He sent information to Cuttack for sending a detachment to follow up the *paiks*. Accordingly on the 9th April 1817 Captain La Fevre with 550 men and a few guns marched to Khurda along the same route as was followed by the Magistrate, Impey.

Martial Law was proclaimed on the 12th April, 1817 in Khurda under Regulation of 1804. On the same day the *paiks* entered Puri and burnt the court building. The officials took refuge in the European residences in the sea shore. On the 13th the *paiks* attacked the British troops and were counterattacked by the sepoy who dispersed them, killing ten and wounding many more. But soon the *paiks* organised themselves and came in large numbers to attack the British troops. Finding it hopeless to fight against enormous odds the British troops abandoned Puri and beat a retreat along with the European officials and safely reached Cuttack on the 18th April.

Martial Law was extended to the town of Puri and Pipli and their neighbourhood and to Parganas of Lembai and Kotdee. All connection between Puri and Cuttack was cut off.

Captain Le Favre who left Cuttack on the 9th April reached Khurda without any opposition. From there he marched towards Puri. He encountered opposition at Dobanda on the 18th April where the *paiks*, about one thousand strong, had assembled to meet them. Captain Le Favre fired on them from his guns and attacked them in their right and left flanks. The *paiks* who were not accustomed to such heavy firing and military tactics were confounded and dispersed without offering any resistance. Le Favre marched towards Puri where he reached at 2 p. m. to the Raja of Khurda who was on the point of leaving Puri was taken into custody by Le Favre.

In the mean time, Governor General had issued order for removal of the Raja of Khurda to Calcutta. So Major Hamilton was ordered to start for Puri with a contingent of Indian troops to retake the town and capture the Raja. But when the information of accomplishment of both the objects by Captain Le Favre reached Puri, Hamilton's march was delayed.

Major Hamilton started for Puri on the 20th April. On his way he dislodged the *paiks* assembled at Sarangarh. Three companies

under Captain Armstrong were detached to defend Pipli and neighbourhood and to re-establish civil authority there.

On Major Hamilton's arrival at Puri, Captain Le Favre started for Cuttack with the Raja of Khurda. A body of *paiks*, 2,500 strong, made an attempt to rescue the king but Captain Armstrong dispersed them. So Le Favre reached Cuttack safely on the 11th May. Raja was placed in confinement in the Barabati fort.

Major General Sir G. Martindell was appointed as the Military Commissioner. He arrived at Cuttack on the 6th May and started for Khurda on the 15th of that month. From the letter of the Magistrate of Cuttack to the Chief Secretary of the 5th May 1817, it appears that the resistance of the *paiks* had been stopped by that date. In that letter the Magistrate further informed that the Raja of Kujang was expected at Cuttack in course of a couple of days. It seems, the Raja of Ranpur was suspected of complicity with the Rebellion. The Magistrate of Cuttack in his letter of the 11th May 1817, to the Chief Secretary informed him that no proof had been obtained for suspecting the Raja of Ranpur and that no other Garjat Chief or people took part in the Rebellion.

The *paiks*, it seems, shifted their sphere of activity to the thanas of Tirun, Gop, Hariharpur, Asureswar, Priyarajpur and Patamunda after the arrival of G. Martindell in Khurda. The *paiks* in Gop area attacked the thana and burnt it down. In June, Captain Faithful was sent with a force to suppress the rebellion at that place but he found no *paik* there. Captain Baines was stationed at Gop with a small force till things returned to normal in October. ⁷

In the month of June the following persons were committed to trial for high treason, ⁸

Jagu Dalai of *Mauza*, Dublo,
Bisambar Mahanty of Gop (†),

7. Toynbee, *Orissa*, pp. 16-23, and Secretary's Report, O.H.R.J., Vol. III, No. 8. App. pp. x x x ff.

8. Ms. Volume, (O.S.A.) No. 42, pp. 11-13

Baishnab Chandra Kangoi... Zamindar of Anmo Serai,
 Lokanath Pardhi of Narasinghpur,
 Govinda Barik of Kachru Sahi,
 Ray Sing of Casaba, Gop.

The Magistrate also reported about Madhusudan Mangraj of Killa Hariapur who had long remained in open rebellion.⁹

Following persons were committed to trial for high treason in July 1817

Mirza Moorand Beg of mauza Singpania,
 Jagannath Das of mauza Behuri in Khurda.
 Pitabas Rautra of mauza Barpana in Serai.
 Madhu Mahanty of mauza Eresanpal in Kujang.
 Deigye Punerah ? of Serryloe in Khundei.
 Govind Chuttoy of Bahamah of mauza Khundei.
 Binakar Mahanty of 'Sairgarseah' of mauza Tirun
 Sham Behera of Ersama in Kujang.¹⁰

Jagunnath Paharaj. Zamindar of Dhena and Mukundaram Boogah, Zamindar of Jamkunda in the marahatta parganas in Balasore were suspected of complicity with the rebellion. This suspicion was based on the admission made by two messengers who had taken letters from them to the *diwan*, Krishna Chandra and were returning with his answer. Magistrate of Cuttack sent this information to the Joint Magistrate at Balasore in his letter of the 14th July 1817¹¹. With reference to Jagannath Praharaaj the Magistrate of Cuttack remarked, "indeed Juggernaut Paharaaj may be estimed a dangerous man in every respect being a fine bold active and determined character as I have heard".

The forces at Puri, Pipli and Gop, etc. could not be spared for Kujang area till September 1817. It was only on the 13th September

9. *Ibid*, p. 5.

10. *Ibid*, p. 80.

11. *Ibid*, pp. 34-35.

that Cnptain Kennet, who was formerly commanding at Gop, was sent to Kujang. Chanhradhvaj, the deposed Raja of Kujang, who was anxious to accompany the party, was not allowed on the recommendation of the Magis'trate¹². Captain Kennet was instructed to secure Narayan Paramaguru and Bamdev Patjosi and to offer pardon to others who might have been involved in any rebellious act. He further remarked that the Raja of Kujang was really innocent and he was virtually under the control of the two leaders mentioned above¹³.

Captain Kennet, on his arrival at Paradip at 2 P. M., found the place strongly stockaded and defended. He began his assault at once. The stockade was carried by storm; one party under Lt. Forrester pursued the *paiks* in to the village and killed fifteen of them and captured three-pounder guns kept at the main entrance. Two other parties of sepoys under Captain Kennet and Lt. Wood followed the *paiks* in other direction, but as the darkness was coming on, they waited for the next morning (the 14th September) for resuming their follow up. Next morning Captain Kennet marched to village Nuagarh and seized a quantity of arms, few cannons and three elephants. On the 19th September there was another encounter with the *paiks* numbering about 2000. Two elephants and eight horses were captured. The Raja of Kujang also surrendered himself; Narayan Paramguru and Bamadev Patjosi, the two leaders of the *paiks*, were also secured and sent to Cuttack along with the Raja. After the capture of the above two leaders the insurrection was practically stamped out, and by October, the conditions returned to normal¹⁴.

Raja Naga Sital Das, Zamindar of Marichpur rendered much assistance to the British troop in subjugating the *paiks* and saving the property of the Company. So the Magistrate recommended remission of one year's revenue as his reward¹⁵.

Though the insurrection was stamped out by the end of October and situation became normal in most of the disturbed parts, the British

12. Ibid, pp. 72-74.

13. Ibid, pp. 68 ff.

14. Toynbee, *Orissa*, pp. 21-22.

15. Ms. Volume, (O.S.A.)²No. 42, pp. 80-81.

authorities could not yet breathe a sigh of relief; they were in constant dread of a fresh flare up any moment as the Chief leaders of the Rebellion, Jagabandhu Vidyadhara, Krushna Chandra Bhramarbar and their associates still remained at large. They suspected that Jagabandhu was hiding some where in the Banpur area, consequently it remained still under martial law.

1818: It was suspected that Rajas of Nayagarh and Ranpur were sympathetic towards Jagabandhu who could escape apprehension through their help.¹⁶ The hunt went on but without any success. In July, 1818, Major Roughedge, commanding South West Frontier, captured one Bhup Singh, a Rajput, who disclosed that he had been sent by Jagabandhu for seeking Maratha help. He was not originally connected with the insurrection; he was just a pilgrim whom the police harassed under suspicion. Out of a feeling of revenge he joined the *paik* party and gradually became one of the trusted followers of Jagabandhu. Bhupa Singh was recommended for pardon as he promised to help the apprehension of Jagabandhu¹⁷.

During this period there were people in Khurda who were in touch with Jagabandhu whom they provided with supplies. One Bhugni Das of Rorung was suspected of furnishing supplies to Jagabandhu.¹⁸ Dharmu Sardar, an important associate of Jagabandhu and one of the proscribed leaders of the *paiks* was arrested at Athamallick.¹⁹

The authorities, had by this time grown restless owing to their failure to trace out and apprehend Jagabandhu within a period of one year after the suppression of the rebellion. So the Commissioner thought of offering pardon to Jagabandhu in order to induce him to come out of his concealment and surrender himself to the British Government on conditions of free pardon and his residence being fixed near about Caloutta. He enquired of Forrester, the joint Magistrate of Khurda if the time was appropriate for such an offer.²⁰

16. G. Martindal to Melville, dated 4-2-1818.

17. Roughedge to Commissioner, 21th July 1818.

18. Stirling to Melville, 7th October 1818.

19. Stirling to Turnbull, 9th October, 1818.

20. R. Ker to Forrester, 30 October, 1818.

All sources were being tapped in the mean time for apprehension of Jagabandhu. The Raja of Baud and the Raja of Athamalik were requested to help in the matter. Two Khond Zamindars were employed by Roughsedge to contact Srikara Bhanja of Ghumsar for purpose of apprehension of Jagabandhu who was believed to be residing in that area and was supported by Srikara Bhanja.²¹ But this plan was productive of no better success. The Commissioner lost all hope of apprehension of Jagabandhu and recommended to the Government the expediency of offering pardon to Jagabandhu on the following conditions.

- (a) He should live in or near Calcutta.
- (b) He should be granted Rs. 200/- as pension.

He further recommended full and free pardon for all the *paiks*, or their sardars involved in the rebellion with exception to the following, provided they surrendered themselves to the Commissioner or the Magistrate, Khurda, in hope of pardon. The following *Sardars* were exceptions.

- (a) Pindaki Bahubalindra.
- (b) Gopal Chhotra.
- (c) Padmanabh Chhotra.

Gopal Chhotra was accused of many acts of murder and was considered as a notorious rebel. Padmanabh Chhotra too was regarded as a notorious rebel who had committed many dacoities. Pindaki Bahubalindra was sentenced to transportation for life in a previous case, but he escaped by breaking jail. He became notorious since the insurrection and committed many dacoities. The Commissioner did not think them worthy of pardon, so he recommended declaration of a reward of Rs. 1000/- for apprehension of each of them. It may be noted here that rewards of Rs. 5000/- for apprehension of Jagabandhu, Rs. 2000/- for that of Krishna Chandra and 1000/- for arrest of each of the principal associates of Jagabandhu had been declared in April 1817. The following were declared as proscribed leaders of the *paiks*.

21. Ker to Roughsedge, 4th November, 1818.

1. Dharmu Harichandan.
2. Lokanath Baliarsing.
3. Adikanda Bidyadhara.
4. Upendra Jagadev.
5. Dinabandhu Santra.
6. Purusottam Mansing.
7. Antaryami Paharsing.
8. Ram Chandra Samantarary.
9. Dama Subudi.
10. Srihari Mansing.
11. Karunakar Paramguru.
12. Bisvanath Harichandan.
13. Bhagaban Singh.

Of these thirteen associates of Jagabandhu, Bhagaban Singh was reported to be dead, Karunakar Parmguru and Dama Subudi were arrested and the rest surrendered themselves in the hope of pardon. The Commissioner recommended for pardon of all *Dalbdeheras* and the former servants of the Raja of Khurda who were suspected to have participated in the rebellion and against whom there was no evidence for their committal to judicial trial. He further recommended that Krushna Chandra Bhramarbar might be pardoned, and a suitable allowance be granted to him on condition that he would live at some distance from Khurda.

Brigadier Thomas had recommended that all the *sardars* should be pardoned but they should be exiled from Orissa.

The Commissioner did not agree with this suggestion. The Magistrate of Khurda, while recommending the cases of *dalbeheras* for pardon, suggested that they should be restored to their properties. The Commissioner recommended this suggestion for consideration of the Government.²²

22. R. Ker, to W. A. Bayley, Chief Secretary, the 14th Dec., 1818.

It appears from a letter of Forrester to the Commissioner that the Gopal Chhotra and Padmanabh Chhotra were apprehended through the help of the following persons who were accordingly distributed cash rewards as noted against their names.²³

1. Sheo Prasad Darogha	Rs. 1000/-	(for apprehension of Gopal Chhotra)
2. Ram Mahrata.	Rs. 500/-	} For apprehension of Padmanabh Chhotra.
3. Bharat Maitee.	... Rs. 100/-	
4. Jagabandhu Mangraj	... Rs. 100/-	
5. Nabin Bahubalendra	... Rs. 100/-	
6. Sher Khan.	... Rs. 100/-	
7. Dhanoo.	... Rs. 100/-	

Raja of Kujang, who was arrested for his complicity in the Paik Rebellion in his estate, was ultimately found innocent and was ordered to be released unconditionally.²⁴

1819: Of the three noted sardars, Gopal Chhotra, Padmanabh Chhotra and Pindaki Bahubalendra, referred to above, the last one was arrested on the 17th January, 1819.²⁵

The Governor General granted full and free pardon to all the persons who had surrendered themselves in hope of pardon. He also authorised the Commissioner to make a declaration to the effect that all persons who might have been involved in the rebellion would be granted pardon if they came back to their respective homes and wait upon the Joint Magistrate of Khurda within two months of the declaration. The grant of general amnesty excluded Padmanabh Chhotra, Pindaki Bahubalendra and Pitabas Mangaraj. Commissioner was further authorised to grant pardon to all the *Dalbeheras* whose list was forwarded to him with his recommendations excepting Karunakar Paramguru. The Governor General expected that the measures adopted will help to dwindle the influence of Jagabandhu

23. Forrester to Pakenham, the 28th Dec., 1818.

24. Bayley to R. Ker, the 12th Dec., 1818.

25. Ker to Bayley, the 28th Jan., 1819.

and wished to know the views of the Commissioner about the expediency of granting free pardon to him and the *Diwan*, Krushna Chandra.²⁶ The Commissioner accordingly instructed the Joint Magistrate of Khurda to declare general pardon to all *dalbeheras*, *paiks* or other offenders who were recommended for pardon with exception to Gopal Chhotra and Karunakar Paramaguru. This pardon also excluded Padmanabb Chhotra and Pitabas Mangraj and those who had already been committed to trial.²⁷ The Joint Magistrate, Khurda, again proposed a modification in the declaration of pardon. He suggested that full and free pardon to be granted to the people of Khurda for all crimes committed upto 1st March, 1819 with exception to Jagabandhu Vidyadhar, Diwan Krushna Chandra, Pandaki Bahubalindra, Gopal Chhotra and Pitabas Mangraj and 87 persons under trial. He thought, the declaration to that effect would restore confidence in the people. He further suggested that amnesty should be extended to *thana* Piply. The Commissioner while recommending the above proposal suggested that full and free pardon for all offences committed in connection with rebellion from its commencement till the end of March 1819 should be granted throughout the District. Of course, the above five leaders were excluded from general amnesty.²⁸ The recommendations of the Commissioner were approved by the Governor General and the Commissioner was authorised to issue the proclamation without delay. Padma Charan Routra, Zamindar of Balarampur who was recommended for pardon was granted full and free pardon.

These arrangements were made evidently in the hope that the associates of Jagabandhu who were still at large and keeping his company would be tempted to avail themselves of this opportunity to come back to their hearth and home leaving their leader to his fate. Thus Jagabandhu would find himself excluded and helpless. He would then either surrender himself, or, it would be easier to apprehend him. Lastly the risk of a sudden flare up would be minimised. The subsequent trend of events will show that the authorities were deceived by

26. Bayley to R. Ker. the 5th February, 1819.

27. Ker to Forrester, the 31st March, 1819.

28. Ker to Bayley, the 3rd April, 1819.

their fond hopes of a speedy apprehension of Jagabandhu who remained at large for six years more causing constant headache to the authorities who were at last compelled to yield to him.

In May 1819 there was an incursion of Pans and Khonds from Ghumsar side into Banpur who plundered one or two villages and drove away 150 heads of cattle²⁹. Jagabandhu who was suspected to be in Ghumsar area was thought to be at the root of the incursion. Magistrate of Khurda had received information that Jagabandhu was at 'Poonepara' and Unkolo' villages for a long time. He had with him an elephant and thirty or forty people. A party of sepoys had been sent to surprise him in his concealment but they failed. On their arrival at the spot they found the kiltuts where Bukhsi was living had been deserted.³⁰

As a measure of strengthening the police force in the Banpur area for prevention of further incursions, three Jamadars and 36 *bargandazes* were appointed in June³¹. Lewis Thomas, probably the officer Commanding the troops in Banpur area, made preparation for a surprise attack on Jagabandhu in the Ghumsar area³². The expedition, it seems, met with failure as Jagabandhu eluded the party and managed to escape.³³ Only one person, Jagannath Ray, and some baggages of Jagabandhu were captured. 'Bhabru' (Bhabani ?) Das Bhabani Santra, Nimai Dalbeher and Chakradhara Patnaik belonging to kila Rorung were suspected of furnishing supplies to Jagabandhu and keeping communication with him³⁴. Stirling, Secretary to the Commissioner, reported to the Chief Secretary that Jagabandhu was in Ghumsar area and was being helped by Srikara Bhanja. The incursion of Panas and Khonds into Banpur was inspired by him. Srikara Bhanja after restoration in his zamindari did not dare to countenance him openly, so Jagabandhu had to move away to Ankola. After the

29. Forester to Magistrate Ganjam, 10th May. 1819.

30. Forrester to Magistrate, Ganjam, 9th June, 1819.

31. Lewis Thomas to Forrester, 21st June, 1819.

32. L. Thomas to Ker, 26.6. 1819.

33. Ker to a Thomas, 15. 7. 1819.

34. L. Thomas to Forrester, 14. 7. 1819.

surprise attack by the military he had to move away deeper into the Ghumsar jungles. Though he escaped, all his baggages including his only elephant were captured. Raja of Nayagarh was suspected to be affording him help. The Raja could help in apprehension of Jagabandhu if he so desired and he had been written to accordingly. In the circumstances there was chance of capture of Jagabandhu, so the idea of offering pardon to him and the *diwan* should be abandoned. Stirling further informed that in April, 1819, the Commissioner had despatched a message to Jagabandhu requesting to him to send one agent of his for discussion about conditions of his surrender; Jagabandhu made no response to it, he only sent an Oriya representation under the signature of himself and Krushna Chandra to Melville, Magistrate, Puri. It was submitted by one adopted son of Jagabandhu⁸⁵. The copy of the letter was forwarded so that the Government might know about the sentiment of Jagabandhu.

In the letter alluded to above, Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra stated the circumstances that led to deterioration of the condition of the *paiks* and people of Khurda. They said, when the English first conquered Orissa, Raja Mukund Deva opposed the establishment of British authority under the evil counsel of Jay Rajguru. They had remonstrated against such course of action, but to no consequences. Jai Rajguru was accordingly taken prisoner and Major Fletcher was appointed to take charge of Khurda. When Fletcher came, Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra made applications to him specifying the lands they had been enjoying from the times immemorial as *Jagirs* both in Khurda and the four Paganas of Lembai, Rahang, Serai and Chabiskud. They particularly drew his attention to lands under the denominations, *Bakhsibar* and *Diwanbar*. But Major Fletcher did not listen to their request and resumed all their lands. When Maharaja Mukunda Deva was released and allowed to settle at Puri on a pension, they again made representation of their case to the authorities at Cuttack and they even agreed to pay an equitable rent for those lands, if they would not be allowed to retain them rent-free. The authorities not only disregarded their prayer but let out their own *killas* in farm to others, though they had engaged for them in the first three years of British rule.

85. Stirling to Bayley, 21-7-1819.

They went on to say that many Rajas had committed offences against the British authority and had been pardoned, but Mukunda Deo a mere youth, committed some offence under evil instigation but was not excused. The result was that the prosperous region of Khurda where people lived happily under their Rajas was devastated, the new farmers extorted thrice the amount of due rent, the price of salt was increased by five times, and the people were reduced to such conditions that they had nothing to eat and drink, they subsisted on leaves of herbs. In this improverished condition they approached Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra with the proposal that they should all leave Khurda and go to jungle. The whole region would thus be a mere waste-land and no revenue would be collected. This might draw the attention of the authorities to their grievances. Accordingly they retired to jungles. But the British authorities instead of enquiring into their grievances drew forth their arms and began slaughtering the people. They prayed that their case might be duly enquired into, each, be restored to his possession and Raja Rama Chandra Deo be reinstated on the throne of Khurda. If after this anybody would raise a finger against the British authority, they would kill him.³⁶

The facts already discussed go to show that the representation of Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra contained no fact the truth of which could be doubted. Ewer's report support every item of the facts stated in the representation. But the authorities did not pay to it the attention it deserved; on the other hand, they continued their endeavours more vigorously for the apprehension of Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra. Had they paid immediate attention to the allegations and made due enquiries giving chances to Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra to prove their points the whole matter would have been amicably settled.

Authorities, in the mean time, had been tightening the guard in the Banpur region with a view to prevent further incursion of Pans and Khonds, and any further activities of Jagabandhu in that area. The

36. *Ibid*, enclosure (The translation of the letter of Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra).

Governor General sanctioned the additional police establishment for Banpur as proposed by the Magistrate. He also authorised him to declare rewards of Rs. 300/- for apprehension of Sheo Naik, the leader of the Pans and Khonds and Rs. 100/- for each of his eleven followers.³⁷

Stirling reported to the Chief Secretary that Gopal Chhotra who was undergoing trial on charges of murder and gang robbery was sentenced to death by the Nizamat Adalat and executed accordingly. Three of his followers were sentenced to transportation for life. Karnnaka Parmaguru was undergoing trial. He further informed that 89 persons were committed to trial on charges of gang robbery, murder or other offences, by the Magistrate of Khurda since the beginning of 1819. Of them 5 were sentenced to death, 74 to transportation for life and 10 to hard labour for a term of years. Amount of rewards distributed to persons helping apprehension of *paiks* and their *sardars* connected with the rebellion amounted to Rs. 12,314/-. Raja of Athmalik was given Rs. 1000/- for help in capture of Dama Subudi, Raja of Nayagarh received Rs. 2000/- for his services in the apprehension of Adikanda Bidyadhara and Lokanath Baliarsing (pardoned afterwards). Baishnab Charan Das, the zamindar of Jhankar got Rs. 5000/- for his services in apprehending rebels in 1817. The zamindar of Marichpur was given a reward amounting to Rs. 3,120/- in shape of remission of one year's revenue³⁸.

The families of Jagabandhu and Bamdev Pattnaik were captured in October and were sent to Forrester.³⁹

The persons accused of treason and rebellion were tried in court and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment (vide list appended at the end of the chapter) The following were sentenced to death.

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1. Parasuram Pattnaik for murder of Charan Pattnaik (Ms. Volume, O. S. A. no 45, pp. 118-19)
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37. Stirling to Forrester, 11-9-1819.

38. Stirling to Baylea.

39. Thomas to Ker, 29. 10. 1819.

2. Sachidananda Pattnaik for murder of Sadasiv Ray. *
3. Gopai Chhotrai.
4. Bansi Paikra.
5. Ram singh.
6. Nath Pradhan.
7. Narasingha. * *

Bamdev Patjose and Narayan Paramguree, the leaders of the Kujyang paiks were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for life in the Jail at Alipore. (Ms. vol., O. S. A., No. 523, pp. 25-26) Besides 9 of the rebels were sentenced by the Nizamat Adalat to 14 years imprisonment in banishment, 25 to temporary imprisonment in banishment, 30 to imprisonment and transportation for life and 103 to imprisonment in transportation beyond sea for life (*Ibid*, pp. 67-68 and 97-98. *vide* list at the end of the chapter)

There is nothing important to record during the years 1820-21 when the attempts to apprehend the two leaders and their associates continued as before, but without any success. The hope that Jagabandhu might be induced to surrender himself on the capture of his family too proved futile. So the family of Jagabandhu were released in November 1820.⁴⁰

Despite all attempts and constant vigilance on the part of the authorities, Jagabandhu could not be apprehended; he remained a source of anxiety and terror to them. and further more, he caused serious strain on the financial resources of the Government on account of maintenance of military and extra police staff in a state of perpetual alertness. So the authorities thought it wise to put an end to this state of affairs by offering pardon to Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra.

The Governor General in Council sanctioned offer of pardon to Jagabandhu, Krushna Chandra and their associates on the following conditions.

* Ms. Vol, 45 (O. S. A.), O. p. 120.

* *Ibid* p. 151

40. Chif Secretary to Commissioner, cuttack, 1, 9, 1820.

1). They should forego their hereditary rights to their killas and also their official titles, 'Bakhsi and Dewan'.

2). They should live in or near Cuttack and would not leave their residences without the permission of the Magistrate.

3). Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra should get Rs. 100/- and Rs 50/- P. M. as pension respectively.⁴¹

This offer, the authorities thought, Jagabandhu would be too glad to accept. The hope was based on the fact that most of the associates and followers of Jagabandhu had been either arrested or had surrendered themselves; so he was almost helpless; further, constant look out and vigilance of the authorities kept them always on the move and lastly, he must be getting very little provision due to alterness of the police and military. But they were mistaken in their calculations. They did not know the mettle he was made of, and the strain he was capable of withstanding. They did not know what an iron will inspired him in his fight against the odds, and how deep was his feeling of frustration and despair engendered by their acts of injustice. So they judged him from the point of view of the psychology of an average man, and no wonder, they should be illusioned in their hopes.

On receipt of the Government order, the Magistrate of Khurda sent for the adopted son of Jagabandhu and acquainted him with the Government offer so that he might communicate it to his father. In about 10 or 12 days he came back and informed the Magistrate that Jagabandhu would deliver himself if the Raja of Khurda was restored to his estate. The Magistrate again communicated to Jagabandhu in January 1823 that no other term than what was offered would be acceptable to the Government. No reply to this communication was received by him till August. The Magistrate thought that Jagabandhu was some where near the limits of Nayagarh. He thought that there was little prospect of his apprehension owing to the fact that people of Khurda would not give out anything about his movement. So the Magistrate expressed his inability to suggest any measure for his apprehension.⁴²

41. Princep, Actg. Secretary, to W. Blunt, Commissioner, 22.8.1822.

42. Wilkinson, Magistrate of Khurda, to Blunt, 4.9.1823.

The Government confiscated the estates of Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra. The Governor General asked the Commissioner to warn the Raja of Nayagarh against granting protection to Jagabandhu.⁴³

Mr. Wilkenson, Magistrate of Khurda, informed the Commissioner that Jagabandhu and Krushna Chandra were residing in the estate of Nayagarh and that they received supplies from the heads of several villages in that estate with the knowledge and consent of the Raja and his servants. Despite numerous warnings the Raja was not withdrawing his support from them. He therefore sought the permission of the Commissioner to summon the Raja to attend on him and to send a party of sepoy to that estate to be stationed there, so that they might be near about Bucksbi. He hoped that Jagabandhu might be apprehended by these measures.⁴⁴ The Commissioner wrote to Wilkenson in reply that if there were sufficient grounds to believe that the Raja of Nayagarh was affording help to Jagabandhu; he would recommend to the Government for authorising him to request Raja's personal attendance. The Commissioner did not find any material objection to the proposal of sending a contingent of sepoy to Nayagarh for apprehension of Jagabandhu.⁴⁵

Nothing came out of these preparations; Jagabandhu remained at large as before. Neither offer of pardon, nor most careful and elaborate arrangements for his apprehension could bring out the invisible foe. He remained concealed in unknown jungle recesses, and from that secluded retreat, he occasionally sent out small parties causing enough flutter in the official circle. He remained a nightmare to the authorities who could not relax themselves on account him.

In November, 1824, the Commissioner reported to the Chief Secretary that there were information about Jagabandhu assembling a party of armed men within the limits of Nayagarh to disturb the

43. Bayley to Blunt, 4.9.1823.

44. Wilkinson to Blunt,

45. Blunt to Wilkinson, 2.12.1823.

peace of the adjoining area and so, he proposed augmentation of police force. In reply, the Chief Secretary informed that the Governor General approved of the arrangements proposed. The Commissioner was authorised to permit Wilkinson to increase the police force at Khurda and to add to the Paik Company, if he thought it necessary for maintenance of peace in the area. The Governor General further warned against the adoption of any measure involving employment of military force against the Raja of Nayagarh in view of the fact that 'such a military force could not be collected without much embarrassment and public inconvenience.'⁴⁶

Wilkinson who visited Banpur area in December 1824 reported that the situation was quiet there. He came to know that emissaries of Jagabandhu visited several *garhs* in Khurda and collected money and provisions for him. Citing one such instance as provided positive proof of the above belief, he reported that Bandhu Santra, who was deputed by Jagabandhu, demanded money from the inhabitants of Seraigarh with the help of Hara Patsahani; Kelu Santra of Seraigarh and his son contributed Rs. 7/- rupees which was given to the Dalbehera who made it over to Bandhoo Santra. The Magistrate, on receipt of this information sent for Kelu Santra, his son and brother, last of whom absconded. On enquiry he came to know that Kelu Santra and his son kept the emissary of Jagabandhu in their house for several days and assisted in collections in their own area and also in other *garhs*. He proposed exemplary punishment of Kelu Santra and his son, whom he wished to commit to trial with the approval of the Government. He also suspected that other *dalabeheras* were furnishing supplies to Jagabandhu, though he had not been able to procure any positive proof against them. He expected that punishment of Kelu Santra and his son would have the best effect in deterring others from furnishing supplies to the Buckshi.⁴⁷

Things were getting too tight for Jagabandhu to continue his resistance. The Raja of Nayagarh who was secretly helping him was warned, and he was afraid of bitter consequences, if he continued to

6. Bayley to Pakenham, 25-11-1824.

47. Wilkinson to Pakenham, Commissioner. 15-4-1825.

countenance the activities of Jagabandhu within his area. The Raja probably withdrew his support, and so, Jagabandhu must have been left entirely to meagre collections of his associates from Khurda and other areas. The vigilance of the authorities, probably, curtailed his meagre supplies to a great extent. Consequently he had no alternative left but to surrender. This he did in a manner that did not seriously compromise his dignity and honour.

Pakenham, Magistrate of Cuttak, in his letter to Blunt, Commissioner, made a report of the circumstances leading to surrender of Jagabandhu. While he was acting as Commissioner, he issued a *parwana* to the Raja of Nayagarh warning him against the consequence of any complicity of his servants with Jagabandhu. On receipt of this warning Barju Paikra, the *bebarta* of the Raja, and one relation of the Raj attended on him in his capacity as the Acting Commissioner. He impressed upon Barju Paikra the risk the Raja was exposed to by affording assistance to Jagabandhu. He also informed him of the grounds on which such suspicion was based. He further impressed on Barju that the Raja had then the most favourable opportunity of retrieving his character in the Government, and also doing an essential service to *Buckshi* by obtaining for him a comfortable residence and allowance which, at his time of life, must be far preferable to living in the jungle in a constant state of anxiety, if Raja used his influence to persuade Jagabandhu to come out and surrender on the conditions proposed.

Pakenham further remarked, 'It frequently occurs that the best intentions and wisest plan of the European Functionaries are thwarted by the intrigues of subordinate native officers who are necessarily employed and that on all occasions their advice has weight. In the present instance, it affords me great pleasure to state my conviction that the Native, on whose exertions I placed some reliance was most earnest in his private meetings with Paikra in supporting my arguments by his own, and that every possible assistance was rendered by him.' The remarks of Pakenham with regard to the behaviour of the Indian clerks are note-worthy. As a matter of fact, the ignorance of the British officers about the affairs of Orissa was most systematically exploited by the *amlas* to their best interests but much to the detriment of the condition of the people and good name of the Government they served under.

However that may be, Barju Paikra was impressed with the risk he and his master were exposed to, and consequently, he repeatedly assured the Commissioner of his best efforts in the matter of persuading Jagabandhu to accept the terms of pardon.

Wilkinson, the Magistrate of Khurda, who proceeded to Nayagarh, had an interview with the Raja and warned him that if Jagabandhu Vidyadhara did not surrender himself within four months the details of Raja's complicity with the *buckshi* would be laid before the Government. The warning was enough for the Raja not only to withdraw his support from Jagabandhu, but also to actuate him to persuade Jagabandhu Vidyadhara to accept the offers of pardon. So Pakenham writes, 'Whatever credit Burgoon Paikra may claim for performance of his promise to me, I feel satisfied that to the fear inspired by Mr. Wilkinson's activity and the knowledge they had of his character is mainly to be attributed the accomplishment of the wishes of of the Government for the surrender of Jagabandhu'.

Barju Paikra then set to the work assigned to him and communicated to the Commissioner of the willingness of Jagabandhu to accept the terms of offer. Then the Commissioner sent Wuz Muhammad, Sheristadar of the office of the Superintendent of Tributary Mahals, to escort *Buckshi* to Cuttack where he arrived on the 27th May, 1825 and executed the agreement that he would not leave his station without permission⁴⁸.

With surrender of Jagabandhu, his followers who had faithfully adhered to him during his most trying and distressing period of the last phase of his fight, also surrendered themselves in the hope of pardon. They were :

1. Gouranga 'Bareesal' ... Dalbehera of Garh Lalsing.
2. Bandhu Santra, ... Dalai of Garh 'Kooree'.
3. Kelai Mansing, ... Brother of Hoonoo (Hunu?)
Dalbehera of Garh Serai,
4. Hari Santra, ... Sevak of 'Burgai Thokorani'.
(Badajai Thakurani).

⁴⁸ Pakenham to Blunt, 30. 5. 1825, and Blunt to Bayley 29. 5. 1825.

5. Madhu Bisoi, ... Paik.
6. Bhagban Janee, ... -do-
7. Rajib Bisoi, ... -do-
8. Urdhul (Uddhab) Naik -do-

The Commissioner recommended to the Government to increase the pension of Jagabandhu Vidyadhera to Rs. 150/- P. M. and not to impose any restraint on him other than that already imposed regarding his not leaving station without permission. He also recommended distribution of rewards to the following persons to the extent noted against them.

(1) Raja of Nayagarh	Remission of one year's tribute.
(2) Barju Paikra	Rs. 2, 000/-
(3) Waz Muhammad	Rs. 1,000/- ⁵⁰

He further recommended that Wilkinson might be authorised to drop proceedings against the persons committed to trial. The Governor General accepted the recommendations and issued orders accordingly.⁵¹ In consequence of these orders Kelu Santra and Harichandan Dalbehera who were committed to trial, about whom reference was made by the Commissioner to the Government (vide foot note 40), were ordered to be released from confinement after dropping of proceedings against them.⁵²

After surrender of Jagabandhu, Krushna Chandra followed the suit. He surrendered himself to the Joint Magistrate, Khurda, as was reported to the Commissioner by that officer in his letter dated the 2nd

49. Blunt to Bayley, June, 1825.

50. Blunt to Bayley, 4-6-1825.

51. Bayley to Blunt, 16-6-1825.

52. Blunt to Wilkinson.

53. Pakenham, offg. Commissioner to H. Sakespear, Secretary to the Government in the Judicial Department, 3-1-1826,

January 1826. Commissioner recommended an enhancement of his pension from Rs. 50/- to Rs. 100/-.⁵³

The Governor General in the Council accepted the recommendations and authorised the Commissioner to pay Krushna Chandra at Rs. 100/- P. M. as his pension and to permit Wilkinson to distribute the rewards recommended for the apprehension of Krushna Chandra.⁵⁴

Karunakara Paramguru who was sentenced to transportation in 1819 managed to escape from the Jail and was rearrested. However, he was granted pardon by the Governor General for the offence of returning from transportation and for crimes of which he was convicted in 1819.⁵⁵

We do not know anything about the activities of Jagabandhu Vidyadhara after his surrender in 1825 till his death on the 24th January 1829. He probably remained in complete seclusion and led a calm and peaceful life. With very meagre facts known so far about him it is not possible for any historian to make a correct assessment of his personality, qualities and his stature as a brave leader. Nevertheless, there cannot be two opinions about the fact that he was a man of exceptional courage, resources and strong determination. Paik rebellion in itself was not something of outstanding features as an insurrection, it could hardly make any impression on the British power, and a few months' exertion on the part of the British force could bring the whole situation under control. It is the personal character of Jagabandhu Vidyadhara that strikes one as most outstanding and conspicuous. The facts at our disposal lead us to imagine that ordinarily he was a man of peaceful disposition and sober outlook. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that he was one of the first to submit to the British authority without any grumble or murmur. Unlike Jay Rajguru, he had a clear appreciation of the situation, and he knew that it was futile to try to dislodge the British authority. While Jay Rajguru instigated Mukunda Deva to resist the British authority, Jagabandhu submitted calmly and entered into engagement for his kila Rorung as already referred to. Jagabandhu's

54. Sakespear to Pakonham, 12-6-1826.

55. Sakespear to Pakenham, 17-3-1829.

submission to the British authority, however, should not be ascribed to his lack of courage or anything of the sort, than to his clear perception of the changed situation and realisation of the futility of any attempt to measure strength with the power that conquered Orissa with utmost ease and expedition. But the heroic spirit in him was stirred to activity when he saw before his eyes the gross injustice of the British authorities driving his beloved people of Khurda to utter despair and destitution. He himself was subject to gross injustice; from the position of opulence and honour he was reduced to that of beggary and humiliation. He himself starved and found his erstwhile subjects rotting in utter destitution. These facts are all stated in his representation to the Government already discussed above. Jagabandhu therefore could tolerate no longer, his iron will and courageous heart were roused to action; he took the leadership of the paiks to avenge the wrongs perpetrated on them and to open the eyes of the callous authorities to their misery and the desolation of the region that once was throbbing with rich and prosperous life. It would be wrong to assume that Jagabandhu suffered from any illusion of challenging the British authority to the extent of dislodging them when he took up arms; he did have no such fond hopes. He knew fully well that such hopes were useless, but still he took up arms to direct the attention of the authorities to gross injustice they had perpetrated on a peaceful population, and he had no other way open to him but to resort to arms as all peaceful remonstrances of himself and the people failed to attract the attention of the authorities,

As a military Commander we do not find anything conspicuous about him, The insurrection lacked organisation and co-ordination between different groups operating in different regions. No where did the insurrection make any impression on the British military force employed against them excepting at Puri, where the British force had to retreat to Cuttack. But with the approach of new force under Captain Hamilton, the insurgents left the town without even trying to strike once. However that may be, we have to take into account the certain factors that led such sad failure of the Paik Rebellion.

Firstly, the insurrection was not pre-planned, it broke out on the spur of the moment, as such, it could not be properly and efficiently

organised. Secondly, it was confined to a few, *paiks* and their leaders, and the mass remained passive spectators. Even the Rajas of Tributary Estates did not come forward to join their hands, though Jagabandhu attempted to rouse them towards that end. Thirdly, the *paiks* were accustomed to their own way of fighting, they had no idea of advanced military manoeuvring and discipline, nor had they the equipments and provisions to sustain them in their fight. In these circumstances any conspicuous achievement on the part of the *paiks* was beyond expectation. That they mustered courage enough to make a bold and determined stand with almost no co-operation from any other quarter, and without sufficient provision or equipment and faced the haviest odds is deserving of highest credit. We cannot expect any thing more of them in the circumstances.

Coming back to the point at issue, the personality and character of Jagabandhu, the strength of his mind that sustained him throughout all his trials and tribulations for about eight years strike one as most astonishing. When we visualise his situation, we cannot but pay the highest tribute to this aspect of his character. Imagine him moving about in a destitute condition followed by a few faithful associates, remaining in constant state of alertness for fear of detection and depending on the help of others for his meagre provisions the sources of which were gradually dwindling due to the vigilance of the authorities; in this state he managed to keep up his strength of mind and strong determination for more than seven years, is it not wonderful? History rarely provides such instance of iron will and dogged determination; who knows he would not have attained the celebrity that attaches to the memory of Rana Pratap Sinha or Rani of Jhansi, had he got an opportunity and scope to distinguish himself in bigger spheres.

We shall close this chapter with a reference to the policy of the Government towards Gopinath Bidyadhara, the minor son of Jagabandhu Vidyadhara.

The Governor General ordered restoration of kila, Rorung to Gopinath Vidyadhara with exception of the share decreed to Gadadhara Vidyadhara. The pension granted to Jagabandhu Vidyadhara was stopped from the date of his death.⁵⁶

56. Sakespear to Stockwell, Actg. Commissioner, 28. 8. 1829.

Bnt Gopinath Vidyadhara represented to the Government that he could not manage his family with the amount of *malikana* of kila Rorung. So the Commissioner recommended for an allowance of Rs. 100/ P. M. He continued to draw this pension till 1844. As Gopinath Vidyadhara was not willing to take possession of his estate for fear of losing his pension the Commissioner recommended for its continuance.⁵⁷

57. J. Mill, Commissioner to Sudder Board of Revenue, 20. 3. 1844

APPENDIX

**Extracts from the Proceedings of the Nizamut Adalat
relating to the trial of Some prisoners of the Paik Rebellion**

EXTRACT FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NIZAMUT ADAWLUT

UNDER DATE THE 21st. DECEMBER 1818.

President

W. E. Rees Esqr.,

Puisne Judge.

The Court having duly considered the proceedings held in the trial of Baumdeb Patjoosee and Narain Purrumgoroo charged with treason and Rebellion against the State and the futwa of one of their Law officers on this said trail pass the following setence.

The prisoners *Baumdsb Pautjoosee* and *Narain Purrumgoroo* having been convicted by the Futwa of one of the Law officers of the Nizamut Adawlut, of various acts of treason and Rebellion against the State, and declared liable to discretionary punishment, the Court, in conviniance with the opinion expressed by the officiating Judge of Circuit, in the 2nd. Paragraph of his letter of the 19th ultimo, which accompanied the trial, sentence the said prisoners to *imprisonment with hard labour for life, in the jail at Allypore*, but, previously to issuing final orders for execution of the sentence, dlrect that the whole of the proceedings with a copy of the letter from the officiating Judge of Circuit Mr. Walpole, accompanying the trial, be submitted for the consideration and the trial, be submitted for the consideration and orders of Government agreeably to Section 5, Regulation 4, 1799.

A true Extract.

Signed and Sealed by the Nizamut Adaulut,

Sd./ W. Doren

Registrar.

O. S. A., Vol. No. 523, pp. 25 26.

To

The Hon'ble W. L. Melville,
Acting Magistrate of Zillah Cuttaok.

Sir,

The Court of Nizamut Adawlut have had before them your letter under date the 25th Ultimo, with the two lists of 112 convicts* under sentences therein mentioned.

2. The sentences passed upon these prisoners having been compared in this office, and appearing to be correct, the court have resolved that the Prisoners, as named in the margin, be removed to the Jail at Allypore.

3. You are accordingly directed to send them under a strong guard with their warrants to the Magistrate of the Subarbs of Calcutta, transmitting at the same time lists of the convicts drawn out in the mode prescribed by the courts circular orders of the 3rd August 1793, and 10th of April 1801.

4. The court leave you to your discretion as to dispatching these convicts in one, or in two or more detachments, as you shall deem either mode most expedient.

Fort William
the 10th December
1819.

I am Sir
Your obedient humble servant
W. Dorin
Registrar,

NIZAMUT ADAWLUT

<i>Name of Prisoner.</i>	<i>Sentence.</i>
*1. Nittanund Putnaik	14 years imprisonment in punishment.
2. Puddumchurn Doss	
3. Bushnoochurn Doss	
4. Chytunchurn Doss	
5. Kirteebaus Rowtrah	
6. Dhunnuran Sing	
7. Lokaw Moodlu	
8. Kunnye Mullik Chowkeedar	
9. Kocssye Mulhik.	
*1. Nutbursoonder Raas	Imprisonment in transportation beyond sea for life.
2. Jaggunath Mohapatter	
3. Fuekeer Junnah	
4. Gouree Nurrinder	
5. Narain Sree Chundun	
6. Lolul Barik	
7. Kurro Patur	
8. Kumulochun Chumputty	
9. Dhunarjee Moharutha	
10. Panchoo Kuhul Sing	
11. Killie Chumputty	
12. Doomun Sing	
13. Roushun Khan	
14. Oojul Tewarree	
15. Gour Singram Sing	
16. Ram Naik	
17. Gnndasee Naik	
18. Khutua	
19. Arut Naik	
20. Kundroo Naik	
21. Beekla	
22. Bheekaree Naik	

*Names of Prisoners**Sentence*

23. Needhe Naik
24. Purmanud Sing
25. Damoo Gujundar
26. Boorunda Patur
27. Bam Naik
28. Chukur Das
29. Beomnd Naik
30. Doolub Doohuree
31. Bishnoo Naik
32. Baka Naik
33. Bishoo Sooaun
34. Bhugut Moharna
35. Pursooram Patur
36. Bishnoo Baral
37. Gobind Soobdhee
38. Chum Sooaun
39. Funchoo Pudhan
40. Joogee Sreechundun
41. Bhagruttee Rai
42. Oochub Bhera
43. Urjoon Doohree
44. Chytun Majhee
45. Lokenath Chooal
46. Sadhoo Mungraje
47. Boodhee Doohree
48. Mooga Naik
49. Phugoo Burhaee
50. Rajib Naik
- * 51. Burjoo Naik
52. Broonda Naik
53. Basso Behra
54. Pinchoo Naik
55. Needhee Naik
56. Raghu Naik
57. Pandub Naik
58. Bundhoo Naik
59. Sukun Naik
60. Pindakee Naik

<i>Name of Prisoners</i>	<i>Sentence</i>
61. Killa Naik	
62. Kundooree Naik	
63. Dam Naik	
64. Boorunda	
65. Fackeer Sing	
66. Muheshur Paikra	
67. Moollee Settee	
68. Oodoy Hurry Chund	
69. Koonjoo Junna Nai	
70. Boorund Naik	
71. Juggut Naik	
72. Mukoond Naik	
73. Findekee Naik	
74. Pudde Naik	
75. Bulee Das	
76. Bheem Sooaun	
77. Gourang Chooal Si	
78. Bheekoo Dulae	
79. Pursotam Singh	
80. Lukhunees	
81. Burjoo Bhnja	
82. Ram Dohree	
83. Bhooj Magee	
84. Purmee Juna	
85. Nabun Patur	
86. Gobind Juna	
87. Kirpan Panee	
88. Gun Naik	
89. Roosee Patur	
90. Madhoo Juna	
91. Narain Dulae	
92. Phugoo Muhtee	
93. Mohadev Juna	
94. Pindekee Patur	
95. Joogee Patur	
96. Mudhoo Patur	
97. Mudhoo Pudhan	
98. Bulbuddur Raee	

<i>Name of Prisoners</i>	<i>Sentence</i>
99. Neela Duree Hurreechundun	
100. Sakhun Chooal Singh	
101. Bawuree Muhtee	
102. Oordhub Mulik	
103. Dhoorub Mulik	

To

M. H. Turnbull, Esqr.
Acting Magistrate of Zillah Cuttack.

Sir,

The court of Nizamut Adawlul have had before them your letter under date the 26th January last, with two lists of fifty-five prisoners therein mentioned.*

2. The sentences passed upon these prisoners having been compared in this office, and appearing to be correct, the court have resolved that the twenty-five prisoners under sentences of temporary imprisonment in banishment be removed to the jail of zillah Midnapore, and that the remaining thirty convicts, sentenced twenty-six to imprisonment and transportation for life, and four to perpetual imprisonment, be sent to the Jail at Allypore.

3. You are desired to send them accordingly under a proper guard with their warrants, and lists drawn out in the mode prescribed by Court Circular orders of the 3rd August 1796, and 10th of April 1801.

Fort William
the 5th March
1819

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I am sir
Your obedient humble servant
Sd. W. Dorin
Registrar.

NIZAMUT ADAWLUT

<i>Name of Prisoner</i>	<i>Sentence.</i>
1. Ram Mullick	Temporary imprisonment in banishment.
2. Haree Bhoee	
3. Ekadusee Bhoeee	
4. Govind Mangee.	
5. Juggye Mullick	
6. Chyteen Swyne	
7. Hurreekishen Sahoo	
8. Bharut Naik	
9. Munsarun	
10. Ruttun Mullick	
11. Nedhee Mullick Chokeedar	
12. Ruggoo Sah	
13. Chuan Sah	
14. Kanye Satputty.	
15. Dataree Satpatty	
16. Ratnaka Misra	
17. Bundoo Saumil	
18. Bansoo Mallick	
19. x x Mallick Kalan	
20. x x Mallick Khoorde.	
21. Beestam Mallick	
22. Soollobe Mullick	
23. Fukeer Mullick	
24. Ballub Junnah	
25. Autang Naik	
1. Muddoo Rawut	Imprisonment and transportation for life
2. Ruhak Sah	
3. Dobbah Doss	
4. Kullunder Pauter	
5. Kesheeb Saumal	
6. x x Nekka	
7. x x Mehtee	
8. Banawaree Saumil	
9. x x dossalia Beswal	

<i>Names of Prisoners.</i>	<i>Sentence.</i>
10. Sk. Syphoollah	
11. Sk. Surdaree	
12. x x Mohapatter	
13. Banchoo Bhoy	
14. Oordhup Rawut	
15. Daum Junnah	
16. Rupa Mohoputteer	
17. Ktssorree Sookeel	
18. Otchoot Gochait	
19. Joggee Naik	
20. Georee Gochait	
21. Purmah	
22. Busitumah	
23. Dinnae	
24. Kerpah Naik	
25. Narruin Naik	
26. Kellai Naik	
27. Bhagbut Mehtee	
28. Baumdeb Putjoosee	
29. Narain Purumgooroo	
30. Bulboo Roy.	

English Translation of the letter of Jagabandhu Vidyadhara and Krushna Chandra Bhramarbar to the Government

Jagbundoo Bownerber Raee Buksbee of Orissa and Dewan Kishen Chender Bhowerber Raee offer their salutation to the English gentlemen and beg to represent as follows:—

It is now 14 years since the Province of Cuttack was conquered by the British arms. At that period Maharajah Mukoond Deo who was quite a youth was urged on by the evil counsels of Jye Raye Gooree, contrary to our earnest advice and remonstrances, to oppose the establishment of the British authority. He was accordingly taken prisoner and sent to Midnapore. Major Fletcher was then appointed to the charge of Khurdah. We from the beginning waited on that Officer. We gave in Derkhausts specifying all the lands which ourselves and our ancestors from time immemorial had been permitted to hold rent free under the heads of written Muhutteran Khereegee and Jageer, both in Khoorda and in the 4 pergannahs (viz. Limbaee, Rahung, Seraeen and chcubeesood) and we particularly urged our claims to the possession of Bukshee Bar and Dewan Bar (valuable Mehals now annexed to Rahung). Major Fletcher however utterly disregarded our claims and resumed every particle of our lands, leaving us not a Bukhra nor a Bigha of ground. When the Maharaja was brought back from Midnapore and settled at Pooree with a fixed allowance for his maintenance, we ventured to represent our cases also to the authorities of Cuttack, stating that we were entirely destitute of the means of supporting our families and dependants amounting to upwards of 500 souls and that if they would but give possession of our lands, we would agree to pay such revenue for them as it might be thought equitable to fix, on a fair consideration of our cases, notwithstanding that we had enjoyed them rent free Jageers obtained by our ancestors many generations back under grants from the Maharajah and the Soobahdars, of the Province. Such was our ill fortune however that this request also was disregarded and further the khoodkast Zemindaree of Killa Rorung which the Emperor of Delhi had conferred on the ancestors of one of us (the Bukshee) which his family has always held and which he himself was allowed to engage for under the British Government during 3 successive years was taken away from him. Year after year he petitioned the local authorities for redress but in vain, He became in consequence reduced to a state of beggary and compelled to depend for his subsistence

on the bounty of certain Zamindars, The Dewan also was brought into a similar condition being dispossessed of Garh Chittri (Chhatrama Garh near Amaniatota in Khurdah ?) and other places ages since granted by the Rajahs to his family. Under the British Government convicted fellows even are allowed food and clothing; what had we done that we should be so degraded and impoverished ? Under the same Government also how many Zemindars and Rajahs who have offended have not been pardoned and restored to their country and Estates? But Rajah Mukoond Deo for an offence against the State committed in his youth at the sole instigation of a wicked and designing Minister was for nearly 14 years kept out of Khoorda and that country, the Guddee of Orissa, the seat of its ancient sovereigns abandoned to ruin and devastations. Had the Maharajah been placed in authority over his country according to former usage a population of 300000 souls would have prospered and and been happy but from the Guddee being vacant they have perished. From Darootherg to Chuttergarh (or from the N. E. to S. W, extremity of Khnodah) the whole country was let out to farmers; where there were resources of 5 Rs. these farmers demanded payment of 15; salt rose from 1 pun, to 5, Such was the deplorable state of the ryots that they were obliged to subsist on herbs and water and scarcely one amongst them had a vessel left to drink his water out of : yet notwithstanding the extremity of wretchedness no one took any notice of the condition. At length the people of the country came to us who were destitute and impoverished like themselves in a body and said we and you and Maharajah have sunk to the lowest stage of misery. This is now our plan, let us retire to the jungle and fix our abode there the lands will then become waste and no revenue be collected. It is possible that on seeing this the English may be induced to take our condition into consideration. Confirmably with this scheme the people of Khoorda retired into the jungles but the British Authorities instead of viewing their conduct in the light that was expected and sending a Vakeel, drew forth their armies and began slaughtering and devastating country. At length from the good fortune of Sree Ramohander Deo and for the benefit of us, of the Maharajah and of the people of Khoorda the present rulers have visited the Province. Let our cases now then be taken fully into consideration and each man reinstated in his just rights. Let Mrharajah Ramohander Deo be placed on the Guddee of Khoorda, we restored to our ancient possessions and former condition and the people of Khoorda to a state of happiness and prosperity. Then, should any

one hereafter commit crimes against Government we will undertake to destroy him with the sword and let this offence of Bukshee Jugbundoo Bhowmarber Raae be pardoned,

M. S. Vol. 18 A, Bd. of Rev

CHAPTER VIII

PARLAKHIMEDI AND GHUMSAR¹ RISINGS FROM 1821 TO 1836.

We may now turn our attention to the affairs of Ganjam. In Chapter V we traced the course of events upto 1822. The constant quarrel between the different parties and its consequent devastating effects on the poor *raiya's*, who had to bear the brunt of it ultimately, unnerved the British authorities, who, sometimes got involved in these quarrels. So they decided to make over the zamindari to the minor Raja Jagannath Gajapati Narayan Deo without waiting till he attained his age. Accordingly the Raja assumed charges of his zamindari in February, 1822¹.

On receiving charge of zamindari, the Raja invested full powers in his *Diwan*, Nityananda Pati, who, however, incurred the displeasure of the most powerful party attached to Pata Mahadevi. He tried to get rid of some persons belonging to that party in order to strengthen his position. The result was instantaneous flare up and immediate removal of the *diwan*.²

Gopendra Pattnaik was appointed as new *Diwan*, Sewajidevi and 'Mamaha' Devi, Raja's grand-mother and mother respectively wanted Padmanabh Deo to be appointed as *Diwan*. For that purpose they made representations to Sir Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, when he visited Parlakimidi in July 1822. But it had no effect, since Padmanabh Deo's character was so well-known that the authorities did not venture to entrust him with the management of the estate once more. So, there was no change in *Diwanship*. But the people continued to suffer as before owing to party-factions, each party trying to avenge on the other by plundering and burning the property and the houses of the people attached to the opposite party. The *Diwan* and Rakano Chendroodoo were accused of plundering and burning the house of two people belonging to the party opposed to them and committed to trial. But they were ultimately acquitted.³

1. *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government, Russel's Report on Disturbances in Parlakimedy.*

3. *Ibid*, pp. 30-33.

At last Padmanabh Deo was appointed as *diwan* in 1824, but he had again to withdraw to his estate owing to stiff opposition of the Pata Mahadevi's party resulting, as usual, in suffering of the people caused by plundering and burning of houses by the contending parties. Pata Mahadevi succeeded Padmanabh Deo as *diwan* and continued in that office till November 1826, whereafter 'Gopendra' Patnaik was again appointed as the *diwan*. But he could hardly maintain his position in the face of stiff opposition and tricky designs of Pata Mahadevi who again succeeded him in October 1827. But she was not destined to continue long. Raja's wife, who had so long remained a passive spectator, was roused to action under the instigation of some persons and vehemently opposed the predominance of Pata Mahadevi whose influence by this time, had begun to wane. There was a lot of sanguinary fighting between the adherents of the two parties. Pata Mahadevi found her cause hopeless, and so, she sought safety in flight. The management was taken over by the Raja's wife.³

But she could not manage the estate for long, disturbances broke out in different parts, revenue was not collected. So the estate was attached in 1822 and an *Amin* was appointed to take charge of collection. But this did not improve matters. So the estate was placed under Court of Wards.⁴

Padmanabh Deo was again appointed as the manager in May 1831. He managed to seize some of the *Bisois* opposed to him and appointed his own nominees in their places. This act of Padmanabh Deo who was hated by the people again led to widespread disturbances all over the estate in August, 1831. Troops were called to quell the disturbances. The baggages of captain Keating employed to command the sepoys were plundered. Sixty sepoys of the Sebendy corps were captured and disarmed, and communication with Chicacole was cut off. Godeapaud Kistnama Dora, some of his relatives and Narsinga Raju one principal town peon, etc. were the chief leaders in the rising.

3. *Ibid*, pp. 33-33.

4. *Ibid*, pp. 33-34.

5. *Ibid*, p. 35.

Mr. Eden, the Collector, found that it was not easy to suppress the rising without proclamation of Martial Law and use of military. As he did not expect Government to support him in this step, he had to make compromise with the peons by paying a sum of Rs. 19,000 to satisfy their claims. This resulted in temporary tranquillity which was again disturbed a month after⁶

Fresh troubles broke out in September, 1831. The rebel leaders Godeyapaud, Towty Dora, Guma Bisoi, Ram Raju and Jagannath Raju made a combined and systematic effort at annihilation of the British authority. They took possession of the Western and Southern Division of the Kimedi Zamindari and assumed the entire government of that part⁷. The manager Padmanabh Deo marched against the rebels with all his force, but due to treachery of Rakena Chendroodoo and Gopinath Pattraik, he could effect little in establishing his authority. His own zamindari in Tekaly and his house in Parlakimedi were attacked, many houses in the town and in the government area to the south of the town were also set fire to. As usual the whole brunt of these devastations fell on the poor *raiyats*⁸.

In January 1832] Mr. Ogilvie assumed the charge of collectorate. He found himself in a very embarrassing position. He could know that deep dislike of the people towards Padmanabha Deo was at the root of the disturbances, but owing to the policy followed by his predecessor he had to support him in the present crisis. The number of peons was enhanced from 700 to 1000. But it was not enough to put down the rising. At this stage Padmanabha Deo died, His death brought about a temporary peace in the area.⁸

In December 1832, Mr. George Russel was appointed as Special Commissioner to enquire into the causes of insurrection and to devise ways and means for its suppression.

Mr. Russel's enquiries convinced him that the intrigues of Gopinath Patnaik and Rakena Chendroodoo were mainly responsible for

6 *Ibid*, pp. 37-39.

7, *Ibid*, pp. 39-40.

8. *Ibid*, pp. 40-41.

the disturbances. Through the help of 'Dausu Patnaik', one of the *mukhtariants*, Mr. Russel was able to procure sufficient evidences against them justifying their apprehension and being committed to trial. So, those two persons, along with some other persons, who had been most active during the rising of 1831, were apprehended and criminal proceedings were instituted against them in the court of the Special Commissioner.⁹

Godepaul, who took a prominent part in the last rising however remained unapprehended. In May 1833 Mr. Russel was informed that Godepaul was hiding in the jungle near Goomah. An attempt was made to apprehend him, but he made good his escape. However, the members of his family, some of his associates were apprehended.¹⁰ This reminds us of the incident when Jagabandhu Vidyadhara, the leader of the Paik Rebellion, effected his escape from the sure clutches of the military in 1819 leaving behind his family and bag and baggage.

Mr. Russel called upon the mother of minor Goomah *Bisoi* to deliver up Godepaul, but she declined. Martial law was proclaimed in Goomah and forces were sent to capture the *Bisanees* (mother of the minor *Bisoi*) but she effected her escape into jungle.

The *Bisoi* of Jeringhi co-operated with Major Baxter, commanding troops in Parlakimedi at the time, in reducing the neighbouring hill posts.¹¹

Mr. Russel employed the *Bisoi* of Jeringhi to help him to capture Godepaul and Jugely and Dombooroo of Goomah who instigated the *Bisanees* of Goomah to defy the orders of the Commissioner. The *Bisoi* undertook to do the work on the conditions that the then Guma *Bisoi* would be recognised as the Chief of that fort. This condition Mr. Russel agreed to, Dasarathi Jena, a prominent member of the town persons, was engaged to carry on communication with the Jeringhi *Bisoi*.¹²

9. *Ibid*, pp. 44-42.

10. *Ibid*, pp. 48-49.

11. *Ibid*, p. 49.

12. *Ibid*, pp. 50-51.

Jeringhi Bisoi specified a day when he would fulfill his mission. But owing to death of his wife he wanted further extension. When this extended date arrived, he represented that he would require some days more for the accomplishment of his mission. Major Baxter who was in charge of the affair owing to absence of Mr. Russel at Masulipatam in connection with giving evidence before the General court of Martial, could brook no further delay. In his impatience he moved up his forces to village Narayanpur where the delivery of the leaders of the last rising was scheduled to take place. He did not listen to the advices of the Manager about the advisability of waiting for a few days more. He was impatient of waiting any longer. He arrived with his force at Narayanpur on the 17th November, 1833. Finding none there he wanted to contact the Bisoi personally in his fort, and proceeded accordingly. The marching of troops to Narayanpur had naturally roused suspicion in the mind of the Bisoi who, apprehending further troubles, had raised stockades for obstructing the passage of troops. When Major Baxter moved towards the fort the Bisoi took alarm and prepared himself for defence. The advancing troops were fired upon suddenly. Major Baxter was fatally wounded by a shot to which he succumbed ultimately. One Havildar was also wounded. The troops had ultimately to retreat.¹³

Mr. Russel came back to Kimedi on the 29th November, 1833. The Bisois and and Town Peons represented to Captain Campbell who had succeeded Major Baxter that they would help in restoring peace and order if the demands of the peons were satisfied and the gurds at different posts were withdrawn and the Estate was restored to the Raja.¹⁴

But Mr. Russel was determined to effect subjugation of the Bisois and other turbulent elements with a view to establish peace and tranquillity on a permanent basis, that is, to ensure permanent subordination of the chiefs to the British authority. The main obstacle on the way was his ignorance of the roads leading to the hill forts. The proprietor of the neighbouring estate of Kurkavalsah lent some of his peons who were of some help in that respect. Some of the obiestains

13, *Ibid.* pp. 53-54.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

who had been disinterested by the intrigues and interference of powerful *Bisois* to make room for their own nominees also came over to the side of the British. With their help some idea about the hilly regions where military operations were intended to be undertaken could be had,

Russel's plan was to secure first the grains in the plains on which the *Bisois* and their followers depended for their subsistence. That done, the *Bisois* would be faced with starvation. After the produce of Narayana puram and its neighbouring region had been secured, military operations were commenced in December, and the forts of Royagudda and Lawanya Kota were captured and new *Bisois* were appointed. This facilitated further operations against Jeringhi as Rayagudda served as key to the road to that Fort.¹⁵

Operations for the capture of Jeringhi *Bisoi* was started on the 9th January 1834. The full attack was made on the fort on the 18th January when the fort was attacked from the front and the rear. Though the *Bisois* made a combined effort, they could not stand when unexpectedly attacked from two sides. So they retreated into the jungles in the Pedakimedi. Soon after the *Bisois* of Royagudda and Lawanya Kota were captured.¹⁶ They were afterwards hanged in February.

The fall of Jeringhi produced the desired effect on the other Chiefs of hill forts who applied for pardon. Thus eastern part of the Zamindari was secured; only southern and western parts remained to be subjugated. General Tayler and Mr. Russel proceeded with a force to accomplish the task. The insurrectionists offered some resistance against the British forces but they were overwhelmed and driven to jungles.¹⁷

After this the whole situation could be easily brought under control. The most dreaded insurrectionists, Godepaul died while being captured¹⁸. Ram Raju, the *Bisoi* of Jeringhi and Jagannath Raju were captured in May 1834.¹⁹ What is most noteworthy in this connection

15. *Ibid.* pp. 52-53.

16. *Ibid.* pp. 52-54.

17. *Ibid.* pp. 64-65.

18. *Ibid.* pp. 67-68.

is that the *Bisois*, peons and *doratanums* who were so long closely united together to resist the British authority since the very beginning became split up through the characteristic British diplomacy, and many of them became instrumental in capture of their own leaders. Referring to this point Mr. Russel writes, "The tie which had so long tied these turbulent chiefs together was now effectually broken. Those who only a few weeks before had given themselves up to the will and guidance of the captives had been the chief instruments of their fall by driving them from their own country, and the strangers with whom they had sought shelter and who had resisted every former requisition of the public officers for delivery of their persons, had at length been compelled to bend to the authority of the Government. From this period I had it in my power to take any person I desired".¹⁹

Thus ended the great resistance movement of the people of Parlakimedi. For about seventy years they fought tooth and nail against the British authority with a combined purpose and determined will. Of course, the ambitions of the anis to control the management of the estate from 1818-1830 resulted in intrigues and loosening of the bond that united them so long. This was promptly taken advantage of by the British authorities who gradually drove the wedge into the still remaining solidarity deeper and deeper till their mission was fulfilled, and they could win over some of the *Bisois* and *Doras* and employed them against their own people. Thus, the citadel of resistance that had withstood many an onslaught of the British force at last crumbled to to pieces, and the fierce and freedom-loving people were tamed down into docile creatures.

When we compare the resistance movement of Parlakimedi with that of Khurda, we find that the former was a sustained effort based on united force of the *Bisois*, peons and *doratanums* for retaining their own system of government, while the latter was characterised by suddenness of flare up, lack of planning, organisation and unity and want of support from any outside quarter. Hence the actual Paik Rebellion of Khurda could last but for a few months, and could be

19. *Ibid*, p. 70.

20. *Ibid*, p. 70.

easily crushed. Here the leadership was vested in one man. Jagabandhu Vidyadhara, while in case of the Parlakimedi movement, it was jointly undertaken by many.

However that may be, the resistance movement of the Parlakimedi people in the latter half of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century constitute one of the few such organised and sustained movements in India during that period; viewed from this angle, its significance in the annals of the struggle of the Indians against the British authority can, by no means, be underestimated.

Lastly we may note that 15 persons were hanged, twenty-five were sentenced to transportation for life and 103 were sent to Velore as state Prisoner in 1834.²¹

Ghumsar Rebellion 1835-1836:

In Chapter V we have described the incidents leading to capture of Ghumsar Zamindari by Srikara Bhanja after expulsion of Dora Bisoi and Bahubhlendra. He was subsequently recognised as the Zamindar in May 1819 on condition that he would pay Rs. 75,000/- as revenue per annum. From 1819 to 1830 he continued to pay the revenue with regularity, but in 1830-31 he fell into arrear to the extent of Rs. 77,633/-. Unable to pay this up he intimated his wish to retire and make over the zamindari to his son, Dhananjay Bhanj.²²

Dhananjay Bhanja was again reinstated in his zamindari on condition that he would discharge the arrears. Srikara Bhanja retired to Jagannath on a pension of Rs. 8,000/- per annum.²³

But Dhananjay Bhanj failed to pay the revenue regularly and fell into arrears. Consequently in 1835 the Collector, Mr. Stephenson, informed him that unless he cleared up the dues within a month, the Zamindari would be resumed. Dhananjaya-Bhanj failed to pay up his

21. *Ibid*, Appendix, pp. V-VII,
Ganjam District Manual, p. 147.

22. *Ganjam Dist. Manual*, p. 147

23. *Ibid*,

dues and retired to his fort Kallada. The British forces occupied Ghumsar on the 3rd November 1836. Kallada was taken on the 9th November. But when the troops arrived at Galari, the supporters of Zamindar fired on them and opposed their progress. Dhananjaya Bhanja who had fled to the hilly regions, died there, but his partisans continued to fight against the British troops.

Mr. Stephenson had applied to the Government to depute some officer with higher powers to deal with the situation. Mr Russel who had earned a name by putting down the Parlakimedi rebellion was again appointed as Special Commissioner in the beginning of the year 1836. The force in field consisted of 49th and 8th Regiments, 2 Companies of the 21st and detachments of the 3rd and 10th regiments together with 4 howitzers. With these forces, Mr. Russel undertook at once to establish law and order in Ghumsar.

Though Dhananjaya Bhanja was dead, the fight was taken up by his illegitimate brothers, Brundaban Bhanj and Jagannath Bhanj Dora Biso and Bonio Khond. With the commencement of the operations the forts of Kallada, Galeri and Durgaprasad were occupied and the insurrectionists were driven out. They sought shelter in the mountain in the Daspalla and Nayagarh borders.²⁴

In February 1836 the troops under Captain Butler ascended the Ghats and entered the Maliah portion of Ghumsar for capturing Brundabana Bhanja and the family members of the late Zamindar. It was the region inhabited by Khonds, whose chief refused to deliver the refugees. The Khonds then rose in rebellion. They cut off small escorts and even attacked the detachments under European officers.

One detachment of 35 men was attacked by the Khonds while they were escorting prisoners, 13 Indian sepoy and two European officers, Lt. Bromley and Ensign Gibbon, were killed. Pressed by the British forces the insurrectionists had taken refuge in the borders of Daspalla and Nayagarh. The Chiefs of those two estates were compelled to deliver up the rebels taking shelter within the limits of their estates.

Under the circumstances the rebels had no place where they could take refuge with safety. The approach of rainy season saved the situation, as the troops were withdrawn from the Maliahs.²⁵

The operations were again started in November 1806. The maliahs or high lands were again invaded and operations were successfully carried on with little loss. Some of the rebellers took refuge in Baud Estate, the Raja of which informed the authorities of their retreat. The troops from Madras and Bengal moved towards Baud and closed in on the rebellers and captured them. The Khonds sued for peace by making over their leaders to the British authorities. Thus all the leaders of the insurrection were either captured or killed. Dora Bisoi, however, could not be captured, he escaped to Patna Zamindari. New chiefs were appointed in place of Dora Bisoi and his adherents, and he himself was replaced by Sam Bisoi of Hozagodo. Thus the second insurrection of the Paiks, Khonds and Bisois of Ghumsar was put down by the end of November, 1806.²⁶

Raja of Atagada who rendered good service during the insurrection was rewarded by reduction of his annual tribute by three thousand rupees per annum. Grants of lands were made to the former *Sardars*, *Nais* and the *paiks* of Ghumsar for life subject to the condition of their good conduct and faithful discharge of duties.²⁷

SURENDRA SAI'S REBELLION

After the death of Maharaja Sai of Sambalpur his widow, Rani Mohan Kumari assumed the reigns of the government. This was deeply resented by Surendra Sai who had a legal claim on the throne by virtue of his descent in the direct line. So he unfurled the banner of rebellion and was joined by the Gond and Binjhal Zamindars who did not like Rani's administration. British force under Lt Higgins and Captain Wilkinson put down the rebellion. In 1833 Rani Mohan Kumari was deposed and Raja Narayan Simha, a member of the royal family was appointed as the Raja of Sambalpur in her place. The claim of Surendra Sai was overlooked again. This caused much resentment in Surendra

25. *Ibid*, p. 149.

26. *Ibid*, p. 150.

27. *Ibid*.

Sai whose claim to the throne was rather stronger than that of Narayan Simha, and he was far better fitted for administration owing to his popularity and the mental and physical vigour he possessed. Consequently rebellion broke out again. Gonds rose under Balabhadra Deo, a Gond Zamindar of Lakhanpur. The rebellion continued for a long time and the British authorities found it hard to bring the situation under control. Balabhadra Deo was slain in Debigarh. After his death the rising of the Gonds subsided to some extent, but in 1838 Surendra Sai again revived it. He and his brother Udwant Sai and uncle Balaram Singh killed the Zamindar of Rampur in cold blood. So they were arrested, committed to trial and sent to Hazaribag Jail as life prisoners in 1840. Surendra Sai was released from Jail during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and again took up arms against the British.

We have briefly indicated the trend of Sambalpur rebellion under Surendra Sai during the period, 1828-40, as the details of it have been discussed in Volume II of the History of Freedom Movement in Orissa.



List of the prisoners tried by a Court Martial.

Names.	Specific crime proved in evidence.	Sentence.	Date of execution.
1. Kamanalah, Bissoye of Royagudda.	Having been at the head of a body of armed men who fired upon the troops at Royagudda.	Sentenced to death and hanged at Booringee a village belonging to his own fort.	On the 22d Feb. 1834
2. Gopenautha Putnaik, Curnum of Gundahuttycottah.	Having been engaged in the attack made on the detachment at Gaurabundah, para 74.	Sentenced to death, and hanged in the town of Kimedya.	Do. Do.
3. Jogoodoo, Dundassee of Gaurabundah, answering to Talia in the Southern provinces.	Do.	Do.	Do.
4. Ramanah, Bissoye of Lawaniacottah.	Do.	Sentenced to death and hanged at Gaurabundah.	On the 24th Feb. 1834
5. Sowarah Mungaloo of Beemavarum.	Having assisted in the plunder and destruction of Pandaly, and cut the ornament from the nose of one of the female inhabitants.	Sentenced to death. The 1st prisoner was hanged at Pandaly.	On the 15th April "
6. Soura Soonkadoo.		The sentence of the second was commuted to transportation.	
7. Beekaree-karee of Gundahutty.	Having been engaged in the attack on the troops at Gaurabundah.	Sentenced to death and hanged at Gundahutty.	On the 21st April "
8. Yakadasa, peon of Gundahutty.	Having been engaged in the attack on the troops at Gaurabundah.	Sentenced to death but the sentence was commuted to transportation for life beyond sea.	
9. Baupance of do.	Do.		
10. Buddegaudoo of do.	Do.		
11. Panjee Naikoo of do.	Do.		

Names.	Specific crime proved in evidence.	Sentence.	Date of execution.
12. Khuggoo of Jeringhee, the rebell Bissoye's most confidential follower.	The 4th prisoner, the Bissoye of Jeringhee, and a peon named Bauginghee, fired the three first shots at Major Baxter, two of which took effect. The other three were posted with the main body of rebels a few yards further on, whose fire commenced immediately afterwards.	All the prisoners were sentenced to death, but as regarded the 2nd and 3rd the sentence was commuted to transportation for life beyond sea. The 1st and 4th were hanged on the spot, were Major Baxter was shot.	On the 21st April 1834
13. Hunnoo, Pradane of do,			
14. Bagawan, Barado of do.			
15. Dhurbaboo, peon of do.			
16. Ramkistna Buddookomaroo of Coepoorum	The prisoners were engaged in the conflict between the rebels and the party of regulars and peons at Coepoorum (see para 98.) The 4th was the murderer of the Guide Juggunnauthem, (see para 98.) whose head was found in the spot he pointed out, with the hair still on it.	The 1st prisoner was hanged at Coepoorum, and the 4th on the spot where he murdered Juggunnauthem. The sentence of death passed on the others was commuted to transportation.	On the 25th do. do.
17. Ramkistna, Badda Dolo of do.			
18. Poorshotum, peon of do.			
19. Rugghoo dc do.			
20. Sowra Gurnall of Goomdah.	The plunder and destruction of Pandaly and the mutilation of the inhabitants, para 88.	Hanged in chains near Kimeddy.	
21. Sowra Juggadoo, cousin of the above.		Hanged in the entrance of the pass leading to Polkondah.	On the 29 do. do,
22. Madola Borroojah, inhabitant of Jeringhee	Taken in farms in the attack on Jeringhee.	Sentenced to death, but sentence commuted to transportation for life beyond sea.	

23. Seevaram, Bissoye of Wujyagudda.	Harbouring the rebel Bissoye of Jeeringhee,	Sentenced to death, but sentence commuted to transportation for life beyond sea.	On the 4th July 1824.
24. Dussarettee Jennah, town peon of Purlah Kimeddy.	Treason in counselling and aiding in the attack made on Major Baxter's party.	Hanged in the town of Kimeddy.	
25. Boobily Naraidoo, town peon of Purlah Kimeddy.	Harbouring and secreting the proclaimed rebel Godeyapaud.	Hanged in the town of Kimeddy.	Do. Do.
26. Neelakuntee, brother of do.	Do.	Sentence of death commuted to transportation.	
27. Ootansing Ram Rauze Mocassadar of Gowry,	The head and leader of the Doratanams, commanded all the rebel force in the western and southern parts of the Zemindary, and was present at the engagement when Lieutenant Sherrard was killed at Walladab, by the party under his immediate command.	Hanged in chains in his Doratanum village.	On the 24th Do. Do.

G. E. RUSSELL,

Late Commissioner.

CHAPTER IX

RISINGS IN KHONDMALS & ANGUL, 1846-43

The practice of *Mariah* sacrifice was prevalent among the Khonds of the Maliah regions of Ghumsar Chinakimedi, Khondmal of Baud Jeypore, Kalahandi etc. from times immemorial. But this was not known to the British authorities. Mr. Russel came to know of it when the British forces entered the Maliah countries during their Ghumsar campaign of 1836. Thereupon Mr. Russel made a report to the Government of Madras on this practice of human sacrifice prevalent among the Khonds in his report dated the 12th August, 1833. He subsequently submitted another report to the Government on the 11th May 1837 entering fully into the subject. In the second report he wrote, 'No one is more anxious for the discontinuance of the barbarous custom than myself, but I am strongly impressed with the belief that it can be accomplished only by slow and gradual means. x x x The superstitions of ages cannot be eradicated in a day.' Mr. Russel did not advocate application of force for its eradication, whereas Captain Miller proposed employment of troop for eradication of the evil. The Madras Government in their Resolution of the 2nd November, 1837 desired the officer in charge of the District of Ganjam to ascertain the extent to which the practice was prevalent and directed that every inducement should be held out to the Khonds for its prevention.¹ We need not go into details here relating to the steps taken for the suppression of the practice of human sacrifice, or the consequences attendant on such attempts. It would suffice to note here that the authorities kept up a vigilant look out for detection of incidents of human sacrifice and tried to rescue the victims wherever possible. It was however given an organised shape in 1845 when Major Macpherson was appointed as Agent for the suppression of *Mariah* sacrifices under the Act XXI of 1845 with three Assistants, Mr. Cadenhead, Captain Hicks and Lieutenant Mac Vicar. Khond areas in Madras Bengal and Orissa were placed under this Agency; subsequently Baud with Khondmal

1. *History of the operations for the suppression of human sacrifice and female infanticide in the hill tracts of Orissa-1836-1851.*

was transferred to control of the Agent. Major Macpherson was directed to establish the influence and authority of the British Government without making force or intimidation as instruments of his mission; for it was thought that display of armed forces would only cause the Khonds to seek refuge in inaccessible tracts and that troops sent against them would be decimated by the unhealthiness of the climate."

These steps of the Government naturally alarmed the Khonds in Baud and Ghumsar regions leading to trouble of political nature to be described hereinafter.

We may now turn our attention to Angul affairs and see how the steps for suppression of human sacrifices by the Khonds became linked up with the political trouble that had been brewing there since 1831 and ultimately resulted in the upheaval of 1847.

When the British conquered Orissa in 1803, Jarwar Singh Mardaraj Birbar Jugadeb was the Raja of Angul. On his death in 1809, his brother Jay Singh succeeded him. But soon he was murdered. Prithi Singh, step-brother of Jay Singh was strongly suspected to have committed the murder. A Special Commissioner made detailed enquiries into the matter. Somanath Sing, a young boy of 16 years only, who was the son of Gopinath Singh, the elder brother of Prithi Singh, was declared as the legal heir of Jay Singh and put in possession of the Estate in 1813. Prithi Singh died in 1814.² and was Succeeded by Somanath Singh who managed his Estate peacefully till the year 1831 when troubles started. At that time he was in possession of full vigour of his health and spirits and was naturally ambitious to maintain his dignity as a ruler of an Estate as far as possible, as would be evident from the facts stated hereinafter. Mr. Mill, who was Commissioner of Orissa from 1839-47 described him as follows.

"He is an intelligent, though eccentric man but is withal proud and head strong—and the most refractory of all chieftains and the most

2. *Bengal District Gazetteer, Angul*, p. 28.

3. *Ms. Volume* (O, S, A,) No. 12, p. 58.

4. *Ms. Volume*, J.3 (Bd. of Revenue) Enclosure to letter No. 2209, 18-3-15 from the Actg. Secretary to the Superintendent of Tributary Mahals.

likely to come into collision with the Constituted authorities. He is little disposed to obey orders-which clash with his imaginary rights whatever may happen, says Mr. Ricketts, to his fortune and not to his fault,— and as being fortune, is to be met as it best may-bowed to and endured.”⁵ These remarks of the Commissioner Mills give us some idea of the character of Somanath Singh, the Raja of Angul. As said above, he detested being interfered with in his normal activities, or unnecessary imposition of authority on him. We stop here from further commenting on the personality of Somanath Singh until we are acquainted with details of his activities that brought him into collision with the British.

In 1831 he plundered a portion of the territory of the Raja of Daspalla for which he was directed to pay Rs. 1450/-as compensation. But he refused to pay even when threatened with attachment of his estate. The amount could not be realised from him.⁶

In 1837 six persons were cruelly murdered in Angul and the authorities suspected him to have been the instigator. Ricketts called upon the Raja to deliver up the murderer, but he refused to comply. On receiving the report of the Superintendent of the Tributary Mahals the Government authorised him to enquire into the case and seize by force and carry to Cuttack any party resisting his authority.”⁷

These cases are by no means of such proportion or of such abnormal nature as to call for employment of force. Such petty feuds also existed between neighbouring estates. We do not have at our disposal the details of enquiry which led the authorities to hold the Raja of Angul responsible for the damages caused. It might have been done by a party of his subjects without the knowledge of the Raja. However that may be, the Raja was held responsible for the damage. Next, the murders committed was suspected to have been at the instigation of the Raja. In this case also there was no positive grounds for such suspicion. In a regular court of law such proceedings would have resulted in

5. Calcutta Review No. XVII, Vol. IX (1848), p. 200.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Bengal District Gazetteer, Angul*, p. 20.

acquittal for want of positive facts or direct evidence. Despite these weak points in the accusation, the authorities proceeded to employ force for commanding obedience.

These are after all pretexts for military actions against the Raja who had increased the displeasure of the authorities for other reasons. Dora Bisoyi who was the leader of Khonds of Ghumsar and who rose against the British Government in 1836 was suspected to have taken shelter in Angul. His nephew Chakra Bisoi was suspected to be residing in Angul in 1837, and indirectly supported by the Raja.⁸ These two factors led the authorities to look upon the Raja with suspicion and to induce them to impress upon him the superiority of British force with a view to nipping all his activities leading to future resistance in bud.

However that may be, we may now return to the facts. At this period the Khonds of Ghumsar had risen against the British Government, and military operations were going on to suppress them. A military force was marching through Orissa for rendering help to the Special Commissioner, Ghumsar, in his attempts to put down the Khond rising. Mr. Ricketts took advantage of this situation and used that force against the Raja of Angul to compel him to comply with the orders of the Government with regard to compensation to the Raja of Daspalla and delivery of the murderers alluded to before. The Raja of Angul had to pay the compensation and also a fine imposed upon him for disobedience of Government orders.⁹

In the year 1846 Raja Somanath Singh took possession of a village of the Raja of Hindol. The Raja was fined Rs. 3000/- for plundering the village, but he maintained that he had legal right over the village having purchased it from the Raja of Hindol. This, however, was not accepted by the Superintendent of the Tributary Mahals who maintained his previous order. The Raja also did not comply with the order resulting in straining of relation between him and the Government.¹⁰ The Commissioner, Mr. Mills, did not press the matter any further. Referring to the case he wrote, "I was induced to yield the

9. *Calcutta Review*, *op.cit.*, pp. 200-201.

10. *Ibid*, p. 201.

point because the sale and purchase of the portions of Tributary Estates had not been formally and publicly prohibited before the transaction occurred. x x x¹¹

Though the Commissioner had to yield, he still continued to labour under mistrust and suspicion regarding the Raja of Angul. Fresh outbreak of Khond rebellion in Ghumsar in 1846 under the leadership of Chakra Bisoi opened up new opportunities to the authorities to drive home their suspicion against the Raja of Angul.

The Khond rising in Baud-Ghumsar area was not of such magnitude as to be termed a 'rebellion', even in a very limited sense of the term. It was just a temporary show of disaffection and resentment of the Khonds at the Government interference in their religious rites.

Major Macpherson, who assumed the charge of Agent towards the close of 1845 marched in February 1846 to Baud where he met all the Chiefs and informed them of the intention of the Government. The result was that 170 Meriah victims were surrendered to him. But suddenly the Khonds broke off all communications with him and held secret councils. The members opposing the Government interference succeeded convincing the Khonds that the Government intended to assess their lands, subject people to forced labour and punish their leaders for the past sacrifices.

In consequence of this, a large mob assembled before the Agent's camp at Bisipara and demanded restoration of victims. They assured, at the time, that they had no intention of reverting back to the old rite but surrender of victims meant 'unconditional submission to its threatened oppressions and to loss of all their rights x x x.' Macpherson had to make over the victims to the Raja of Baud on solemn promise that they would be redelivered to the Government. Macpherson then 'retired across the Ghumsar border, where the Khonds of Baud subsequently attacked him on two occasions and did their best to incite the Ghumsar tribes to revolt'.

'In December 1846 a rebellion broke out in Ghumsar headed by Chakra Bisoi and troops were hurried to the front the command being given to Brigadier General Dyce x x x.' 'With exception of a few skirmishes, there was no regular fighting, the Khonds flying into the jungle on the approach of armed forces. The rebellion was soon quelled.'¹²

The authorities, however, believed that the rising was due to combined efforts of the Baud-Khond leader, Nabaghana Kahar and Chakra Bisoi, and that the Raja of Angul was secretly aiding and abetting them¹³. This suspicion against the Raja of Angul gradually became deep rooted¹⁴ despite the fact that there was no positive grounds for such a belief.

It is interesting to note here the views of Brigadier General Dyce about the incursion of the Khonds and the behaviour of the Agent, Captain Macpherson and his Assistants¹⁵. He alleged that the people manifested extreme hatred towards Captain Macpherson and his establishment on account of their oppressive conduct. They constantly made demands on them for coolies and supplies. He felt convinced that the rising of the people was not directed against the Government but against the local authorities. Captain Macpherson followed no conciliatory measure but adopted coercive measures, like burning, plundering, destruction of grains etc. He further alleged, 'efforts have been made to embroil the Wngool Rajah (not in the Agent's Jurisdiction) with the Government and to fix upon him the odium of all the recent commotions and disturbances'. Dyce regarded the Khond insurrections as directed not against the Government but against the local authorities placed over them. He further alleged, 'not only has the character of the disturbance been misrepresented and exaggerated and a most unnecessary alarm created, but a large fore has been drawn up to

12. *Bengal District Gazetteer, Angul*, p. 29.

13. Commissioner to Brigadier General Dyce, dated 31-3-1847.

14. From G. A. Buxby, Secretary to the Government of India to F. J. Halliday, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated 3-7-1847.

15. Dyce to Adjutant General of the Army, Fort St. George, dated 20-3-1847.

this frontier and scattered over the disturbed district without either order or system by the Agent and his assistants and employed under their immediate orders in marching about the country and committing acts disgraceful alike to the character of the army, and of the Government x x x.' He further said, 'I have to observe that the pacification of these districts, the apprehension of Chokra Bisaye and the entire submission of all parties at present in opposition to the locally constituted authorities is not only not likely to, but never will in my opinion be affected by Captain Macpherson and his assistants from the cause I have already noticed.'

He finally prayed that he be either relieved 'from the anomalous and painful position' 'or be at once vested with full powers to carry out the objects of Government by adoption of such means' as he might find it necessary to pursue.

These remarks of Brigadier General Dyce are extremely significant in as much as they show clearly that the Khond insurrection of 1846-47 in Ghumsar-Baud area was more attributable to the oppression and maladministration of the Agent and his assistants than to fomentations of Chakra Bisoi and Nabaghan Kahar, the two Khond leaders. It further shows that the Raja of Angul was unnecessarily dragged into the affair and was accused or suspected of complicity with the alleged leaders of the insurrection.

In response to the above letter of Brigadier General Dyce, the Government authorised him to take upon himself "the complete political authority in the whole of the territory formerly under the control of the Agent in the Hills of Orissa x x x.". They also intimated that it was not the intention of the Government of India any longer to employ Captain Macpherson in his last office and Mr. Dyce was requested to carry on his duties until other arrangements were made.¹⁶ Accordingly, Colonel Campbell was appointed as the Agent in place of Capt. Macpherson.¹⁷

Col. Campbell followed a more conciliatory policy in accordance with the desires of the Government as contained in the letter quoted

16. Bushby to Dyce, dated 27-3-1847.

17. *Bengal District Gazetteer*, Angul, p. 29.

above (f. n, 16) wherein it was stated, "It was the object of the Government to carry out the measure of inducing the Khonds to abandon a savage and inhuman rite gradually by measures of conciliation and persuasion and not by recourse to force and violence.' The result of Campbell's exertions to induce the Khonds to abandon the practice and submit to the Government in the Baud area are described by him in the following words.

"With one or two exceptions, every influential man in Baud has completely submitted to the will of the Government, pledged themselves by swearing in their most solemn manner on a tiger skin and some earth hence forth to abstain from the performance of Meriah, and in token of their admission and obedience, delivered 235 victims, which included all those which were redelivered in 1846 and had not been sacrificed."¹⁸

Thus ended the Khond rebellion, which, as we have seen, is more a natural outcome of the policy of oppression and terrorisation of the local authorities than that of political intrigues or incitement of some leaders as was originally suspected in the official circle. But this suspicion did not die out; it continued to work steadily upwards till the Raja of Angul was completely engulfed in it, as we would see from the course of events discussed hereinafter.

Now we shall briefly trace out the incidents leading to use of force against the Raja of Angul and his ultimate deposition for a proper appraisal of the situation by the readers.

We have already described how the Raja of Angul vigorously opposed the imposition of a fine of Rs. 3000/ on him for his occupation of a village of the Raja of Hindol and how the Commissioner had to yield to him. But the matter did not end there. In the beginning of 1847, Capt. Macpherson and his Assistant, Cadenhead reported that the Raja of Angul had aided Nabaghana Kabar in his attack on Macpherson's party at Kusumgarh. On the 27th February 1847, two Kondh villages in the Daspalla Estate, Kuturi and Marada, were plundered and

burnt by a party not identified. But Cadenhead again reported to the Commissioner that the party was deputed by the Raja of Angul.¹⁹ Thus these reports deepened the suspicion of the Commissioner against the Raja of Angul, though there was no direct evidence to prove the allegation.

In March, 1847 Capt. Macpherson informed the Commissioner that Nabaghana Kahar was resisting the British forces and that Cadenhead had destroyed some of his strongholds the defence of which was aided by the forces of Angul and Athamalik²⁰. The Raja of Angul in his memorandum dated the 4th March 1847, submitted that the depredations of Nabaghana Kahar was due to imprisonment of his son by Capt. Macpherson. He further said that he was ready to help in the attempt to apprehend Nabaghana and Chakra Bisoi.

Despite those assurances on the part of the Raja of Angul, Capt. Macpherson reported to the Bengal Government that on 19-2-1847 Cadenhead's party was attacked by Nabaghana Kahar who was supported by 300 paiks of Angul, and on 22nd February, 1847, a similar clash occurred. He accused that the Raja of Angul was exciting the Khonds.²¹

The Superintendent of Tributary Mehals in his letter to the Secretary to the Bengal Government (dated nil), informed that the Raja of Angul had sent him words to the effect that he would produce the parties responsible for disturbances in Baud and Ghumsar provided troops were withdrawn and Bir Kahar, son of Nabaghana Kahar, and Baishnab were released. The Superintendent expressed conviction that the insurrection was mainly being guided by the counsel and direction of the Raja of Angul.

There are voluminous correspondences on the subject containing but little substance in them. In those correspondences the Raja has been charged with complicity with the insurgents, while the Raja has

19. Patnaik, *Raja Somanath Simha Jagu 'eb* (in Oriya) pp. 31-33, and Dunlop to Gouldsbury, 20-3-1847.

Dunlop to Gouldsbury, 5-3-1847.

20. Macpherson to the Secretary.

21. Macpherson to the Secretary, Bengal Government, 5-8-1847

denied the charges. The Government was not in a sure position as to the actual guilt of the Raja. Some times they believed that there were no grounds against the Raja, and again in the next moment, they thought that the Raja was really guilty. We will only deal with a few of such instances to show how the proceedings of the Government were based more on imaginary than actual facts.

Government directed the Commissioner to observe utmost caution in dealing with the accusation preferred against the Raja of Angul to whom the fullest opportunities should be offered of clearing himself from imputation cast upon him, while the charges against him are impartially investigated.²²

The Commissioner reported to Brigadier General Dyce that there was 'little room for doubt that the proceedings of some of their chiefs as Chakra Bisoi, Nabagban Khourd have been at least countenanced by the Raja of Angul' and that Cadenhead, Principal Assistant to the Agent, had openly accused the Raja of Angul of having given aid of his troops to Nabaghana Kahar in opposing the Government forces. He further reported that Raja denied the imputations in strongest terms and protested that his enemies were falsely implicating him in the matter. The Raja avoided presenting himself before the Commissioner on the grounds of illness and thus did not avail himself of the opportunity to clear himself of the imputations. It is curious to note how he indirectly justified the Raja's conduct in the same breath when he wrote, 'The imprisonment by Captain Macpherson of Beer Khouro who surrendered himself by advice of Angool Rajah on the faith of safe conduct which he imagined had been guaranteed to him by my predecessor, has created a strong feeling in the Rajah's mind against the officers of the Agency, which (rude and uncivilised as he is) may have justified him in his opinion in the course which he is said to have adopted'²³.

Captain Dunlop who was sent to enquire into the allegations of complicity of the Raja of Angul in the burning and plundering of two

22. Bushby to Gouldsbury, 27-8-1947.

23. Commissioner to Dyce. 31-3-1847.

villages in Daspalla reported that the crime was attributable to the people of Angul as far as the evidence of the inhabitants could lead, but since the matter was first reported to Col. Grant, instead of the Raja of Daspalla, he thought that no blame could be attached to the people of Angul.²⁴

Captain Dunlop proceeded to Angul and was attended upon by the Raja. On the basis of Captain Dunlop's enquiry report, Gouldsbury wrote to the Government that the Raja was 'evincing sincerity of his desire to clear himself from the imputations cast on him'. The Commissioner wrote that there was nothing to show that the *Paiks* of the Raja of Angul committed any crime of aggression at Kusumgarh in Baud. The second charge that the people of the Raja burnt the two villages in Daspalla, the Commissioner opined, 'must fall to the ground' as the witnesses examined by Captain Dunlop declared their inability to identify the perpetrators. He recommended to the Government to view with leniency the conduct of the Raja in view of the above facts and also that the Raja was placed in a difficult position by imprisonment of Bir Khuro and was considered as treacherous by his guardian.

He further recommended, "But as proof of the accusations is altogether wanting, Justice demands for the Raja what clemency probably have conceded to him, viz., release from the charges."²⁵

But the Governor General did not accept the view of the Commissioner. He thought that there were strong grounds for suspecting the Raja of Angul to have been guilty of disloyalty to the state in countenancing the opposition of rebels to the authorities of the Government, if not in employing his own troops in acts of hostility or outrage.²⁶

While writing to Lt. Col. Campbell the Commissioner said that the charge of attack on two Daspalla villages against the Raja of Angul had

24. Capt. Dunlop to Gouldsbury, 1-1-1847.

25. Gouldsbury to the Secretary to the Government, 13-4-1847.

26. Bushby to Halliday, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 3-7-1847.

not been proved, and that there was no positive evidence that the Raja was in contact with Chakra Bisoi and he had not sufficient proof on that head to frame charge against the Raja.²⁷ He also reported to the Government to the same effect.

The Commissioner again reported to the Government that the the family Chakra Bisoi were living in one of the hill villages called Balling. Raja was also constructing two new forts other than the original one.²⁸

Gouldsbury in his letters of the 21st September, 1847, and 24th September, 1847, informed the Secretary to the Government that the Raja of Angul had fully made up his mind to oppose the Government and that his force consisted of 6 to 7 thousand soldiers which could be controlled by a force of two regiments of Native Infantry and a full company of artillery with Howitzers.

The Commissioner in his letter to the Government of 1-11-1847(?) forwarding a translation of Sk. Karim Bux of the date 28th October, 1847, with a translation of the reply of the Raja about his attendance at Cuttack with witnesses in the Kusumgarh case informed that the Raja could not be prevailed upon to comply with the Government orders. The Raja, however, had promised to produce the witnesses before any officer deputed to Angul. The Commissioner added that Raja's unwillingness to send witness to Cuttack was due to the fact that on a former occasion a witness who was assured of fair treatment was placed in confinement. The Commissioner enquired whether under such circumstances it would be expedient to insist upon their being sent in. Commissioner further wrote that he did not expect any commission of hostility by the Raja of Angul and hoped that Raja may be restrained from creating any disturbance in future if vigilance was maintained. He further opined, 'The Raja's alleged implication in the Khond disturbances being still a matter of conjecture I apprehend that without more decided proof than we at present possess, he can not of justices be proceeded against on that account.' He also informed that there were

27. Gouldsbury to Campbell, 6-9-1847.

28. Commissioner to Secretary, 20-8-1847,

two parties in Angul, one headed by Krupasindhu Gadnaik instigating the Raja against the Government and the other by the Raja's son urging loyalty to the Government. Raja had also written that on account of his failing health he had empowered his son to act for him. The Commissioner thought, it was a good sign.²⁹

Sk. Karim Bux who was sent to deliver the letter of the Commissioner to the Raja said in his statement that the Raja denied the accusation of disobedience of any order. The Raja said, he had always submitted to the Government orders, discharged his tribute regularly and had two *muktears* in attendance for the purpose of executing orders promptly. He said that he had been falsely blamed by his enemies. He was fully conscious of the consequences of a fight with the British, he had not collected any arms or ammunition or forces, and if desired, it might be inspected. Sk. Karim Bux corroborated Raja's statement about collection of arms and forces after due enquiry and opined that from his disposition Raja did not appear to be inclined to take up arms,

Despite these facts the Government were determined to bring the Raja down on his knees, or to depose him in the alternative.

The trend and tone of letters show that no consideration of justice, or propriety weighed with them in their determination to accomplish their wish. Accordingly the Government directed the Commissioner to summon the Raja of Angul to Cuttack insisting on his bringing in the 3 witnesses whose attendance was required by Mr. Grant. The Raja was further to be informed that after he had obeyed the Government order of his personal attendance at Cuttack with the witnesses, such punishment would be determined as the Government might think proper to inflict for his late disobedience in the matter of submitting the witnesses and his contumacy and disloyalty. A date was to be fixed within which the Raja was to comply with the order on the expiry of which he would be declared a Public Rebel, if he did not turn up with witnesses. Raja was to be further informed that he was to remain at Cuttack for full investigation into his conduct with regard to the two charges, viz., aiding and abetting Nabaghana Kahar and plunder of two villages in Daspalla. The Commissioner was further

29. Gouldsbury to Bushby, 1.11-1847.

directed to inform the Raja that his forts would be dismantled and his forces would be reduced. The Commissioner was also informed that a sufficient force had been ordered to be concentrated near Berhampore and Russulkonda for effecting the orders of the Government if needed.³⁰

In the face of the recommendations of the Commissioner, the officer on the spot and in the full knowledge of things, for conciliatory policy, specially in view of the facts that the Raja had no specific authenticated charges against him, the favourable report of the envoy sent to the Raja, and Raja's profession of loyalty, one cannot imagine what made the Government to take such a stiff attitude which transcended the bounds of reason and propriety. One cannot but term this attitude as an unreasonable whim. The whole thing sounds like the famous Tiger and Lamb story.

However that may be, things moved fast hereafter and headed towards the final show. The report of Karim Bux of 30th November, 1847, clearly shows that Raja had known it for certain that the storm was coming on and there was no escape from it.

There is another curious thing to be noted in this connection. Lokanath Singh Gambhir Samanta, the son of the Raja of Angul made a statement before the Commissioner on the 2nd January, 1848, relating to the Angul affairs. He did not pull on well with his father, specially he did not like his father's attitude of independence, as he knew, it would ultimately lead to consequences prejudicial to his future prospects. When he found that his father was not bending, he escaped from Angul on the 29th December 1847, and met the Commissioner who had given a hint about this to the Government in his letter dated the 1st November, 1847.

Lokanath Singh Gambhir Samanta named Krupasindhu Gadnaik, Kumar Guru, Haricharan Singh and 9 others as giving his father bad counsels. They instigated him against the Government. He also said that a letter was written to Gopinath Vidyadhara for joining them against the Government. Messages were also sent to other Rajas. As

30. Bush by to Gouldsbury, 6-11-1847.

for the reason of not sending the witnesses required by the Government he said, Krupasindhu Gadoaik advised his father not to send them, as he was afraid, they might reveal his intrigues against the Government. He however said that Paramananda Chamupati and Kamal Lochan Bebartā were good persons. He further revealed that though Angul paiks about, 700 in number, with guns had gone to Kusumgarh under Krupasindhu Gadnaik to aid the Khonds, they did not take any part, as he threatened to write to the Commissioner. He also stated that as he opposed his father he was kept under guard, so, he made his escape with a view to submit to the Government before any thing happened,

The facts stated must be accepted with a grain of salt. Gambhir Samanta was evidently anxious to secure the patronage of the authorities so that his claim to the estate might not be overlooked for the fault of his father. The statement made by him leads one to think that he had said such things as would win the favour of the authorities. As such, not much reliance can be placed on it about its authenticity.

After this the British forces consisting of two regiments of Madras Native Infantry and the right wing of a third with the full complement of artillery marched towards Angul on the 15th January, 1848. After passing through Athagarh, Dhenkanal and Hindol, they reached the village Huttur on the border of Angul on the 20th November. About two miles ahead they came across a stockade with nobody to defend it. On the 22nd November the forces crossed into Angul estate. From there they proceeded twelve miles inside the State upto village Kinda without any opposition. On the 23rd they marched to Pokutgia, about ten miles from Kinda. From there the party, excepting the 29th Regiment left at the place, started for the Kuruthputtergarh. The fort was surprised and taken without any fighting or any casualty on either side. All the soldiers of the Raja including the Commander, Krupasindhu Gadnaik fled away in confusion. The fort was dismantled.

Then the forces proceeded to Krushnachakragarh. There they found the place deserted. So it was taken without any effort. Thus ended the Angul campaign without even a petty skirmish.

Raja was captured on the 1st February, 1848, through the help of the Raja of Bamra and the *diwan* of the Raja of Sambalpur. On the 9th February, Krupasindhu Gadnaik and other *Sardars* were also captured.⁸¹

The Government in their Resolution dated the 16th September, 1848 declared the estate confiscated to the Government; Raja was ordered to be sent to Hazaribag as State Prisoner for life. Lands yielding Rs. 2900/- were set apart for the use of the Ranis and other female relations of the Raja. An allowance of Rs. 340/- per month was sanctioned for the Raja and his attendants in captivity. Lokanath Singh was granted an allowance of Rs. 150/- p. m. Krupasindhu Gadnaik, Parmananda Champati, Gour Singh and Lochan Debata were sentenced to life imprisonment, while nine other *Sardars* were sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. The Commissioner recommended that the former should be sent to Alipur Jail and the latter to Patna Jail.

Reviewing the whole situation one has a curious feeling that the whole affair was like a tempest over a tea pot. The two charges against the Raja were not of such serious nature as to call for such drastic steps or so much of alertness. These charges, after all, had never been proved or, warranted by positive facts. Raja also did not come into direct clash with the British authority. Jagabandhu Vidyadhara who actually fought against the British could be pardoned, but the Raja of Angul who did nothing was sentenced to life imprisonment on alleged rebellious conduct. Queer is the dispensation of Justice in this instance, and one can not but think that the authorities followed the policy of 'giving the dog a bad name and hang it'.

81. Bengal District Gazetteer, Appendix.

82. Gouldsbury to Secretray to the Government of Bengal, 8.

CHAPTER—X

ORISSA ON THE EVE OF THE MUTINY.

we now enter into the last phase of resistance movement in Orissa prior to the Indian Mutiny of 1857. No event of much significance as considered from the point of view of resistance movement did occur during the period from 1840-1857. The people of the plains, as we had occasion to point out before, remained always passive spectators of the fight their brothers in the hilly regions were carrying on. They hardly joined in any of such fights, even indirectly, as have been described in the previous Chapters. Thus British authority in the plains of Orissa had been firmly established from the beginning of their conquest. Only a few among the Rajas and zamindars of Orissa and their followers who still retained in them the traces of ancient martial spirit of their predecessors did not calmly submit to the British authority. They defied any imposition of authority on them and rose in arms whenever opportunity afforded. But they could do little to shake the British power with well equipped and disciplined army and vast resources. Thus, the Rajas, zamindars and their followers, *bisois*, *dalbeheras*, *dalais* and *paiks* took up arms against the British not to knock them out of their position, but as a measure of making strong protest against the policies of the authorities. In some cases they could make the authorities yield to their wishes, while, sometimes they had to forfeit claims to all they had even their lives, on some occasions. But still they were undaunted and continued in their attitude of defiance and insubordination to wrongs imposed upon them. But lack of organisation, want of co-operation of the people in general, lack of fighting equipments and material resources stood on the way of any effective and sustained resistance to the British authority. Gradually their spirit began waning; they became tired of hide-and-seek plays with authorities at grave risks to their life and property, and, so, one by one, the resisters surrendered to the inevitable and became tamed into docile and lawabiding subjects.

Many of the leaders of such resistance-campaigns had to suffer death, or were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. These actions of the authorities did a lot in calming down the effervescence of the

people. The military operations of the British coupled with their characteristic diplomacy and the policy of divide-and-rule cleared the field of all major unruly elements, and toned down their followers. Thus, Orissa, on the eve of the Great Indian Mutiny, was calm and quiet excepting a little unrest among the Khonds of Ghumsar and Baud and the Savaras of Parlakimedi.

The remarks of E. A. Samuells, the Commissioner of Cuttack in 1855 relating to the character of the people of Orissa is noteworthy. He says, 'The long strip of sea coast which forms the Cuttack Division is inhabited by a race eminently pacific. None of the disturbances which have from time to time agitated the province since we have obtained the possession of it, have extended to them.'¹ This certificate of the pacific nature of the people of coastal plains of Orissa by a Commissioner of the Orissa Division leaves little room for doubting the fact that the people of the plains never took part in any major agitation directly or indirectly.

Now we may turn our attention to Chakra Bisoi who had resisted all attempts of the authorities to capture him since 1837 when his uncle Dora Bisoi was arrested. His dominating influence among the Khonds was a matter of dread to the authorities. The British wrath on the Raja of Angul was mainly inspired by the suspicion that the Raja was actively supporting Chakra Bisoi who had been proclaimed a rebel since the Khond rising in Ghumsar in 1846,

A village, Toolasinghee in Ghumsar, was attacked and plundered by some people in May, 1854. The Magistrate of Ganjam suspected that it was done by Chakra Bisoi or his followers. So he wrote to the Commissioner of Cuttack requesting him to take steps for his apprehension. In reply, the Commissioner wrote that Chakra Bisoi was living in Baud near Bir Kahar's place since the confiscation of Angul. He did not think that the crime was committed by Chakra Bisoi whose name was implicated in the affair, because he happened to be a rebel, and the real culprit could not be apprehended or identified. However, the Commissioner assured the Magistrate of Ganjam that he had asked the

1. Samuells to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, 13-10-1855.

Raja of Baud to be on the look out for Chakra Bisoi. He had also warned Bir Kahar against continuing protection of Chakra Bisoi. He expressed the inexpediency of sending a force to arrest Chakra Bisoi who would retreat to depth of jungles rendering his capture impossible, specially as the Khonds would not betray anything against him.²

The Commissioner also informed the Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department of the incident to that effect. He opined therein that the crime was probably committed by some famine-stricken people of Ghumsar and the name of Chakra Bisoi was drawn into the affair simply because he was a rebel connected with Khond insurrections in that area.³

In 1855-56 there was a slight upheaval among the Khonds of Ghumsar and it was naturally attributed to Chakra Bisoi. It was said that he gained over the Khonds by promising them revival of the Mariah rite which the Agent had put a stop to.⁴ This rising was immediately suppressed without any difficulty.

There was also a rising among the Khonds of Baud at the same time. British force was sent against the Khonds, and order was restored under the direction of Mr. Samuells, the Commissioner of Cuttack and the Superintendent of the Tributary Mahals. In the same year (1856) proclamation was issued annexing Khondmals to the British territory.⁵ Dinabandhu Puttnaik was appointed as *tahasildar* under the Superintendent of the Tributary Mahals.

After these incidents Chakra Bisoi took refuge in the depth of the forest at Dakangi close to Phulbani in Khondmals. As the authorities were after him he had to move from place to place to elude their grasp. In March, 1856 he was reported to be in Athgaon in Patna estate in the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Chotanagpur. Mr. Mac Donald, Asst. to the Governor's Agent in Ghumsar, who could not personally

2. Samuells to Magistrate of Ganjam, 26-6-1854.

3. Samuells to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 30-6-1854.

4. *Ganjam District Manual*, p. 157.

5. *Bengal District Gazetteer, Angul*, p. 157.

proceed to that area, accepted the offer of Dinabandhu Pattnaik, Tahsildar of Khondmals, to make an expedition to capture Chakra Bisoi. Dinabandhu proceeded to Athagaon with a force of seventy soldiers. Chakra Bisoi however managed to escape, but his principal Assistant, Bhutia Sardar together with another Sardar and other followers with their families were captured. A reward of 200 rupees was distributed among the soldiers.⁶

Among those captured by Dinabandhu Pattnaik was a mendicant who was supposed to be Chakra Bisoi. But he was found out to be a different man. Dinabandhu Pattnaik was again entrusted with the task of hunting out Chakra Bisoi.⁷

In 1156-57 the Savaras of Parlakimedi rose in rebellion. They were led by Radhakrushna Dandasena. 50 villages of Parlakimedi were plundered and burnt. Captain Wilson who was entrusted with suppression of the rebellion entered deep into the forest and suppressed the rising with the assistance of *Bisois* and *Doras*. Dandasena was arrested and was afterwards hanged in 1857.⁸ Chakra Bisoi was reported to have joined hands with Dandasena in the rebellion.⁹ Chakra Bisoi however continued to remain at large and all attempts to apprehend him failed. His later activities in connection with the rebellion of the Kuttia Khonds in 1857 and the attack on the Agent's Camp at Oorladoni will be described in the next volume.

These are the few incidents that disturbed the peace from 1848 to 1856, but these are all of minor type requiring small scale operations, and they were suppressed with no difficulty. What is note-worthy in these operations was that the erstwhile rebels, the *Bisois* and *doras*, rendered assistance to the Government in suppression of these risings. This provides one more instance of the effectiveness of the British policy of divide-and-rule. The *bisois* and *doras* who fought so hard against the

6. Commissioner, Cuttack to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 25-3-1856.

7. Commissioner, Cuttack to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 3-3-1856.

8. *Ganjam District Manual*, p. 157.

9. Commissioner, Cuttack to Secretary, Bengal Government, 18-6-1856.

British for more than half a century could be tamed down to be used as instruments in the suppression of the risings of their own brethren. This policy, the British stuck to throughout their early campaigns and could use it as the most effective weapon in conquering their enemies.

Before finally closing the Chapter, with that, this volume, we may just look back, to see how Orissa reacted to the imposition of British rule on it.

The British had an easy and smooth march into Orissa, almost without any opposition from either the Marathas or the Orissan people. Of course, we refer here to the events of conquest of Northern Orissa in 1803. The Maratha officers had been gained over, and the Orissan Chiefs, like those Mayurbhanj, Khurda etc., had been effectively tackled before-hand to grant an easy access through their territory. Other Chiefs remained passive spectators. There was no plan or thought of resistance. They probably waited to see how the change would effect them. Most of them found, the change was not for the worse, so they kept quiet. This suited the British diplomancy. They wanted to keep friendly relation with all, in the beginning, excepting those from whom any danger was expected. Elimination of such elements was their first concern.

The eyes of the British first fell on the Raja of Khurda for political reasons. He was regarded, in theory at least, as the head of the Orissan Chiefs who attached a special reverence to that family on account of its connection with Lord Jagannath. So the British were afraid that he could effectively organise a formidable resistance at any time, if circumstances favoured. He was therefore removed at once on a flimsy pretext. The keen military foresight of Colonel Harcourt could visualise the situation, and he actually led the Raja to rise against the British by refusing to restore to him the four parganas of Serai, Rahang, Chabiskud and Lembai and the town of Puri, which he had promised in lieu of safe passage to the British troops through Khurda. This object achieved, Harcourt turned his attention to the Rajas of Kanika and Kujanga who were dubbed as conspirators. As a matter of fact, the British had an old grudge against the Rajas of Kanika and Kujang who had interfered with their trade along the coast during the Maratha period. Further, the estates being situated on the coast were vulnerable to

infiltration by other European powers hostile to the British. So they were the next targets to be attacked for ensuring safety of the British power in Orissa.

Then we pass on to the Paik Rebellion of Khurda. The authorities were perfectly aware of the consequence that would follow resumption of lands of the *paiks*. They had bitter experience of the reaction of the *paiks* of Midnapore, when their lands were resumed in 1799. How can we expect that they inadvertently repeated the mistake in 1804, before the effects of the Paik Rebellion of Midnapore had hardly died out. In the circumstances, we are led to assume that the authorities did manipulate, directly or indirectly, a *paik* insurrection so that they might crush for ever the spirit of those militant people in the beginning to eliminate all future dangers from that quarter. As we have seen, they perfectly succeeded in this attempt; the *paiks* rose and were crushed for ever. Then they were constituted into Paik Company, and harnessed to crush those that still strived to resist. Viewed from this angle, we can not but be surprised when we consider with what foresight Colonel Harcourt had manoeuvred things and how things came to pass as he desired. The rising of the Rajas of Khurda, Kujang Kanika and of the *paiks* of Khurda are, therefore, not sportsaneous ones, but were natural effects of shrewd and subtle political manoeuvring.

When we turn to the Ganjam area, we note the same purpose underlying the policy of the British authorities. They deliberately did things in most cases to which the *zamindars*, *bisois* or their followers would react violently. That would afford them opportunity to crush the militant spirits. They had well gauged the strength of the *Zamindars*, and knew well enough that they could do little harm. So they did not fear playing with fire for a while in order to put it out for ever. In fact, throughout the campaigns the loss of British life was negligible. The native infantry were employed to put down their own brethren.

These subtle proceedings were conducted in so subtle ways, and the records were prepared in such a way as to leave no trace of this under-current of the British Policy. Very few important secret records that contained the minutes of the highest authorities on formulation of such policies have come down to us. Even the ordinary British administrators did not know how things had been shaped to take a definite course.

The Angul case, about which we have already discussed, is an instance of how British policy was guided by political expediency than by actual facts. It also shows clearly that even the Commissioner was not aware of the move of the Government. Angul constituted a strategic position in the midst of the Orissan estates like, Dhenkanal Baud, Daspalla, Keonjhar etc. Sambalpur in the northwestern part was already under the British control, though the puppet Narayan Singh was on the throne. They knew that the State would lapse to the British after the childless king. So the neighbouring estates of Gangpur Patna, etc. could be controlled from there. Thus acquisition of Angul was a political necessity, hence it had to be conquered, no matter, whether Angul Raja had any fault or not.

Viewed from this angle, we can judge the course of events better than what they appear to us at the first sight.

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